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Abstract
Inter-linkages between suppliers and customers are a channel by which
shocks can spread between firms. When firms buy and sell intermediate
goods from one another, they may rely on each other for the supply of
input goods or for cash-flow from sales. This is a problem because finan-
cially distressed suppliers can pose significant risk to the economic activity
of customers that rely on them for goods and services. A case in point is
the heavy loss suffered by General Motors when its equipment and parts
supplier Delphi went on strike in 1998. Vice-versa, distressed customers
can negatively impact suppliers’ business operations.
Real economic activities are highly related to major stock pricing factors.
The main hypothesis of this thesis is that shocks to a firm’s direct and
indirect suppliers and customers influence its stock price. There is a large
amount of research addressing how shocks spread between international
financial markets and asset classes influence stock prices during financial
crises (financial contagion). Past research has identified the macroeconomic
conditions and the types of linkages between markets and assets that make
a country or market vulnerable to financial contagion.
Little is known, however, about how shocks spread via economic linkages
influence firm-level stock returns. Studies find that significant movements
in a firm’s stock price forecast subsequent movements in the stock price
of its major suppliers. Several questions remain open, however, regarding
how shocks spread via economic linkages influence stock returns, such as:
how shocks spread via economic linkages influence return volatility and cor-
relation; what characteristics of economic linkages (e.g. the degree or the
concentration of linkage) are most important in the process of contagion;
and whether the spread of shocks via economic linkages increases during
recessions.
The main objective of this thesis is to increase knowledge of how economic
linkages between firms influence stock returns. My approach is to exam-
ine how a firm’s economic linkages influence three dimensions of its stock
returns: volatility, pairwise correlation between linked firms’ returns and
the cross-sectional distribution of average returns. The research questions
addressed are:
1. How does the structure of a firm’s economic linkages influence the
volatility of its stock returns?
2. How do shocks transmitted via economic linkages increase correlation
between linked firms’ returns?
3. How do shocks transmitted via economic linkages affect average re-
turns, cross-sectionally and over time?
For each dimension of stock returns (volatility, pairwise correlation and
average returns) I examine what characteristics of economic linkages are
most influential, and whether the influence of economic linkages increases
in recessions.
I develop a theoretical model explaining how the spread of cash-flow shocks
via economic linkages between firms influences the volatility, pairwise cor-
relation and average level of stock returns. The reduced form of the the-
oretical model corresponds to a factor model of stock returns (based on
Arbitrage Pricing Theory), with an additional factor added to allow for
non-diversifiable risk created by economic linkages. This model describes
the relationship between economic linkages and return volatility, pairwise
correlation and average returns.
To answer the first research question, I apply the Lindeberg-Feller theorem
to derive an explicit relationship between a firm’s stock return volatility
and the structure of its linkages to other firms. I prove that when the
distribution a firm’s economic linkages is heavy-tailed (such that it has an
extremely high degree of economic linkage to a few firms and a far lower
degree of economic linkage to all others), shocks to the firm’s key suppliers
and/or customers can significantly influence its return volatility. Intu-
itively, shocks to the most connected suppliers and/or customers are not
offset by shocks to less connected suppliers and/or customers, so they can
significantly influence a firm’s cash-flow and therefore stock returns. Monte
Carlo simulations confirm that shocks transmitted via economic linkages
are diversified away at rate much slower than the 1√
N
rate implied by the
law of large numbers in many common supply chain structures. In these
‘concentrated’ supply chain structures, shocks transmitted via economic
linkages can create portfolio return volatility in excess of that explained by
systematic risk factors, even in large portfolios.
To answer the second and third research questions, I use monthly stock re-
turn data and annual accounting data on the major customers of all listed
US firms between 1990 and 2010 from the CRSP/Compustat database. To
investigate how shocks transmitted via economic linkages influence corre-
lation between linked firms’ returns, I test the hypothesis that an increase
in the degree of linkage between two firms increases the pairwise correla-
tion between their stock returns. First, I adapt correlation-based tests of
contagion to test whether pairwise return correlation is higher when two
firms are linked than when they are not linked. Second, I develop mea-
sures of the strength of pairwise linkage between firms (using principles
from network theory and economic input-output modeling). I then esti-
mate regressions of firm-pairs’ return correlation against the strength of
their linkage and a number of controls (such as industry-pair fixed-effects
and credit usage along the supply chain). The regression results show that
an increase in the economic linkage between two firms is associated with
increased correlation between their stock returns. Linked firms’ returns are
more correlated when credit is involved in the supplier-customer relation-
ship and in recessions, implying that it is harder to replace a supplier or
customer in these situations.
Finally, I test whether shocks spread via economic linkages influence aver-
age stock returns over and above other factors that have been shown to in-
fluence stock returns. My method is to develop measures of the degree and
concentration of a firm’s supplier and customer linkages. I include these
measures in a factor model of stock returns alongside a number of other
factors that have been shown to explain stock returns. Cross-sectional re-
gressions show that, in a given time-period, firms with more concentrated
supplier bases have higher average returns than firms with less concentrated
supplier bases. Second, time-series regressions showed that an increase in
the concentration of a firm’s supplier-base lowered realized returns in the
following period. These results suggest that investors demand a positive
risk premium (higher expected return) for holding the stock of firms whose
supplier-base is concentrated. This places downward pressure on prices
following an increase in supplier-base concentration. While concentration
of a firm’s supplier and customer linkages has a significant influence on
stock returns, the magnitude of this effect is small compared to the influ-
ence of systematic risk factors. The influence of economic linkages on stock
returns, however, increases in recessions.
Together the results in this thesis provide solid evidence that shocks spread
via economic linkages can affect the volatility, correlation and average level
of stock returns. The thesis establishes a robust framework for modeling
the returns of portfolios in which the underlying securities or firms are
linked via economic relationships. This is an important extension to exist-
ing models that ignore the potential impact of shocks spread via linkages
between firms on stock prices. The model can be used for pricing securi-
ties with concentrated supply chain exposures or to identify stock portfolios
that are susceptible to contagion.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and overview
1.1 Research background
Over the past thirty years, interdependence in financial markets has increased as
a result of many factors including globalization and technological developments
(Brock, 1999; Farrell, Lund, Folster, Bick, Pierce, and Atkins, 2008). At the same
time, the interdependence between firms’ economic activities has also increased
(Jarrow and Yu, 2001). For example, changes in production processes like ‘lean’
and ‘just-in-time’ manufacturing mean that firms are increasingly reliant on their
suppliers. Such economic linkages between firms along a supply chain are a chan-
nel by which shocks can spread between supplier and customer firms (Dornbusch,
Park, and Claessens, 2000). This is a problem because financially distressed sup-
pliers pose significant risk to the economic activity of customers that rely on them
for goods and services (Wagner, Bode, and Koziol, 2011). A case in point is the
heavy loss suffered by General Motors when its equipment and parts supplier
Delphi went on strike in 1998. Vice-versa, distressed customers can negatively
impact suppliers’ business operations (Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers, 2008).
For example, in 2008/2009 the chief executive of Ford requested emergency gov-
ernment support for General Motors and Chrysler from the US Senate. He argued
that given the significant overlap in the suppliers and dealers of Ford, General
Motors and Chrysler, the collapse of either General Motors or Chrysler could
create serious operational and financial distress for Ford (Mulally, 2008).
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Given that real economic activities are highly related to major stock pricing
factors, market volatility and to investors’ attitudes toward risk (Fama, 1990),
the spread of distress between suppliers and customers may have a significant
influence on stock returns. If interdependence between firms’ economic activities
has increased, it is therefore important to assess whether this has increased inter-
dependence between stock returns. However, very little is known about how the
economic linkages between firms (that issue equity stocks) influence their stock
returns1.
Ignoring the potential impact of shocks spread via economic linkages on asset
prices is problematic for two reasons. First, if investors are aware of the linkages
between assets, asset prices will reflect the market’s assessment of the counter-
party risk created by these linkages (Jarrow and Yu, 2001); therefore ignoring
economic linkages may result in mispricing. Second, even if investors are un-
aware or unconcerned by counterparty risk, when firms are linked to each other,
shocks can spread between firms. I show that shocks spread via inter-firm linkages
can increase the volatility of asset returns and the correlation between assets, and
may create aggregate fluctuations in financial markets. So ignoring shocks spread
via economic linkages may lead to an underestimation of risk.
1.2 Previous research and gaps
Currently, there is no comprehensive study of how shocks spread via economic
linkages influence stock prices. Recent financial crises, however, show that firm-
level events, such as the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008, can spread far beyond
the firm, market and country in which they originate2. Contagion is defined as
an increase in return dependence during periods of crisis and/or during volatile
markets. Most tests of contagion are performed at the level of an entire market
1 The small number of studies is partly due to a lack of reliable data on the supply linkages
between firms.
2 Other examples include the effect that the potential default of Long Term Capital Manage-
ment had on other major investment banks in 1998, and the effect that the collapse of the
Thai Baht in 1997 had on stock prices throughout most East Asian stock markets.
2
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or asset class, by testing whether there is a statistically significant increase in
return correlation between markets or assets during a crisis period (Dungey, Fry,
Gonzlez-Hermosillo, and Martin, 2005). Research on contagion has identified the
types of links and other macroeconomic conditions that can make a country or as-
set class vulnerable to contagion during crisis periods. Extant research concludes
that the most important channels by which firm-level shocks spread in financial
crises are credit linkages and investor behavior (Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh,
2003). Very few studies, however, have been undertaken at the firm-level and
very few studies explicitly test whether economic linkages may be a channel of
contagion.
Some empirical studies shed light on how shocks spread between customers and
suppliers influence stock prices. Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) find
that financial distress of customer firms (as indicated by bankruptcy filings) is
associated with significant negative effects on the stock price of their suppliers.
Similarly, Cohen and Frazzini (2008) find that the returns of customer firms’ stock
predict their suppliers’ subsequent returns. Both of these studies indicate that
the connection between customers and their suppliers has a significant influence
on stock returns; however, they are both limited in two respects. First, both
studies focus on pairwise linkages and ignore the potential influence of shocks
transmitted from further up or down a firm’s supply chain (e.g. customers’ cus-
tomers, or suppliers’ suppliers etc.). Second, both studies focus on stock price
movements surrounding a significant event, such as bankruptcy or a significant
news announcement by the customer firm. The narrow focus on direct linkages
and significant events means that these studies do not fully answer the question of
how shocks spread via economic linkages between suppliers and customers affect
stock returns, as they do not address the influence of both direct and indirect
economic linkages on stock returns, on average over time.
Research investigating how production linkages between the sectors of an econ-
omy affect the volatility of economic activity shed light on how economic linkages
between firms may influence their stock returns. Recent papers show that the
structure of economic linkages between sectors and/or firms affects volatility in
3
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GDP(Gabaix, 2011; Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2010; Carvalho,
2008). Similar intuition underpins all of these models: when sectors are linked, a
shock to one sector can spread via linkages to other sectors and can create aggre-
gate fluctuations in the economy. Horvath (2000); Carvalho (2008); Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2010); Dupor (1999) all show that sectoral shocks,
propagated via inter-sector linkages, can create fluctuations in GDP.
The theoretical explanation of this effect is clarified in Gabaix (2011) and Ace-
moglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2010). They prove that sector-level shocks
are not diversified away when the distribution of each sector’s total influence on
the aggregate is heavy-tailed, i.e. when a few firms have a very large influence,
while most firms have a negligible influence on the aggregate economy. This is
because the law of large numbers does not hold when a few sectors (or firms) have
an extremely large influence on the aggregate, while most have a small influence
on the aggregate3. While these studies explain how sector-level economic linkages
influence economic activity, the theory can be adapted to explain how firm-level
economic linkages influence stock returns.
1.3 Research questions and rationale
This thesis focusses on whether or not, and on how, shocks spread via economic
linkages between supplier and customer firms affect stock returns. The main ob-
jective of this thesis is to establish how economic linkages between firms influence
stock returns. My approach is to examine how a firm’s economic linkages influ-
ence three dimensions of its stock returns: the volatility of stock returns, pairwise
correlation between linked firms’ returns and the cross-sectional distribution of
average returns. The research questions addressed are:
3 The law of large numbers predicts that the sum of N i.i.d. shocks, S =
∑N
i=1 Yi where
Yi ∼ (0, σ2) will have variance σ2N . Now let the shocks have different influence on the
aggregate, such that Sw =
∑N
i=1 wiYi where
∑N
i=1 wi = 1. Gabaix (2011) and Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2010) show that when the distribution of the weights wi is
heavy-tailed, aggregate volatility decays much more slowly than the 1√
N
rate predicted by
the law of large numbers.
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1. How does the structure of economic linkages influence the volatility of stock
returns? (Chapter 3)
2. How do shocks transmitted via economic linkages increase correlation be-
tween linked firms’ returns? (Chapter 5)
3. How do shocks transmitted via economic linkages affect average returns,
cross-sectionally and/or over time? (Chapter 6)
For each dimension of stock returns (volatility, pairwise correlation and average
returns) I examine what characteristics of economic linkages are most influential,
and whether the influence of economic linkages increases in recessions. Together
the answers to these questions elucidate the influence of shocks spread via eco-
nomic linkages on the volatility, pairwise correlation and cross-sectional distribu-
tion of stock returns. The results offer insights for a range of asset pricing and
risk management problems, including portfolio risk management and assessing
financial stability.
The methodology extends existing models of stock returns to allow for shocks
transmitted via linkages between firms. First, I develop a theoretical model ex-
plaining how the spread of cash-flow shocks via economic linkages between firms
influences the pairwise correlation, mean and volatility of stock returns. By apply-
ing the Lindeberg-Feller theorem, I prove that diversification occurs significantly
slower than the 1√
N
rate predicted by the law of large numbers if the distribu-
tion of firms’ degree of economic linkage is heavy-tailed (such that a few firms
have an extremely high degree of economic linkage while the majority have a far
lower degree of economic linkage). I derive an expression explicitly linking the
structure of linkages between firms and the rate at which shocks are diversified
away. Importantly, economic network structures are identified in which shocks
to a single firm may not be diversified away, and can have a significant influence
on aggregate volatility even in large portfolios. This has wide-ranging implica-
tions because the assumption that diversification occurs at rate 1√
N
is frequently
used to support the assumption that a set of common, systematic risk factors
adequately explains stock returns. In cases where shocks are not diversified away
at rate 1√
N
there is a strong case to allow for exposure to shocks transmitted via
5
1.3 Research questions and rationale
inter-firm linkages in asset pricing models.
In Section 3.3 I derive a reduced form model (corresponding to the theory) of how
shocks transmitted via economic linkages affect stock returns. An approximate
factor model is the correct reduced form representation of returns in a portfolio
where residual returns may be correlated. However, the standard approximate
factor model assumes that in large portfolios the proportion of non-zero corre-
lations between assets approaches zero (Chamberlain and Rothschild, 1983). I
prove that when the distribution of economic linkages is heavy-tailed ( i.e. there
are a few extremely connected firms while the majority of firms have limited
connectivity), the contribution of firm-level volatility to aggregate volatility is
non-zero, even in extremely large portfolios. This implies that rather than using
an approximate factor model, standard factor models of asset prices should be
extended to allow for inter-firm linkages if the distribution of inter-firm connec-
tivity is heavy-tailed. To test the significance of inter-firm linkages within this
framework, I develop factors that measure the pervasive influence of shocks trans-
mitted via linkages and include these factors in an asset pricing model to capture
the influence of economic linkages on stock returns.
In summary, the theoretical model implies testable hypotheses concerning how
economic linkages between firms influence the pairwise correlation, mean and
volatility of stock returns. The reduced form of the theoretical model corresponds
to a factor model of returns. Therefore I extend a factor model of returns to al-
low for economic linkages, and then investigate how shocks spread via economic
linkages between suppliers and customers affect stock returns. To empirically test
the implications of the theory I use annual account data containing the significant
customer-supplier links of all listed US firms on the CRSP/Compustat database
from 1990 to 2010, and monthly data on the stock returns all listed US firms on
the CRSP/Compustat database from 1990 to 2010.
6
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1.4 Overview of results and contributions
In Chapter 3 I show that if the distribution of firms’ connectivity, measured by
the number of customers and/or suppliers that rely on the firm, has heavy-tails
(i.e. there are a few extremely connected firms while the majority of firms have
limited connectivity) then aggregate variance decays much slower than the 1√
N
rate predicted by the law of large numbers. This implies that when the distribu-
tion of firms’ connectivity is heavy-tailed shocks to the most connected firms can
significantly influence the variance of stock returns.
In Chapter 4 I analyze annual accounting data on the economic linkages between
all listed US firms on the Compustat database from 1990 to 2010. I show that the
distribution of US listed firms’ connectivity (number of dependent suppliers and
customers) follows a power law distribution, with a very small chance that a ran-
domly selected firm is a key customer of an extremely large number of suppliers.
The data analysis identifies an increasing trend in the degree of linkage between
firms from 1990 to 2010, implying firms have become more inter-dependent on
their suppliers and on their customers over this period. These findings support
the assumptions of the theory in Chapter 3, and suggest that analyzing the in-
fluence of inter-firm connectivity on asset prices is of increasing importance in
modern financial markets.
Using accounting data and monthly stock price data for all listed US firms on
the Compustat/CRSP database from 1990 to 2010, in Chapter 5 I test whether
economic linkages increase the correlation between linked firms’ stock returns. I
show that there is a direct relationship between the strength of linkage between
firms and the correlation of their stock returns. An increase in the economic
linkage between two firms (i.e. the proportion of total production inputs and/or
outputs bought and/or sold from one another) is associated with increased corre-
lation in those firms’ stock returns. The influence of economic linkages on return
correlation is stronger when trade credit is used along the supply chain connecting
the firms and is stronger in recessions. This is consistent with economic theory
and intuition, as a supplier (customer) is harder to replace when there are credit
7
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contracts involved in the relationship and/or when the economy is in recession.
Pairwise return correlation is a central component of portfolio return variance, so
this finding suggests linkages may have a significant influence on stock returns.
In Chapter 6, therefore, I test whether shocks transmitted via economic link-
ages influence average stock returns, over and above systematic risk factors (such
as the market return) and firm-specific characteristics (such as size and book-to-
market ratio) that have been shown to influence returns. I show that when firms’
connectivity is heavy-tailed, the proportion of non-zero correlations between as-
sets remains greater than zero, even in large portfolios; so factor models of stock
returns should be extended to allow for inter-firm linkages. I develop factors that
represent connectivity and the level of risk transmission between linked firms.
These factors are included in a factor model of asset returns in order to test the
influence of inter-firm linkages on average returns.
The results show that shocks spread via economic linkages can have a signifi-
cant negative influence on average stock returns over time. I find that there is a
significant positive risk premium attached to the concentration of a firm’s supply
chain, in addition to the factors commonly accepted as explaining equity risk
premiums. This positive contemporaneous risk premium is consistent with the
finding of lower average lagged stock returns following an increase in the con-
centration of a firm’s supplier-base (as higher expected returns place downward
pressure on prices over time). While shocks spread via economic linkages can
significantly influence stock returns, their influence is small compared to that
of systematic risk factors; although the influence of shocks spread via economic
linkages on stock returns increases in recessions.
In summary, the theoretical and empirical results in this thesis advance knowl-
edge of how shocks spread via economic linkages affect stock returns and when
this effect is most significant. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study
of how economic linkages influence average asset prices over time. This is an
important contribution because it is a first step towards extending asset pricing
theory to allow for episodes of financial contagion and/or interdependence.
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1.5 Structure of thesis
Figure 1.1: Schematic diagram of thesis structure.
Chapter 2 contains a critical review of the existing literature in economics and
finance which considers the relationship between inter-firm linkages, economic
activity and stock returns. Three substantial bodies of literature offer insight
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into the influence of economic linkages between firms on stock returns:
• Literature on how shocks spread within and between equity markets during
a financial crisis (financial contagion)
• Literature that explains how shocks spread via credit and counterparty
linkages and create default correlation
• Economic theory on how shocks spread via production linkages between
economic sectors effect aggregate output and can explain business cycles.
The main gaps in this literature are identified and formulated into research ques-
tions. Drawing upon the existing literature, hypotheses are developed to answer
the research questions.
In Chapter 3 I develop a theoretical model of the way in which shocks transmitted
via inter-firm linkages affect returns. I derive two key results on the relationship
between the structure of inter-firm linkages and the distribution and volatility of
stock returns. I derive the implications of these results for asset pricing models.
In Chapter 4 I describe the methodology used to test the implications of the the-
ory and the data source on economic linkages (which covers all firms with stocks
listed on North American stock exchanges recorded on the Compustat/CRSP
database from 1990 to 2010). I show how accounting disclosures on ‘key cus-
tomers’ can be used to characterize the supply chain network underlying the US
stock markets. Furthermore, I develop statistical measures of the degree and
structure of the economic linkages between all stocks listed on North American
exchanges and summarize how these linkages have changed between 1990 and
2010.
Chapter 5 presents empirical tests of the hypothesis that inter-firm linkages in-
crease the correlation between linked firms stock returns. I also test whether
the influence of economic linkages on return correlation is stronger when trade
credit is used along the supply chain connecting the firms and/or in a recession
(as suggested by economic theory in which a supplier (customer) is harder to
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replace when there are credit contracts involved in the relationship and/or when
the economy is in recession). Chapter 6 contains empirical tests of the relation-
ship between economic linkages and the cross-sectional and time-series variation
in stock returns, after controlling for systematic and industry-level risk factors.
Chapter 7 concludes by summarizing the answers to the research questions. The
implications of the results for portfolio risk management and financial stability
are discussed.
1.6 Terminology
Groups of firms or assets, such as an entire market or a portfolio, may exhibit con-
tagion and/or interdependence. Contagion is defined as contemporaneous trans-
mission of shocks between firms, assets, sectors or markets after conditioning on
common factors. A similar definition is used in Dungey, Fry, Gonzlez-Hermosillo,
and Martin (2005). Forbes and Rigobon (2002) distinguish interdependence from
contagion, defining interdependence to be comovement in outcomes caused by
linkages which exists during crisis and non-crisis periods. The distinction be-
tween contagion and interdependence is that the former implies that linkages
(which cause comovement) change during a crisis, whereas the latter implies that
linkages remain the same in all states of the world. As the primary focus of this
thesis is to establish how economic linkages between firms influence stock returns,
this distinction is not necessary and the term contagion is used in this thesis to
refer to the transmission of shocks between firms (after conditioning on common
factors) in both crisis and non-crisis periods.
Shocks are the realization of underlying random variables or risk factors. The
terms systematic and idiosyncratic are used when referring to the initial impact
of a shock. A systematic shock is one that immediately affects all units in the
economy. For example, monetary policy shocks are systematic as they immedi-
ately affect a large number of exposed securities and firms. Idiosyncratic shocks
only initially affect one firm. For example, internal fraud by an employee is an
idiosyncratic shock.
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When referring to the affect of a shock on stock returns (rather than the ini-
tial point of impact of a shock) I use the terms pervasive and asset-specific. A
pervasive risk factor has an economically significant aggregate effect on returns
in large portfolios. In contrast, an asset-specific risk factor affects a single or
limited number of units in the economy, and has a negligible aggregate effect as
the number of units in the portfolio being considered grows. By definition, a
pervasive risk factor is non-diversifiable, whereas an asset-specific risk factor is
diversifiable4 (Ross, 1976). This terminology is consistent with the terminology
used the Arbitrage Pricing Theory of Ross (1976), and in the factor models de-
rived from this theory developed in Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983); Chen,
Roll, and Ross (1986); Connor (1995)5.
Finally, it is important to note the difference between a link and a linkage. A link
is used to refer to a one-step or direct, point to point connection. For example,
if A is linked to B, it is possible to travel from A to B in one step. A linkage
is a chain of two or more links. If A buys directly from B, and B buys directly
from C, there is an indirect linkage between A and C. (The terms inter-linkage,
inter-firm linkage and linkage are used inter-changeably.)
4 In the exact words of Ross (1976), an asset specific risk factor must be ‘sufficiently indepen-
dent to permit the law of large numbers to hold’.
5 The distinction between the initial impact of a shock and its aggregate effect on returns is
crucial in Chapter 3. In Chapter 3 it is shown that a shock initially affecting one firm may
spread via inter-linkages and have an economically significant aggregate effect on returns in
large portfolios. This occurs because shocks transmitted via inter-linkages create sufficient
dependence between linked firms returns such that the law of large numbers does not hold.
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Chapter 2
Literature review and research
questions
2.1 Introduction
This thesis focusses on whether or not, and on how, shocks spread via economic
linkages between supplier and customer firms affect stock returns. The main ob-
jective of this thesis is to establish how economic linkages between firms influence
stock returns. Three separate bodies of literature offer insight into the influence
of economic linkages between firms on stock returns:
• Literature on how shocks spread within and between equity markets during
a financial crisis (financial contagion)
• Literature that explains how shocks spread via credit and counterparty
linkages (corporate default and credit contagion)
• Economic theory on how shocks spread via production linkages between eco-
nomic sectors can create fluctuations in aggregate economic activity (eco-
nomic linkages and business cycles).
In this chapter I analyze each of these bodies of literature from the following
angles:
• What underlying theories did they apply?
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• What empirical methodologies do they use?
• What are the main empirical findings?
• What are the gaps in theory, empirical methodology and findings (regarding
how economic linkages between firms influence stock returns) that need to
be addressed?
I conclude by formulating research questions and hypotheses that address some
of the gaps identified in the literature regarding how economic linkages between
firms influence stock returns.
2.2 Overview of literature
In recent years, there has been an increasing recognition of the importance of
networks and inter-linkages in both finance and economic literature. In finance,
the role of networks and inter-linkages is most commonly examined within the
context of financial crises or the spread of financial distress through asset mar-
kets. In economics, research has analyzed salient features of networks and their
effects on pricing, economic fluctuations (or volatility) and market structure. In
order to understand how shocks spread via economic linkages (arising from the
trade of goods between suppliers and customers) might influence stock returns, I
draw on key findings and methodologies from both finance and economics.
By way of introduction, financial contagion is defined as ‘the contemporane-
ous transmission of local shocks to another country or market after conditioning
on common factors that exist over a non-crisis period’ (Dungey, Fry, Gonzlez-
Hermosillo, and Martin, 2005). Several financial crises in the past decade have
highlighted the importance of inter-linkages in process of contagion. In these
crises, financial contracts, such as bank loans or credit contracts that linked
banks, were the main channel by which initially country-specific shocks spread
between international stock markets (Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh, 2003; Kauf-
man, 1994). There is a large body of literature exploring the role of financial
linkages in contagion, which offers insights into how shocks spread via economic
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linkages may influence stock returns.
Contagion is also a major concern in credit portfolios, particularly following cor-
porate default (or bankruptcy). Egloff and Leippold (2007) define ‘credit conta-
gion’ as the transmission of shocks via interdependencies between debtors that go
beyond their exposure to common factors. Like financial contagion, credit con-
tagion involves the transmission of shocks via channels involving a finite number
of firms (e.g., supply chain or legal interdependencies) rather than via systematic
channels affecting all firms. In credit portfolios, linkages between the assets can
create significant credit risk (Schonbucher, 2000). In contrast to financial con-
tagion, which is mainly at the market-level, research on corporate default and
credit contagion is mostly at the firm-level or asset-level. In addition, in the most
commonly used model of default, the Merton (1974) model, stock price is one of
the main inputs driving default risk. Therefore the literature on corporate default
and credit contagion contains many results that may be adapted and extended
to model how shocks spread via economic linkages between firms influence stock
prices.
In particular, the empirical methodology for modeling contagion is well devel-
oped and unified (Dungey, Fry, Gonzlez-Hermosillo, and Martin, 2005). Almost
all empirical models of contagion and interdependence in asset markets are spec-
ified as factor models of asset returns (Dungey, Fry, Gonzlez-Hermosillo, and
Martin, 2005). The theoretical basis of factor models of asset returns is the Arbi-
trage Pricing Theory (APT) developed by Ross (1976). Under APT, asset returns
are determined exclusively by common factors representing non-diversifiable risk,
as idiosyncratic factors are assumed to be diversified away (Ross, 1976). Dungey,
Fry, Gonzlez-Hermosillo, and Martin (2005) extend factor models to include a
latent factor that captures the transmission of local shocks between asset mar-
kets, after conditioning on common factors. The methodology for modeling credit
contagion proposed by Egloff and Leippold (2007) also augments standard factor
models of asset returns with a term that captures microstructural dependence
between creditors and debtors. The key difference between these two approaches
is that Dungey, Fry, Gonzlez-Hermosillo, and Martin (2005) assume that the link-
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ages between assets are unobservable and allow for them using a latent factor,
whereas Egloff and Leippold (2007) assume that the linkages between assets are
observable and explicitly include them in a factor model.
Traditional models of stock returns assume that idiosyncratic shocks do not in-
fluence stock returns because they are fully diversified away in large portfolios.
Importantly, however, recent economic literature demonstrates two situations in
which the law of large numbers does not hold and firm-level shocks have a signif-
icant influence on aggregate outcomes. First, Gabaix (2011) shows that shocks
to individual firms may not average out in aggregate when the distribution of
firm sizes is heavy-tailed. Modern economies are dominated by large firms and
shocks to these firms can trigger significant fluctuations in stock market indices
(Gabaix, 2011). Second, Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2010) proved
that shocks to individual firms do not average out in aggregate when firms are
linked and the distribution of firms’ total influence via these linkages is heavy-
tailed. In an inter-linked economy, a firm’s influence on the aggregate is deter-
mined by its connectivity as well as its size. Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-
Salehi (2010) prove that the structure of inter-sector linkages determines how
shocks propagate through an economy and influence GDP volatility. These pa-
pers highlight a significant gap in the previous research that has assumed that
the law of large numbers applies in all situation and has therefore ignored id-
iosyncratic shocks.
In light of this new evidence it is crucial to reconsider whether shocks spread
via economic linkages affect stock returns. I do so by synthesizing key empir-
ical methodologies and results from the contagion literature with the theoreti-
cal results from the economic literature. The key theoretical findings, empirical
methodologies and results from the literature are reviewed in detail in the rest
of this chapter. I analyze the main theoretical findings, and then the empirical
methods and results for each of the following bodies of literature in turn: fi-
nancial contagion, corporate default and credit contagion, economic linkages and
aggregate fluctuations.
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2.3 Financial contagion
‘Contagion’ is defined as a change in the contemporaneous transmission of shocks
during a crisis period (after conditioning on common factors that exist over a non-
crisis period). Contagion results in increased correlation between asset classes
and/or asset markets during crisis periods. There is a large body of research into
methods of modeling this phenomenon (see Dungey, Fry, Gonzlez-Hermosillo,
and Martin (2005) for a review). The focus of this literature is on identifying
transmission channels at the aggregate market level. This literature does not
directly address whether shocks transmitted via economic linkages influence stock
returns, but many of the theories and empirical tests can easily be modified in
order to investigate this question.
2.3.1 Theoretical literature
It is widely accepted that common exposure to macroeconomic factors (such as
interest rates or GDP) creates correlation in asset prices because these factors
simultaneously affect many assets and firms (Allen and Saunders, 2003). While
common macroeconomic and industry conditions are important causes of default
correlation, Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita (2007) and Duffie, Eckner, Horel,
and Saita (2009) show that observable firm-specific, industry-level and macroe-
conomic conditions do not fully explain the degree to which failures are correlated
across firms. Consistently, three explanations have been proposed for contagion:
common observable risk factors (macroeconomic conditions), contagion via direct
linkages and contagion via common unobservable risk factors (frailty or informa-
tional contagion)(Elizalde, 2012). In this section I review the theory of contagion
due to direct linkages and contagion due to unobserved information effects.
Contagion via direct links
Direct contagion operates if there is a direct link between two firms that leads to
a causal relationship between an initial default (A) and a subsequent default (B).
Jarrow and Yu (2001) cite the example of the automotive industry where A is a
major car producer and B is a small supplier who only sells to A and who will
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have to close if A fails. In contrast, informational contagion (frailty) describes the
situation where the bankruptcy of firm A conveys bad news about other firms that
have an unobservable risk factor in common with A. Contagion may occur via
direct linkages such as supply or purchase contracts for goods, financial contracts
such as bank loans or trade credit and/or ownership contracts. For example, in
vertically integrated manufacturing processes, intermediate goods flow between
many pairs of suppliers and customers along a supply chain.
In relation to financial firms, the first significant paper to focus on contagion
in financial networks was Allen and Gale (2001). In an equilibrium economic
model, they showed how ‘liquidity preference’ shocks can trigger contagion in a
network of financial claims. Their key finding was that the possibility of conta-
gion depends strongly on the completeness of the inter-firm network (i.e. on the
degree of connectivity between banks generated by the cross holdings of deposits
and other inter-bank claims). If the interbank market is complete and each region
is connected to all the other regions, the initial impact of a shock in one region
may be attenuated. On the other hand, if the interbank market is incomplete,
each region is connected with a small number of other regions. The initial impact
of the financial crisis may be felt strongly in a few neighboring regions, with the
result that they too succumb to a crisis. Complete claims structures are shown to
be more robust than incomplete structures because the initial impact of a shock
in one region is spread over a greater number of firms.
An important issue not considered in the paper by Allen and Gale (2001) is
that for a fixed level of completeness, different network structures have different
potential for positive feedback. If increasing the completeness of the claims struc-
tures sets up one or more significant positive feedback loops in the claims network,
then increasing completeness may increase the possibility of contagion. This idea
is developed in Battiston, Delli Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald, and Stiglitz (2009).
Battiston, Delli Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald, and Stiglitz (2009) develop a model
that characterizes the network of credit relations among financial agents as a
system of coupled stochastic processes. Each stochastic process describes the
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dynamics of individual financial robustness, while the coupling results from a
network of liabilities among agents. Resembling the conclusion of Acemoglu,
Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2010), Battiston, Delli Gatti, Gallegati, Green-
wald, and Stiglitz (2009) find that the average level of default risk diversification
across firms in a financial network is related to the distribution of links in the
network (i.e. the pattern of connectivity as distinct from the degree of connectiv-
ity). They show that the correlation of output and default risk can be explained
by local interaction among firms connected by production and credit ties. The
framework can yield avalanches of bankruptcies in the presence of delayed pay-
ments (trade credit) and costs due to failures in supply.
In contrast to Allen and Gale (2001) they find that when there is positive feed-
back (in this particular model feedback takes the form of a financial accelerator),
the aggregate risk of a portfolio of firms does not decrease monotonically as the
degree of connection in the network increases. In most conditions there is an
optimal level of connectivity, beyond which aggregate risk increases non-linearly
(Battiston, Delli Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald, and Stiglitz, 2009). That is, di-
versification works when connectivity is low, but increasing connectivity beyond
the optimal point may have the effect of amplifying shocks due to propagation
through the network and the positive feedback mechanism.
These studies conclude that linkages between businesses are a channel by which
shocks flow from one firm or sector to another, resulting in comovement between
linked firms’ or sectors’ output. There is no consensus, however, on whether it is
the degree or the distribution (or structure) of inter-linkages that influences the
extent of contagion.
Informational contagion
Default correlation can also arise from information effects if investors are imper-
fectly informed about common factors affecting the true riskiness of an asset or
debtor. The basic idea is that a default event reveals information to the mar-
ket about unobserved risk factors, which may influence the market’s assessment
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of the risk of any other firms that are affected by the same risk factors; so in-
vestors update their beliefs whenever defaults arrive with a timing that is more
or less clustered than expected based solely on the observable risk factors (Duffie,
Eckner, Horel, and Saita, 2009). Frailty explains why the spreads of unlinked,
competing firms can widen significantly upon a default (Schonbucher, 2000; Jo-
rion and Zhang, 2009). For example, Schonbucher (2000) argues that the failure
of Enron reduced trust in accounting information and this ‘frailty’ raised the
failure risk premium priced into credit spreads for all firms related to Enron or
Arthur Anderson. Other examples of increases in market-perceived risk could be
observed for example in the widening of credit spreads in the telecom sector upon
the frequent failures between 2000 and 2002, or in the airline sector in the period
after September 11th 2001. These spread moves were associated with a change
in market perceptions rather than a change of the underlying business funda-
mentals (Schonbucher, 2000; Giesecke and Weber, 2003). Similarly, corporate
bankruptcy can decrease the market value of competitors by conveying informa-
tion that affects a firm’s dealings with customers, investors, creditors, regulators,
and/or suppliers (Lang and Stulz, 1992). Information about one or more firms
in an industry adversely affects all other firms in the industry, including firms
that may have little in common with the first firms other than being in the same
industry (Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers, 2008).
Frailty effects are strongest when firms are viewed by the market as being more
or less homogeneous (Kaufman, 1994). Vice versa, heterogeneity of firms has a
negative effect on the likelihood of contagion (Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers,
2008). This is consistent with theories of financial contagion which suggests that
contagion is more widespread when firms or products are homogenous (Kaufman,
1994). This can occur when investors are not able to distinguish between prod-
ucts because they are too complex (as in the case of complex financial products)
or because the information is not publicly available. Informational contagion,
therefore, is also more likely to occur between firms in the same industry, as they
have the same operating environment and produce similar products.
The strength of contagion is also influenced by factors affecting the extent of
20
2.3 Financial contagion
informational asymmetry. High levels of uncertainty, poor disclosure, incom-
plete information, and incentives to withhold information can mean that firms
are viewed by the market as being homogeneous because investors do not have
enough information to distinguish individual firms or products from one another
(Duffie, Eckner, Horel, and Saita, 2009). In conclusion, frailty is likely to be more
significant in the following circumstances: during periods of uncertainty, when in-
formation is costly or scarce, when market values change quickly or liabilities are
short term, and/or when firms or products are homogenous.
Finally, theoretical models generally imply that both types of contagion (direct
and informational) are more prevalent during a recession, when firms are closer to
their default thresholds (due to high levels of debt and/or low net worth) and/or
when firms have more contractual links with one another (Lang and Stulz, 1992).
2.3.2 Empirical studies
Empirical studies use a number of alternative methods to test for the presence of
contagion during financial market crises. Most statistical tests of contagion test
whether the correlation in returns is significantly higher in crisis periods than in
non-crisis periods (Dungey and Martin, 2004; Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez-Hermosillo,
and Martin, 2006; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). Billio and Pelizzon (2003) show
that the methodologies proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) are highly af-
fected by the time windows used and by the presence of omitted variables. They
propose some analyzes to strengthen the robustness of these tests. Correlation
based tests focus on pairs of asset returns, but it is possible to test contagion in
multiple directions using factor models. Dungey, Fry, Gonzlez-Hermosillo, and
Martin (2005) show that factor-based models and correlation-based models of
contagion can be united within the general framework of latent factor models
(because financial contagion occurs via unobservable, or latent, channels). These
findings suggest that it should be possible to extend factor models of stock re-
turns to allow for contagion via observable economic linkages between firms.
Empirical studies find that the correlation in asset returns is higher during re-
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cessions than in growth periods (Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta, 1994; Das, Duffie,
Kapadia, and Saita, 2007)1. Similarly, a large number of studies show that cor-
relation in stock markets is higher during more volatile markets (i.e. that the
dependence of assets or markets is asymmetric). Importantly, Longin and Sol-
nik (2001) show that correlation between international equity markets increases
in volatile times, but only when the market trend is positive. They find that
correlation is not related to market volatility per se but to the market trend,
so correlation increases in bear markets, but not in bull markets. The finding
that equity returns are more correlated in bear markets than in bull markets is
confirmed by Ang and Chen (2002) and Ang and Bekaert (2002). Ang and Chen
(2002) find significantly higher correlations between equity portfolios and equity
markets. These findings suggest that contagion via economic linkages may be
stronger in recessions and/or volatile market regimes.
The usual tool for investigating whether correlation is significantly higher in
volatile markets is the ‘exceedance correlation’ (correlation between returns con-
ditional upon returns exceeding a threshold) developed by Longin and Solnik
(2001). Ang and Chen (2002) develop a statistic for testing asymmetries in con-
ditional exceedance correlations and find that correlations between US stocks
and the aggregate US market are much greater for downside moves, especially
for extreme downside moves, than for upside moves. Their test is a joint test
of the model used to predict returns and of whether or not return correlation is
asymmetric. Hong, Zhou, and Tu (2007) develop a model-free test for asymmet-
ric correlations, and also find that stocks tend to have greater correlations with
the market when the market goes down than when it goes up. They find that
stock return asymmetries over crisis periods are statistically significant and are
of substantial economic importance.
Regime shifting models can also capture asymmetric dependence in returns. Ang
and Chen (2002) and Ang and Bekaert (2002) show that regime switching models
can reproduce the fact that large negative returns are more correlated than large
1 Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita (2007) find that the correlation between corporate default
risk is significantly higher in recession periods.
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positive returns. Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita (2007) also use a regime shifting
model to capture how default correlation increases in recessions, and finds that
a model that allows default correlation to increase in recessions (when marginal
default probabilities are also higher) is able to predict out-of-sample aggregate
default rates much better than a model with a single regime.
Summary Contagion is defined as an increase in return dependence during
periods of crisis and/or during volatile markets. Theoretical models identify pro-
duction, trade and/or credit linkages between firms as a source of contagion. In
addition, higher levels of correlation are associated with higher levels of linkage
between firms (Raddatz, 2010). Most tests of contagion are performed at the level
of an entire market or asset class, by testing whether there is a statistically signif-
icant increase in return correlation in a recession or a bear market (Dungey, Fry,
Gonzlez-Hermosillo, and Martin, 2005). Very few studies have been undertaken
at the firm-level and very few studies explicitly test whether inter-firm linkages
may be a source of contagion. This is partly due to the difficulty obtaining data on
inter-firm linkages, and partly because the informational linkages that have been
proposed as a cause of contagion are unobservable (Egloff and Leippold, 2007).
However, there is a unified empirical methodology for testing for contagion be-
tween markets which can be adapted to test for contagion between economically
linked firms.
2.4 Corporate default and credit contagion
Corporate defaults tend to cluster in time (Allen and Saunders, 2003). This is
problematic because even small levels of default dependence (credit contagion)
have significant effects on the price and risk of credit portfolios (Schonbucher,
2000). Due to the economic significance of this problem, much effort has been
put into modeling corporate default and credit contagion. This body of research
contains several insights for understanding and modeling linked firms’ asset prices.
A major advantage of this literature, for the purposes of understanding how
economic linkages between firms influence stock prices, is that default is typically
modeled at the firm-level.
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2.4.1 Theoretical literature
The probability that a borrower defaults (PD) is the major driver of the credit risk
borne by lenders. This fact has motivated a large amount of research on default
risk, mostly at the level of the individual borrower. The standard structural
model of default assumes that a firm defaults when its asset value (Vt) falls below
a default threshold (Merton, 1974). The default threshold is typically related to
the value of a firm’s liabilities. It is not possible to observe Vt continuously in
time (Jarrow and Protter, 2004). In practice, therefore, stock prices are used as
a proxy for the firm’s asset value. Within the Merton (1974) framework, any
factors that simultaneously influence, or reveal information about, the condition
of many firms’ asset values may create default correlation. It is necessary to
identify and control for key drivers of default correlation when testing whether
contagion occurs via economic linkages in addition to these other causes. In the
following sections, therefore, we review empirical research that identifies the key
drivers of default correlation.
2.4.2 Empirical studies
Corporate default and macroeconomic conditions
Time-series of corporate default rates exhibit two important characteristics. First,
aggregate default rates vary over time in a way that is related to macroeconomic
conditions. Second, defaults tend to cluster because, on average, correlation
between corporate defaults is positive across firms (Allen and Saunders, 2003).
Several strands of theory explain these stylized facts.
There is consensus in the economic and credit risk literature that macroeco-
nomic growth impacts corporate default risk (that is, the likelihood a firm will
become bankrupt in the US or insolvent in the UK) (Jarrow and Turnbull, 2000;
Allen and Saunders, 2003). Corporate failure rates are related to macroeconomic
conditions (such as investment and output) in several ways. Wilson (1998) found
that macroeconomic factors explain much of the overall variation in the aggre-
gate corporate failure rates. Studies linking corporate failure and macroeconomic
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conditions show that, in addition to firm-level financial position, macroeconomic
factors influence firm failure risk (Duffie, Saita, and Wang, 2007; Jacobson, Lind,
and Roszbach, Forthcoming; Carling, Jacobson, Lind, and Roszbach, 2007).
Many studies suggest that macroeconomic factors such as nominal interest rates,
output growth or deviation from trend, aggregate levels of indebtedness, and real
exchange rates, profits, price, and corporate birth rates explain the majority of
variation in aggregate failure rates in both the short run and in the long run
(Wilson, 1998; Jokivuolle, Virolainen, and Vhmaa, 2008; Liu, 2009). Of these
macroeconomic variables, interest rate appears to be an important factor influ-
encing failure rates. Hunter and Isachenkova (2006) model default risk of UK
listed firms between 1989 and 1991 and find evidence that in addition to financial
statement variables, shocks in the nominal interest rate and the real exchange
rate are key factors in causing large firms to fail. These results underscore the
significant influence of macroeconomic conditions on corporate default risk.
Duffie, Eckner, Horel, and Saita (2009) find that the three month Treasury bill
rate and the annual return on the S&P 500 are significant predictors of corpo-
rate bond default rates. Lando and Nielsen (2010) find that, in addition to the
aforementioned factors, US industrial production and the Treasury interest rate
spread are also significant predictors of default rates. At an aggregate level, the
probability of default (PD) is positively correlated across firms and macroeco-
nomic risk factors explain the majority of the positive correlation of PD across
firms (Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita, 2007). However, this relationship is dy-
namic as cyclical effects in asset valuations and shifts in market regimes due to
structural, regulatory, or economic factors may change PD and PD correlation
(Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita, 2007; Liu, 2009).
Structural changes, however, affect the way that firms react to macroeconomic
shocks. For example, Liu (2009) shows that UK firms were more affected by
net lending to the corporate sector and less affected by interest rates prior to
the 1980s (when market-oriented economic reforms in the UK made it easier for
firms to access non-bank credit and increased the importance of interest rates as
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a monetary policy tool (Liu, 2009). Another structural influence on default rates
is bankruptcy law (Allen and Saunders, 2003)2. Finally, in an interconnected
economy, business cycles in other regions or sectors may be significant determi-
nants of business exit (Bhattacharjee, Higson, Holly, and Kattuman, 2009).
Macroeconomic conditions affect many firms and many assets at the same time.
It follows that, macroeconomic conditions that explain an individual firm’s PD
are also crucial drivers of default correlation. Therefore, in adverse macro con-
ditions, such as a recession, clusters of defaults are more likely and aggregate
credit risk increases (Allen and Saunders, 2003). However, models only allowing
for dependence caused by macroeconomic factors under-predict levels of default
correlation and cannot reproduce the high degree of correlation found in empiri-
cal data on defaults (Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita, 2007; Egloff and Leippold,
2007).
Summary Adverse macroeconomic conditions tend to increase corporate de-
fault rates. Examples of adverse macroeconomic conditions include low growth
in terms of GDP or stock market returns and/or tight monetary conditions. The
relationship between macroeconomic conditions and default risk may change over
time as a result of average levels of leverage, structural factors or changes in the
way firms react to shocks.
Macro factors are a significant source of default correlation, but models only
allowing for macro factors are insufficient for modeling the aggregate return of
both equity and credit portfolios. I.e. pure macro models cannot reproduce the
high degree of correlation found in empirical data on defaults (Das, Duffie, Ka-
padia, and Saita, 2007; Egloff and Leippold, 2007). Models that ignore contagion
understate the joint failure risk and the probability of large losses (Duffie, Eck-
2 Bhattacharjee, Higson, Holly, and Kattuman (2009) find significant differences in the way
that US and UK firms react to changes in the macroeconomic environment related to differ-
ences in bankruptcy legislation. In particular, firms in the US are able to enter into Chapter
11 bankruptcy, which allows the firm protection from creditors while it reorganizes itself.
Protective bankruptcy laws can allow firms to survive a period of macroeconomic distur-
bance and have been related to lower failure rates and lower sensitivity of failure rates to
macroeconomic volatility (Bhattacharjee, Higson, Holly, and Kattuman, 2009).
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ner, Horel, and Saita, 2009). Therefore, it is crucial that credit risk models are
extended to allow for other factors that explain default correlation. Finally, as
stock prices are a key driver of default risk, these findings imply that factors other
than systematic risk factors can create correlation in stock prices.
Corporate default and industry-level conditions
Several models of corporate default allow for industry-level factors that explain
default correlation in excess of that explained by SRFs, in order to generate ob-
served levels of dependence between default events.
There may be differences in the way different types of firms, or different in-
dustries, respond to macroeconomic conditions. In the academic literature in-
dustry effects on corporate default have received significantly less attention than
macroeconomic risk factors. Relationships are often modeled at an aggregate
level, despite the issues of aggregation bias or the fact that aggregation may ob-
scure heterogeneity in relationships between different units (Bond, 2002). Few
studies allow for industry heterogeneity in the relationship between corporate
failure and macroeconomic factors. Chava and Jarrow (2004) suggest this is due
to the limited number of bankruptcies in the databases previously available. Yet,
economic intuition, theory and empirical evidence suggest that industry effects
are an important component in bankruptcy prediction.
Firms in different industries respond differently to macroeconomic and finan-
cial market conditions (Wilson, 1998). For example, heavy exporters are more
impacted by the real terms of trade than firms that do not export their products
and services; demand for non-durables and services is less sensitive to interest
rates than demand for durable goods (Mankiw, 1985); industries with greater
dependence on external finance grow disproportionately faster when credit is
available (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Different industries also have different lev-
els of competition and operating environments that influence default rates (Opler
and Titman, 1994). On the other hand, firms in the same industry share similar
structural characteristics such as inputs, dependence on external financial, capi-
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tal needs and the nature of the production process (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997; Carling, Jacobson, Lind, and Roszbach, 2007; Booth,
Aivazian, Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2001). This means that firms in the same in-
dustry are likely to be influenced in a similar way by macroeconomic and financial
market conditions. So industry effects should be controlled for when testing for
contagion via economic linkages.
Empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that industry linkages are a signif-
icant channel of credit contagion. Lang and Stulz (1992) and others find that
bankruptcy announcements have significant contagious and competitive intra-
industry effects on stock prices. Cheung and Levy (1998) found statistically sig-
nificant inter-industry linkages among bankruptcy rates in Australia, with high
rates in one industry positively related to an increase in default in other industries
in subsequent periods. In addition, a number of other industry-specific variables
were also found to be significantly associated with business bankruptcy rates,
including the number of industrial disputes, housing prices and manufacturing
wage rate. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that when a firm in financial distress
needs to sell assets, its industry peers are likely to be experiencing problems them-
selves; they show how this ’fire-sale’ of assets places downward pressure on prices,
leading to sales at prices below fair value. Supporting this argument, Acharya,
Bharath, and Srinivasan (2003) find that industry conditions at the time of de-
fault are important determinants of recovery rates, in addition to seniority and
security of the defaulted securities. These studies support the view that default
risk can spread between industries or through firms within an industry via busi-
ness relationships, and that industry conditions can significantly affect the spread
of financial distress between firms.
Summary It appears that industry-level risk factors (such as capital needs
of production, the stage in industry life-cycle and industry concentration) have
a significant influence on joint default risk in addition to macroeconomic and
firm-specific risk factors. There are also interacting effects between industry con-
centration, leverage and macroeconomic conditions that determine the strength
of contagion effects (following a bankruptcy or default) by affecting the ability
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of the firm to substitute its suppliers and customers. As default risk is closely
linked to a firm’s asset value and stock price, these findings suggest that industry
factors, leverage and macroeconomic conditions should be controlled for when
testing for contagion between economically linked firms3.
Corporate default and firm-level conditions
In addition to the degree and structure of linkages, the influence of linkages is
determined by firm-level characteristics and firm-level counterparty relationships.
Several studies report that the influence of inter-linkages on correlation between
firm value depends on the extent of linkages and the degree to which linked firms
are substitutable (Lang and Stulz, 1992; Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi,
2010). In turn, the substitutability of a counterparty is a function of specialized
product nature, industry structure, and the degree of leverage of affected firms.
Product specificity affects the spread of contagion because it is more difficult to
replace a supplier (customer) if the goods made by (for) the supplier (customer)
are highly specialized or custom made (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Titman and
Wessels (1988) find that suppliers of unique or specialized products (as measured
by research and development intensity) are more likely to suffer distress when an
important customer is in distress.
Substitutability of a supplier (customer) is also affected by whether or not the
supplier’s (customer’s) own industry is highly concentrated. This is because a) in
a concentrated industry there are not many alternative firms, and b) in a concen-
trated industry, the default of a firm would be of greater significance to that indus-
try, which could make it harder for suppliers and customers to find a replacement
(Lang and Stulz, 1992; Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers, 2008). On the other
hand, Lang and Stulz (1992) argue that competitive benefits to intra-industry
rivals are more prominent in concentrated industries, whereas intra-industry ’in-
formational’ contagion dominates in competitive industries. They also note that
competitive benefits can only be realized if intra-industry competitors have spare
3 I.e. it is important to control for factors other than economic linkages that have been shown
to influence stock returns and return correlation, in order to make sure that the significance
of economic linkages is not due to an omitted factor.
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debt capacity and can access external finance, as expansion and acquisition re-
quire investment funded by internal or external finance. The ability to realize
competitor benefits will be limited for firms that are highly leveraged and cannot
access additional external finance even when a good opportunity arises because
they have reached the limit of investors’ willingness to lend. Supporting the hy-
pothesis that a firm’s spare debt capacity and/or leverage affects its counterparty
risk, many studies note that spare debt capacity is important in capital structure
decisions of the firm, because firms reserve spare debt capacity to maintain finan-
cial flexibility and to avoid having to pass up profitable investment opportunities
(Graham and Harvey, 2001).
Finally it is important to note that macroeconomic conditions interact with
industry-level and firm-level factors driving contagion. For example, spare debt
capacity is influenced by macroeconomic conditions and the current stage of the
credit cycle; in a bull market, firms are more likely to be able to access external
finance because leverage ratios tend to increase as asset prices increase (Chen and
Wang, 2007). In addition, in a recession, when more firms are in distress, it is
more difficult to replace a supplier or customer should they fail.
Summary The theory above suggests that the market-level, industry-level and
firm-level risk factors shown in Table 2.1 influence default correlation. The substi-
tutability of a counterparty is a function of specialized product nature, industry
structure, and the degree of leverage of affected firms. The influence of inter-
linkages on firm value is likely to be greater when firms are more reliant on coun-
terparties because they cannot easily substitute them should they fail. Therefore
shocks are more likely to spread between suppliers and customers: when spare
debt capacity and access external finance are lower, or in a recession.
Credit contagion
The previous sections have focussed on literature relating to corporate default.
Additional insights regarding how shocks spread between firms may be gained by
analyzing literature on contagion in credit markets and from studies that examine
the impact of bankruptcy on the stock price of a firm’s suppliers and customers.
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Table 2.1: Market-level, industry-level and firm-level risk factors documented as hav-
ing an influence on default correlation
Theoretical variable Model covariate
Market-level Measure of market uncertainty Volatility of stock price in-
dex (Duffie, Eckner, Horel, and
Saita, 2009)
Industry-level Product specificity Industry pair dummies (Rad-
datz, 2010)
Capital needs of production Measure of dependence on exter-
nal finance (Rajan and Zingales,
1998)
Industry concentration Herfindahl index (Lang and
Stulz, 1992)
Stage in industry life-cycle Industry growth rate and/or rate
of new entrants (Caves, 1998)
Firm-level Trade credit Ratio of trade credit to total
sales (Raddatz, 2010)
Leverage Ratio of bank debt to assets
(Raddatz, 2010); Book or market
leverage (Duffie, Eckner, Horel,
and Saita, 2009)
The empirical methodology for modeling credit contagion proposed by Egloff
and Leippold (2007) also augments standard factor models of asset returns with
a term that captures microstructural dependence between creditors and debtors.
The key difference between this model and the approaches for modeling financial
contagion are that Egloff and Leippold (2007) assume that the linkages between
assets are observable and explicitly include them in a factor model, whereas in
models of financial contagion the linkages between assets are unobservable and
are allowed for using a latent factor. By calibrating this model, Egloff and Leip-
pold (2007) conclude that even small levels of inter-dependence between debtors
in a credit portfolio has a significant impact on the tails of the portfolio loss dis-
tribution.
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In regards to how bankruptcy events may impact the stock price of a firm’s suppli-
ers and customers, Lang and Stulz (1992) investigated the effect of bankruptcy
announcements on the equity value of other firms in the same industry as the
bankrupt firm. On average, bankruptcy announcements decreased the equity
value of (a value-weighted portfolio of) competitors by 1%. Negative effects on
equity value were significantly larger for: a) highly levered industries and b) in-
dustries where the unconditional stock returns of the non-bankrupt and bankrupt
firms are highly correlated4. These negative effects on other firms within the same
industry may be offset by positive ‘competitor’ effects. Lang and Stulz (1992)
suggest that positive competitor effects are only realized when other firms are able
to increase their market share following the bankruptcy of a competitor, or to ac-
quire the bankrupt firm’s assets. In summary, the effects of a bankruptcy on the
equity value of rival firms within the same industry may be negative (contagion)
or positive (competitive benefits). Competitive benefits are more prominent in
concentrated industries, with low leverage, whereas contagion dominates in com-
petitive industries, with high leverage.
Jorion and Zhang (2009) extend the work of Lang and Stulz (1992) and exam-
ine intra-industry effects of bankruptcy announcements using credit spread and
stock price data. They find that the response of credit spreads and stock prices
varies significantly across industry and by the type of default (anticipated versus
non-anticipated); default correlation effects are significantly related to industry
characteristics such as concentration, leverage and correlation of stock prices.
Contagion effects are greater amongst industries in which firms have very similar
cash flows (or equity correlations) or are highly leveraged. Whereas, in highly
concentrated industries, the default of a competitor is likely to strengthen the
position of surviving firms, or reduce default intensity.
More recently, innovative sources of data on direct linkages have been used to
examine inter-industry contagion between linked firms. Using bankruptcy an-
4 A high degree of correlation in returns suggests that all firms within an industry are similar
to one another, or homogenous, in terms of cash flows and other factors that influence market
price.
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nouncements that detail the major creditors of bankrupt companies, Jorion and
Zhang (2009) examine the effect of unexpected bankruptcy events on creditors’
stock returns, and subsequent default probabilities. Using bankruptcy filings and
credit spread data, they find that creditors experience negative abnormal returns
if a debtor becomes bankrupt, and that losses reflect both direct exposure and
the loss of customer relationships (or present value of loss of future profits and
income). Creditors with large exposures are more likely to suffer financial dis-
tress. These effects are stronger for non-financial companies than for financial
companies. Finally, they illustrate that default clustering can be explained by
counterparty connections in this data set.
Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) test for abnormal returns following
bankruptcy filings of major suppliers and customers. The main finding is that
a supplier’s abnormal returns are significantly negative on average around both
the distress and bankruptcy filing of a major customer, especially when the fil-
ing firm’s industry experiences intra-industry contagion (Hertzel, Li, Officer, and
Rodgers, 2008). In some cases contagion effects spread beyond reliant suppliers
and major customers to firms in their respective industries. Hertzel, Li, Officer,
and Rodgers (2008) do not find any significant contagion effects on customers,
nor do they find any significant contagion effects on suppliers when intra-industry
contagion is not present in the bankrupt firm’s industry5. Wagner, Bode, and
Koziol (2011) also find significant levels of default dependency in auto firms’
supplier portfolios using detailed industry reviews of major suppliers in the auto-
mobile industry. They show that supplier default dependency can have significant
consequences.
Summary Most of the studies testing for contagion effects following default (or
bankruptcy) look for effects over reasonably short periods (e.g. around financial
distress filing events). Many of the effects of financial distress build up over
5 They were also not able to find a significant relationship between contagion (measured by
abnormal stock returns following default of a customer/ supplier) and industry concentration,
specialized product nature or leverage, due to the small size of their sample, the considerable
cross-sectional variation in customer and supplier returns, and the coarseness of proxies used
to capture the characteristics.
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time and occur simultaneously, therefore a continuous time methodology is often
more appropriate than an event study for studies of default risk (Duffie, Saita,
and Wang, 2007). With regard to the impact of linkages on stock prices, these
findings suggest that an unexplored area is the influence of shocks spread via
economic linkages on average stock returns over time.
2.5 Economic linkages and business cycle fluc-
tuations
The question of how shocks spread via linkages between sectors of the economy
influence aggregate outcomes (such as movements in Gross Domestic Product)
has been analyzed in the economic literature, and contains significant results that
shed light on how shocks spread between supplier and customer firms.
2.5.1 Theoretical literature
Economic business cycles are marked by distinct periods in which volatility and
correlation in economic aggregates increases (Lucas, 1981). Early attempts to
understand business cycles focussed exclusively on macroeconomic shocks, ar-
guing that micro shocks could not generate the aggregate movements observed
in markets (Lucas, 1981). The traditional argument against the relevance of
idiosyncratic shocks for aggregate fluctuations in economic and/or financial mar-
kets invokes the law of large numbers (see Gabaix (2011) and Ross (1976) for
discussion in context of economic markets and financial markets respectively).
The law of large numbers implies that when idiosyncratic shocks are independent
of one another, they will have a negligible aggregate affect in large portfolios.
This argument underpins the exclusive use of SRFs to aggregate fluctuations in
economic aggregates Lucas (1981)6. For a long time, almost no research refuted
this assumption, or considered situations in which idiosyncratic shocks might in-
fluence asset prices or create aggregate market fluctuations.
6 The law of large numbers also underpins the exclusive use of SRFs to explain asset prices in
almost all asset pricing models (Ross, 1976).
34
2.5 Economic linkages and business cycle fluctuations
Two recent papers, however, show that idiosyncratic shocks can cause fluctua-
tions in economic aggregates when the influence of different units in the economy
is very uneven (Gabaix, 2011; Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2010).
These papers show that idiosyncratic shocks do not average out in the aggregate
when a few firms have extremely high influence, but most have low influence (i.e.
the distribution of units’ influence, across the aggregate, is heavy-tailed). First,
Gabaix (2011) and Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2010) demonstrate
two separate sets of conditions in which the law of large numbers does not hold.
Gabaix (2011) shows that individual firm shocks do not average out in aggregate
when the distribution of firm sizes is heavy-tailed. As pointed out by Gabaix
(2011), modern economies are dominated by large firms, so shocks to these firms
can trigger non-trivial aggregate fluctuations. Second, Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and
Tahbaz-Salehi (2010) prove that individual firm shocks do not average out in
aggregate when firms are linked and the distribution of firms’ total influence via
these linkages is heavy-tailed. In an inter-linked economy, a firm’s influence on
the aggregate is determined by its connectivity as well as its size, so the results of
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2010) are most useful when considering
the spread of shocks between linked firms and/or assets. These papers highlight
that firm-level shocks to very large or very connected firms can create aggregate
economic fluctuations.
Empirical evidence on aggregate economic fluctuations also supports the hypoth-
esis that firm-level (or micro) shocks can create aggregate economic fluctuations.
Horvath (2000) and Shea (2002) find that micro shocks can cause aggregate fluc-
tuations. Dupor (1999) debates the evidence put forward by Horvath (2000) (that
sectoral shocks, propagated via inter-sector linkages, can cause aggregate fluctua-
tions), arguing that the variance of aggregates in multi-sector models is the same
as the variance of aggregates in their single-sector counterparts so sector-specific
shocks cannot cause aggregate fluctuations.
The crux of the debate between Dupor (1999) and Horvath (2000) is whether
or not the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) applies, so that idiosyncratic shocks av-
erage out in aggregate portfolios of size N at rate 1√
N
. Dupor (1999) assumes that
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the distribution of linkages across sectors is balanced7. Horvath (2000), on the
other hand, noted that actual US input-use matrices are not balanced; the num-
ber of sectors supplying inputs increases much slower than the total number of
sectors upon disaggregation. This implies that a few central ‘hub’ sectors provide
most of the inputs supporting production across a range of sectors, while most
sectors act as producers rather than input suppliers. In unbalanced economies,
the diversification of sector-specific shocks is affected by inter-sector linkages; and
the rate at which the law of large numbers applies is controlled by the rate of
increase in the number of full rows in the input-use matrix rather than by the
rate of increases in the total number of sectors (Horvath, 2000). In the types of
structures observed in the US economy, aggregate volatility from sector shocks
declines at less than half the rate implied by the law of large numbers, sug-
gesting that a sizable portion of aggregate volatility could be caused by shocks
to individual sectors(Horvath, 2000). Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi
(2010) formally proves that the structure of inter-sector linkages in an economy
determines whether or not the CLT applies, and therefore whether or not sector-
specific shocks can cause aggregate fluctuations.
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2010) provide a general framework for
understanding how linkages affect the spread of shocks between firms. The intu-
ition is as follows. The structure of inter-sector linkages determines the way in
which sector-specific shocks average out over the whole network of linked firms.
In the class of balanced economies considered by Dupor (1999) shocks to all sec-
tors have equal weight, so aggregate volatility decays in line with the law of large
numbers. When an economy is unbalanced (or heavily reliant on a few ‘hub’
sectors so that the distribution of linkages across sectors is uneven), however,
aggregate volatility decays much slower than the law of large numbers. This is
because adding unconnected (low influence) sectors to an economy does very little
to offset the effect of shocks to the high influence sectors in the economy. Ace-
moglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2010) develop an expression for the lower
bounds on aggregate volatility in terms of the linkages between sectors. They
7 Balanced economies are those in which each sector’s output is used to approximately the same
extent, such that the structure of linkages for each sector is approximately symmetrical.
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show that aggregate volatility converges to zero (i.e. the CLT applies) only if the
share of sales (or output) of the largest sector approaches zero as the number of
sectors increases. Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2010) and Horvath
(2000) both provide empirical evidence from US input-output tables that cor-
relation between outputs across sectors is highest when a few non-substitutable
sectors supply inputs (such that their share of aggregate output is bound away
from zero even as the number of sectors increases).
2.5.2 Empirical studies
In the theoretical literature above, the transmission of shocks via linkages (pro-
duction linkages and credit linkages respectively) amplifies shocks, meaning that
shocks that are initially small can have a significant effect on aggregate out-
comes8. Similarly, multi-sector models of economic production imply that the
output of sectors that buy goods from (sell goods to) each other will be corre-
lated (Raddatz, 2010; di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2010). The comovement of
economically linked businesses has been empirically verified at the country-level
and at the sector-level. Countries that trade more with each other exhibit higher
business cycle correlation(di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2010). At the sector-level,
Shea (2002) finds that input-output linkages between US manufacturing sectors
are important to sector-level comovement in output and employment. Likewise,
Raddatz (2010) finds that comovement in output across sector-pairs in 43 coun-
tries are related to the strength of input-output relationships and also to the use
of trade credit in these relationships.
Recent empirical studies have shown that inter-sector (input-output) linkages
do explain correlation in output at an industry level e.g. Horvath (2000), Shea
(2002) and Raddatz (2010). Shea (2002)finds that input-output linkages and lo-
cal activity spill-overs are important to comovement in aggregate output of US
8 Financial crises provide plenty of examples of shocks spreading far beyond the firm, market
and country in which they originate. For example, the potential default of Long Term Capital
Management in 1998 created financial difficulties for several other major investment banks,
and the collapse of the Thai Baht in 1997 had a wide-spread effect on prices throughout East
Asian stock markets.
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manufacturing industries, whereas aggregate activity spill-overs are not impor-
tant. Raddatz (2010) focuses on production networks in which firms are linked
by supplier-customer relationships involving extension of trade credit. Specifi-
cally, he investigates the relationship between the correlations and input-output
relations of 378 manufacturing industry-pairs across 44 countries (with different
degrees of use of trade credit) and finds that an increase in the use of trade-credit
along the input-output chain linking two industries increases the correlation of
their output.
Very few studies, however, consider how shocks are transmitted along supply
chains at the firm-level 9. The transmission of shocks through supplier-customer
linkages has been investigated at the sector-level by Lang and Stulz (1992) and
Raddatz (2010). Lang and Stulz (1992) investigated the effect of bankruptcy on
the equity value of firms in the same industry as the bankrupt firm. On average,
bankruptcy announcements decreased the returns of same-industry competitors
by 1%. Negative effects on equity value were significantly larger for highly lev-
ered and homogenous industries (where the stock returns of the non-bankrupt
and bankrupt firms were highly correlated). Within the same industry, negative
contagion may be offset by positive ‘competition’ effects when firms are able to
increase their market share following the bankruptcy of a competitor (Lang and
Stulz, 1992). Competition effects are stronger in highly concentrated industries
with low leverage(Lang and Stulz, 1992), where a bankruptcy is likely to free
up more market share and where fewer firms subsequently compete to secure
the available market share. In addition to the industry environment, the use of
trade credit amplifies contagion, as it increases the spread of shocks along supply
chains (Raddatz, 2010). In summary, contagion is strongest in competitive (not
concentrated) industries with high leverage.
Other studies also show that the spread of shocks via economic linkages in-
fluences stock returns. Jorion and Zhang (2009) and Hertzel, Li, Officer, and
Rodgers (2008) use bankruptcy announcements and filings to identify contagion
9 The small number of studies is partly because detailed data on supplier-customer linkages is
not readily available.
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between suppliers and customers following the bankruptcy of a major supplier
(customer). Jorion and Zhang (2009) find that the response of credit spreads
and stock prices varies significantly across industry and by the type of default
(anticipated versus non-anticipated). Default correlation effects are significantly
related to industry characteristics such as concentration, leverage and correlation
of stock prices. Like Lang and Stulz (1992), they show that contagion effects
are greater amongst industries in which firms have very similar cash flows or are
highly leveraged. There is evidence that a firm’s stock returns respond to signif-
icant events to its key customers (Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers, 2008; Cohen
and Frazzini, 2008). Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) examine suppliers
and customers of distressed firms using bankruptcy filings and find that the stock
prices of a firm’s suppliers, but not customers, are affected by its bankruptcy,
but the average effect for suppliers is less than 2% of the market value of equity.
Similarly, Cohen and Frazzini (2008) show that customer firms’ returns predict
their suppliers’ subsequent returns.
In summary, several studies find statistically significant counterparty effects on
suppliers’ stock prices, but the magnitude of the effects is small (Hertzel, Li,
Officer, and Rodgers, 2008; Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; Jorion and Zhang, 2009).
These studies, however, are limited in three ways. First, event studies focusing
on a time window around a bankruptcy filing or significant stock price movement
shed little light on how counterparty effects can influence returns over medium to
long term periods. Second, these studies focus on how the direct links between
suppliers and customers explain correlation in returns, and neglect the poten-
tial influence of shocks transmitted via indirect linkages on returns. As shown
in Chapter 4, shocks from suppliers (customers) multiple steps upstream (down-
stream) along a supply chain can be a non-diversifiable source of risk. If shocks
transmitted from suppliers (customers) multiple steps upstream (downstream)
are significant, this will increase the economic significance of counterparty ef-
fects. Finally, these studies do not test the hypothesis that the magnitude of
counterparty effects is higher in recessions.
Supplier-customer relationships are affected by dynamic factors such as shifts
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in market regimes, and structural, regulatory, or economic factors (Das, Duffie,
Kapadia, and Saita, 2007; Liu, 2009). It is widely noted in the credit risk liter-
ature that default correlation and default probabilities are higher in recessions
(Allen and Saunders, 2003). Jarrow and Yu (2001) show that default correlation
arises because of both a SRF and a counterparty risk factor (exposure to other
firms’ risk). Counterparty risk is a significant factor driving the default clustering
in recessions (Jarrow and Yu, 2001), suggesting counterparty effects are stronger
in recessions. Furthermore, there are economic reasons to expect that the trans-
mission of shocks via economic linkages is stronger in recessions. The influence
of inter-linkages on firm value depends on the extent of linkages and the degree
to which linked firms are substitutable (Lang and Stulz, 1992). The influence of
economic linkages is stronger in recessions as it is harder to replace a counter-
party in a recession, and because more firms are in distress in a recessionLang
and Stulz (1992). Hence, an important but unexplored question is whether the
magnitude of counterparty effects on stock returns is larger when indirect linkages
are considered and/or during recessions.
Summary The structure of linkages between sectors in the economy can have
a significant impact on the correlation and volatility of aggregate output (Ace-
moglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2010; Raddatz, 2010). Specifically, when
the economy is dominated by a few ‘hub’ sectors (so the distribution of economic
output across sectors is heavy-tailed), aggregate volatility decays much slower
than the law of large numbers predicts. This is because adding additional sec-
tors to the economy does very little to offset the effect of shocks to the ‘hub’
sectors in the economy. While Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2010)
notes that his framework could be down-scaled to the firm-level, as yet there is
no general framework for analyzing the relationship between inter-firm linkages
and asset prices. Both theoretical and empirical evidence exists that firm-level
shocks, transmitted via economic linkages, have a significant influence on eco-
nomic aggregates. This effect may be influenced by the use of credit.
40
2.6 Summary and research gaps
2.6 Summary and research gaps
The financial contagion literature has successfully identified channels relevant in
the spread of financial crises, many of which are unobservable factors associated
with investment behavior. There is a unified empirical methodology for modeling
and testing for contagion between markets. Far less is known about how firm-
level linkages influence contagion. In particular, there is a disagreement about
whether the degree or the structure of financial linkages is more important in the
process of financial contagion.
The literature on corporate default and credit contagion is helpful because unlike
studies of financial contagion, a lot of this research and modeling has been done
at the firm-level. Studies of corporate default are instructive in understanding
the factors that influence stock returns, and as a whole this literature suggests
that it is important to control for the market-level, industry-level and firm-level
risk factors shown in Table 2.1 when modeling firms’ asset values or stock prices.
In addition this literature highlights the potential for regime shifting behavior in
the way that firms’ asset values respond to shocks to their suppliers, customers
or industry. In particular, the influence of inter-linkages on firms’ net worth is
likely to be greater when firms are more reliant on counterparties because they
cannot easily substitute them should they fail. Therefore shocks are more likely
to spread between suppliers and customers: when spare debt capacity and access
external finance are lower, or in a recession.
Finally, there are also a range of economic models of the way that shocks spread
through economic networks, and the impacts that shocks spread through inter-
sector economic linkages have on aggregate volatility in GDP (Acemoglu, Ozdaglar,
and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2010; Gabaix, 2011). Gaps remain, however, in the broad area
of inter-firm contagion (not specifically via economic linkages). The most relevant
gaps in the existing research may be summarized as follows:
• The existing literature focuses on financial linkages between firms. Limited
consideration has been given to the way in which shocks spread through
production and economic linkages influence asset prices and/or aggregate
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market outcomes. These shocks can potentially affect asset prices if they
change the expected future cash-flow stream of any firms.
• There are very few firm-level studies that assess the effect of inter-firm
linkages on asset prices (partly due to the lack of detailed information on
inter-firm linkages). Most studies focus on inter-linkages that influence
output and asset prices at the sector-level or market-level. For example,
most studies of contagion are at the level of international financial markets,
or across asset classes within the same national market.
• Finally, there has been a focus on the spread of shocks during crisis periods,
but comparatively little is known about how shocks may spread in non-crisis
periods through channels associated with production and economic activity.
2.7 Research questions and hypotheses
In order to address some of these gaps, the research questions (RQs) addressed
in this thesis are:
1. How does the structure of economic linkages influence the volatility of stock
returns? (Chapters 3 and 6)
2. How do shocks transmitted via economic linkages increase correlation be-
tween linked firms’ returns? (Chapter 5)
3. How do shocks transmitted via economic linkages affect average returns,
cross-sectionally and/or over time? (Chapter 6)
In particular, RQ 1 addresses whether shocks transmitted via inter-firm link-
ages are diversifiable. To answer this question I test the hypothesis that return
volatility increases as the structure of upstream and/or downstream linkages be-
comes more concentrated (i.e. as the distribution of inter-firm linkages becomes
heavy-tailed). My rationale (based on the work of Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and
Tahbaz-Salehi (2010) and the theoretical model presented in Chapter 3) is that
the structure of upstream and downstream linkages determines the way in which
firm-level shocks average out and influence return volatility. As shown in Chapter
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3, return volatility is influenced by direct and transmitted (systematic and firm-
level) shocks; when the structure of the linkages by which shocks are transmitted
is concentrated (such that a few firms are highly connected while most are not)
the law of large numbers does not apply, so return volatility will decay slower
than rate 1√
N
as a firm adds customers and/or suppliers.
RQ 2 focuses on the correlation between the returns of pairs of assets. I investi-
gate the relationship between economic linkages and stock return correlation, and
ask: do shocks transmitted via supply chains increase correlation between linked
firms’ returns?. If so, a secondary question is whether the influence of inter-firm
linkages on return correlation (i.e. stock price dependence between linked firms)
is different in bear markets than in bull markets (as suggested by numerous stud-
ies including Longin and Solnik (2001)).
By adapting correlation-based tests of contagion (see Dungey, Fry, Gonzlez-
Hermosillo, and Martin (2005)), I test the hypothesis that as the degree of linkage
between two firms increases, so does the strength of transmission of shocks from
one firm to the other. When there is significant transmission of shocks from one
firm to another, the two firms’ returns will be correlated because they are ex-
posed to the same shocks. My rationale is that the degree of linkage between
two firms determines the strength of transmission of idiosyncratic shocks from
one firm to the other. Finally, I test whether the sensitivity of return correlation
to inter-firm linkages is higher in recession and/or high correlation regimes or for
more leveraged firms (as suggested by the work of Lang and Stulz (1992) and
Raddatz (2010)).
To the extent that the public is aware of the linkages between assets, the prices
of traded securities will reflect the public’s assessment of the importance of risk
that may be transmitted through these linkages (counterparty risk) (Jarrow and
Yu, 2001). Therefore, RQ 3 is whether the cross-section of stock returns reflects
a premium for exposure to shocks to economically linked suppliers and/or cus-
tomers, in addition to SRFs. If so, a secondary test is whether this premium (i.e.
stock price dependence between linked firms) is higher during economic recessions
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than it is during economic expansions.
My rationale is that the degree of upstream and downstream linkages determines
firms’ exposure to shocks to linked firms and in turn influences return volatility.
Investors will demand compensation for this higher risk exposure and/or volatility
via a risk premium. Furthermore, the premium for the degree and/or structure
of upstream and/or downstream linkages should be higher in recessions when it
is hard to replace or substitute linked firms.
In addition to informing the RQs, I use the literature reviewed above to de-
velop a theoretical framework and methodology (in Chapters 3 and 4) which is
used to empirically investigate the RQs (in Chapters 5 and 6).
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Chapter 3
Theoretical framework
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I develop a theoretical framework for modeling how inter-linkages
between firms influence stock returns. I develop a model of stock returns that
shows how the structure of inter-linkages between firms determines whether or
not shocks transmitted via linkages influence stock returns. The reduced form
of the model corresponds to a factor model of stock returns. I prove that factor
model of stock returns should be extended to include a factor representing the
portion of shocks transmitted via linkages that is non-diversifiable.
Section 2 presents an original firm-level model that illustrates how inter-firm
linkages affect returns. The main results in Section 2 specify the relationship
between inter-linkages, return variance and return correlation in a portfolio of
stocks. Section 3 outlines the implications of these results for factor models of
stock returns.
3.2 Model of economic linkages and returns
In firm-level economic networks, shocks may be transmitted between customers
and suppliers. For example, during 2008 Ford Motor Co. was concerned about
the failure of its competitors, General Motors and Chrysler, because such an
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event could trigger the failure of upstream suppliers that they all share. Multi-
sector models of economic activity model the influence of shocks transmitted
between different sectors of the economy on aggregate economic activity1 (Ace-
moglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2010). One way to develop a model of how
economic linkages influence stock returns is to note that multi-sector models can
be downscaled to apply to a set of firms (rather than a set of economic sectors).
There are fundamental differences, however, between the influence of economic
linkages on economic activity and the influence of economic linkages on finan-
cial asset prices. In this thesis I focus on modeling the influence of firm-level
economic linkages on stock prices. For the purposes of asset pricing studies, it
is important that the linkages reflect the cash-flow between firms (rather than
the flow of intermediate input and output goods between firms, as in economic
models). Furthermore, at the firm-level substitution of suppliers and customers
needs to be modeled. As shown in Chapter 2, substitution possibilities might be
different in different economic conditions. For example, firms might be beholden
to their suppliers in a recession, but can switch suppliers with sufficient advance
planning outside of recession periods. I develop a framework which addresses
these fundamental issues.
The analysis of the influence of economic linkages on stock returns is based on
the relation between stock returns and cash-flows noted in Chen, Roll, and Ross
(1986). I.e. stock prices can be written as discounted expected cash-flows,
P =
E(c)
k
where p is the price of the stock, E(c) is the expected stream of future cash-flows
associated with the stock and k is the discount rate. Ignoring dividend pay-outs,
this implies that the actual return of the stock in any period (R) is given by
dP
P
= R =
dE(c)
E(c)
− dk
k
.
1 The mathematical tools and economic models that underpin this framework are reviewed in
Appendix 3.B.
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Holding the discount rate constant, R ≈ dE(c)
E(c)
i.e. factors which change a firm’s
expected future cash-flows will affect its stock returns. If economic linkages be-
tween firms affect correlation and volatility in firm-level cash-flows2, therefore, it
is reasonable to expect that these linkages will in turn affect stock returns.
The basic intuition of the model in this section is that if expectations fully incor-
porate available information, so that changes in expectations are driven by shocks
only, then when firms are linked the one-period, equilibrium change in expected
cash-flows for firms i = 1, ..., n is given by:
R ≈ dE(c)
E(c)
≈ CSη + βF
Where CS3 is a matrix capturing direct and indirect inter-firm linkages, whose
ij’th element CSij is the share of firm j in providing firm i’s total sales revenue
through direct and indirect linkages; η is a vector of firm-specific cash-flow shocks
(which may be transmitted via inter-firm linkages); and βF is a weighted summed
of common, systematic cash-flow shocks.
I now formalize this intuition and develop a model which shows how the structure
of economic linkages (supply chains) influences the marginal and joint distribution
of stock returns. I show that in certain structures of inter-linkage the proportion
of aggregate risk explained by shocks transmitted via economic linkages is non-
diversifiable and significantly influences returns, even in large portfolios.
Let W denote a (n by n) matrix whose elements wij represent the strength of the
business interdependence between i and j. Let wij be defined as the share of i’s
2 Research reviewed in Chapter 2 shows that economic linkages between sectors affect the cor-
relation and volatility of sector-level income and output (Shea, 2002; Horvath, 2000; Raddatz,
2010).
3 The notation used from now on is: matrices are denoted by bold, capital letters (e.g. F).
Vectors are denoted by bold, lower case letters (e.g. f). Scalars are represented by plain,
lower case letters (e.g. f). Vectors are columns by definition, so row vectors are obtained by
taking the transpose of a column vector, which is denoted by a prime (e.g. f ’). I is a unit
matrix, which is a square matrix with ones on the diagonal, and zeros elsewhere.
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revenue received from j4. The matrix W captures the structure of a weighted,
directed inter-firm network. By definition, the row sums of W are less than or
equal to one5, so W acts as the transition matrix of a Markov Chain describing
the movement of shocks across firms. wij represents the probability of a shock to
firm j moving to firm i in one step. The probability of a shock moving from j to
i in m steps is given by the ij’th element of the m’th power of W , i.e. (Wm)ij.
When firms are inter-linked, shocks initially hitting only one firm can feed back
between firms. The structure of W determines how transmitted shocks affect
returns.
In Figure 3.1 the firm j is influenced by all shocks that enter the circle la-
beled j. Allowing for feedback, the total effect of a shock to firm i (ηi) on firm
j can be represented as the sum over all paths, of any length, from i to j or
ηi(wji + w
2
jiwkjwik + w
3
jiw
2
kjw
2
ik · · · ). The total effect of the vector of shocks,
η = [ηi, ηj, ηk], on firm j is the sum over all paths, of any length, that the shocks
can take to firm j6.
As shocks circulate the inter-firm network specified by W , I assume that each
link independently has the same probability 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 of passing on a shock.
This means that a k-step chain has probability a αk of passing on a shock from
start to finish . α = 1 corresponds to complete pass-through, and α = 0 to ab-
sence of any pass-through. Allowing for the influence of linkages, the total effect
of a shock directly to firm j (ηj) on firm i is the α-weighted sum of all transition
4 In a supply network wij represents the average cost of goods firm i must purchase from firm
j to produce one unit of its own output. wii may be greater than zero as firm’s can use their
own output to as an input into production.
5 In a closed model, W includes all suppliers of all firms so the
∑
j wij = 1; in an open model,
W includes only some of a firm’s suppliers so
∑
j wij < 1.
6 So in Figure 3.1, the total effect of the vector of shocks, η = [ηi, ηj , ηk], on firm j is given by
εj = ηi(wji + w
2
jiwkjwik + w
3
jiw
2
kjw
2
ik · · · )
+ ηj(1 + wkjwikwji + w
2
kjw
2
ikw
2
ji · · · )
+ ηk(wikwji + w
2
ikw
2
jiwkj · · · ).
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of the return model with linkages. The return is the cumula-
tive sum of all shocks passing through the inner circles representing firms
i, j and k. The inter-linkages are the lines marked wji, wkj and wik
connecting the inner circles. The inter-linkages between firms mean that
shocks hitting each firm (ηi, ηj , ηk) have an indirect impact on all firms
connected through one or more inter-linkages to the initial shock. Feed-
back occurs over looping paths e.g. the shock to firm i will travel to j,
then k, then back to i etc.
probabilities from j to i or
∞∑
m=0
αm(Wm)ijηj,
and the total effect of all transmitted shocks on firm i is the sum of the total
effect of all shocks η1 · · · ηn
n∑
j=1
∞∑
m=0
αm(Wm)ijηj.
Assuming that returns are proportional to the sum of all (direct and indirect)
cash-flow shocks, stacking this model for i = 1, · · · , n yields the following system
49
3.2 Model of economic linkages and returns
of equations for the total effect of transmitted shocks, η = [ηi, ηj, ηn], on returns
R ≈
∞∑
m=0
αmWmη
= (I− αW)−1η
= CSη, (3.1)
where R is a vector consisting of the one-period return for firms i = 1, ..., n; I is
an n by n identity matrix; α is a constant between zero and one; W is the n by
n matrix of inter-firm linkage weights and η is a vector of independent firm-level
shocks. As above, the parameter α is the probability of a single link passing on
a shock.
The elements CSij, of the square matrix CS, denote the total effect of a shock
to firm j on firm i, or the total connectivity of firm i to firm j (via all 1-step,
2-step, 3-step etc. paths from firm j to firm i). In (3.1), η is the effect of shocks
direct to the firm and (CS− I)η is the indirect effect of shocks transmitted via
inter-linkages on returns. The indirect effects, (CS− I)η, may be non-linear and
capture the effect of any feedback on returns.
In the model above, α is assumed to be exogenous, time-invariant and the same
for all firms. (In section 3.2.4, however, I simulate a situation in which α is an
endogenous function of the average level of shocks. I specify α to be higher when
shocks are negative than when shocks are positive, to simulate a scenario in which
it is much harder for firms to substitute or replace a counterparty during reces-
sions.) It is also assumed that the network of inter-linkages is deterministic and
exogenous7. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a solution to
(3.1) are included in Appendix 3.A.
One assumption of (3.1) is that the shocks directly hitting each firm are indepen-
dent of one another. Put another way, model (3.1) does not allow for common
7 If shocks spread rapidly through asset markets, firms are unlikely to have time to alter
linkages before they are affected; so a static network is appropriate in this context.
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of the return model with linkages and common shocks. The
return is the cumulative sum of all shocks passing through the inner cir-
cles representing firms i and j. The inter-linkage is the line marked wji
connecting the inner circles. Because of wji, firm j is exposed to a portion
of the common shock F passed on via firm i. This indirect exposure to
the common shock changes j’s return by βiFwji.
systematic shocks, such as monetary policy shocks or shocks to the general state
of the economy, that hit each firm. This situation is shown in Figure 3.2.
Let F be a vector of K systematic shocks and β be a matrix of asset-specific
exposure weights, the return relationship allowing for systematic shocks becomes:
R = (I− αW)−1(βF + η)
= CS(βF + η)
= CSβF + CSη, (3.2)
And equivalently the firm level model becomes,
Ri =
N∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
CSijβjkFk +
N∑
j=1
CSijηj. (3.3)
The systematic shocks Fk (k = 1, · · · , K) are non-diversifiable because they affect
all firms. Whether or not the total (direct and indirect) effect of the shock ηj is
diversifiable depends on the distribution of CSij over j = 1, · · · , N as proven in
Section 3.2.3.
Model 3.2 illustrates that economic linkages can amplify the effect of systematic
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shocks on asset returns, as firm i’s exposure to systematic risk factor Fk increases
from βikFk to
∑N
j=1 CSijβjkFk. Most tests for financial contagion (to identify the
transmission of shock between markets) condition on common factors, because
common exposure to systematic shocks is not evidence of contagion. Provided
each firm i = 1, · · · , N is allowed its own firm-specific sensitivity to common
factors (β∗ik ≈
∑N
j=1 CSijβjk), the residual returns after controlling for common
factors is given by (3.1). To theoretically study how inter-linkages influence di-
versification, it is important that the shocks that are transmitted via linkages
are independent of one another; therefore, in the following sections I retain the
assumption that systematic shocks directly hitting the firm have been controlled
for, so equation (3.1) only captures the portion of stock returns associated with
(direct and transmitted) idiosyncratic shocks.
3.2.1 Mean and variance of returns
The mean and variance of returns in (3.1) depend upon the total exposure im-
plied by inter-linkages, measured by CS. E.g., assuming shocks are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.), all firms with first order exposure of 90% (i.e.∑
j wij = 0.9) will have the same mean return if their total exposure to higher
order effects is the same (such that
∑
j CSij =
∑
j CSlj), and will have the same
variance if
∑
j CS
2
ij =
∑
j CS
2
lj.
Given CS, if firm-level shocks (η1, · · · , ηn) are independent r.v.s with finite mean
and variance E(ηj) = µj and V ar(ηj) = σ
2
j <∞ for j = 1, ..., n and Cov(ηj, ηk) =
0 for j 6= k, then the mean, variance and covariance of returns (Ri =
∑
j CSijηj)
are:
E(Ri) =
n∑
j=1
CSijE(ηj) =
n∑
j=1
CSijµj
V ar(Ri) =
n∑
j=1
CS2ijV ar(ηj) =
n∑
j=1
CS2ijσ
2
j
Cov(Ri, Rl) =
n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
CSijCSlkCov(ηj, ηk) =
n∑
j=1
CSijCSljσ
2
j . (3.4)
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The expected return, E(Ri), is driven by the i’th row sum of the matrix of to-
tal exposures CS, or ||CSi|| =
∑
j CSij. Similarly, the variance returns is a
weighted sum of the variance of the firm-level shocks, which scales with ||CSi||22;
where ||CSi||2 =
√∑n
j=1CS
2
ij is the norm of the i’th row of CS. Thus the total
exposure implied by firm i’s linkages, ||CSi||, drives the mean and variance of its
returns, as distinct from first order exposure implied by firm i’s direct links, ||Wi||.
Diversification of Wi reduces risk so long as it either reduces or diversifies to-
tal connectivity (i.e. ||CSi||). For example, in all structures in Figure 3.3, firm
4 has the same total first order exposure (||W4|| = 0.9) but different combina-
tions of total connectivity (||CS4||) and total risk exposure (||CS4||2). As return
variance is proportional to ||CSi||22, variance reduces as ||CSi|| becomes more dis-
aggregated. In Figure 3.3, moving from A to B reduces the variance of returns,
as ||CS4||22 drops from 3 to 2.5 because the 100% first order exposure to η3 has
been split into two 50% exposures to η2 and η3. It is also possible to reduce risk
by reducing total exposure while maintaining the same first order exposure. In
Panels C and D of Figure 3.3 the second order influence of firm 1 on firm 4 (i.e.
the product of the weights along all 2 step paths lead from firm 1 to firm 4) is
lower than in A and B; so ||CS4|| = 3 in A and B, but ||CS4|| = 2.5 in C and D.
Finally, firm 4’s return variance will be lower in D than in C as the total exposure
to η1 is reduced in D by linking to firm 5 rather than firm 1 (i.e. in C: CS41 = 1,
CS51 = 0 and ||CSi||22 = 2.25 but in D: CS41 = CS51 = 0.5 and ||CSi||22 = 1.75).
In summary, it is possible to reduce risk by diversifying first order linkages (Wi)
across an increasing number of firms if the total exposure to transmitted shocks
(||CSi||) is reduced or spread across more firms. Diversification fails to reduce risk
if changing first order linkages increases or concentrates higher order exposures.
Diversification of an investment portfolio follows the same principles since port-
folio returns and variances are weighted averages of the corresponding measures
for the component assets8.
8 That is, the variance of portfolio returns is given by pCSΣCS′p′, where p = [p1, · · · , pn]
is a row-vector of portfolio weights summing to 100%; CS is the (n by n) connectivity
matrix; Σ denotes the (n by n) diagonal covariance matrix of η. The investor must minimize
pCSΣCS′p′ subject to a fixed level of expected returns, by choosing p conditional upon the
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Figure 3.3: Networks with identical first-order connections that have different levels
of aggregate volatility resulting from higher-order connections. In all four
structures, firm 4 has the same total first order exposure (||W4|| = 1) but
different volatility (Panel A: ||CS4|| = 3, ||CS4||22 = 3; Panel B: ||CS4|| =
3, ||CS4|22 = 2.5; Panel C: ||CS4|| = 2.5, ||CS4||22 = 2.25; Panel D:
||CS4|| = 2.5, ||CS4||22 = 1.75). Volatility may be reduced by reducing or
diversifying total connectivity. When total exposure is constant (||CS4|| =
3 in both A and B), diversification of first order exposure reduces risk. In
Panel B firm 4’s 100% exposure to firm 3 has been split into two 50%
exposures so ||CS4||22 drops from 3 to 2.5. In Panel C and D, firm 4’s
risk is lower than in A or B because second order exposure to firm 1
has been reduced so ||CS4|| drops from 3 to 2.5. Finally, Panel D has
the lowest risk (||CS4||22 = 1.75) as second order exposure is reduced and
diversified.
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3.2.2 The asymptotic distribution and variance of returns
The assumption of multivariate normally distributed returns is central to many
asset pricing and risk management models (Embrechts, McNeil, and Straumann,
1999). Therefore, it is crucial to understand how inter-linkages affect the shape
of the return distribution. First note that if η has a multivariate normal distri-
bution, then returns in (3.1) will also be normally distributed. In most financial
applications, however, the distribution of firm-level shocks is not precisely known,
so neither is the exact distribution of returns in (3.1).
To obtain general results regarding how inter-linkages affect returns I consider
a sequence of portfolios of increasing size, corresponding to increasing disaggre-
gation of first order exposure as portfolio size increases. As Ri is a weighted sum
of independent r.v.s, [η1, · · · , ηn], its asymptotic behavior can be derived using
central limit theorems. Namely, the Lindeberg-Feller (LF) theorem can be used
to derive the asymptotic behavior of Ri. The LF theorem says that so long as
each r.v. accounts for an infinitely small proportion of aggregate variance as
n → ∞, the normalized sum of the r.v.s will be normally distributed. Formally,
the asymptotic distribution of returns can be characterized as follows:
Proposition 1: Asymptotic return distribution Let Ri be a random variable
(r.v.) defined as
Ri = CSiη =
n∑
j=1
CSijηj, (3.5)
where CSi = [CSi1, · · · , CSin] is the i’th row of the matrix CS = (I− αW)−1;
η = [η1, · · · , ηn] is a vector of i.i.d. shocks, centered so that E(ηi) = 0, with finite
variance E(η2i ) = σ
2 <∞. Then, as proven in Appendix 3.C
• If maxj(CSij)||CSi||2 → 0 as n→∞ then Ri||CSi||2 → N(0, σ2)
• If maxj(CSij)||CSi||2 9 0 as n → ∞, and η is a vector of independent, non-normal
r.v.s, then the distribution of Ri, when it exists, is not normal.
first order exposures of other firms (Wj j 6= i) and Σ. This situation is depicted in Figure
3.3 if 4 represents a portfolio allocating p = [p1, · · · , pn] across assets.
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Proposition 1 establishes that returns, when normalized by ||CSi||2, are asymptot-
ically normal so long as each shock affecting firm i accounts for a negligible frac-
tion of the total standard deviation of i’s returns as n→∞ (i.e. maxj(CSij)||CSi||2 → 0).
On the other hand, if one or more shocks accounts for a positive proportion of
aggregate variance as n → ∞ then returns will not have a normal distribution
unless the shocks themselves are normal. The firm corresponding to the largest
term in CSi = [CSi1, · · · , CSin] is referred to as the dominant firm in i’s network.
Note that a dominant customer (supplier) may be several steps downstream or
upstream the firm’s supply chain. If the dominant firm does not account for a di-
minishing proportion of total risk as firm i spreads its exposure over more firms,
then the distribution of returns will not be normal. Instead it will reflect the
distribution of shocks to the dominant firm (Gnedenko and Kolmogorov, 1954).
Dominant firms are characteristic of ‘Star’ networks (see Figure 3.8). In a Star
network regardless of how an investor chooses assets from the pool of assets shown,
shocks to the central firm 2 will have a significant influence on the aggregate risk
of the portfolio. If the Star network in Figure 3.8 is expanded by adding more
spokes out from firm 2, then the influence of shocks to firm 2 on the aggregate
return will be significant even in very large portfolios. In contrast, if the idiosyn-
cratic risk exposure of i was spread evenly over j = 1, ...n (as in the Balanced
network in Figure 3.8) then
maxj(CSij)
||CSi||2 → 0 as n→∞.
Networks with dominant firms can arise in real world business structures. For
example, say a major source of revenue for Allegheny Technologies is the sale of
metals to electronics companies producing semiconductors. If all of the electron-
ics companies buying metals from Allegheny Technologies sell semiconductors
to Apple and IBM, then by adding more customers Allegheny Technologies is
not reducing its exposure to negative events that may affect Apple and IBM. In
this case Apple and IBM are dominant customers of Allegheny Technologies, and
shocks to these customers may not be diversified away. The returns of Allegheny
Technologies are unlikely to be normally distributed and may have higher volatil-
ity because of exposure to transmitted risk from its dominant customers.
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When there are dominant firms the summands of ||CSi||2 are not uniformly dis-
tributed, as one entry in CSi must be larger than the others. So the variation
across CSi is an indicator of whether or not returns converge to normality
9. If
there is a dominant firm in row i then (CSij − CSi) will be large for that firm,
which will increase V ar(CSi). Conversely, small variance across the rows of CS
implies that returns are more likely to be asymptotically normally distributed.
3.2.3 Diversification of return volatility
It is also of interest to determine the rate at which return volatility decays (i.e.
the rate at which transmitted shocks are diversified away) as a firm increases the
number of linkages it has to other firms. Several studies show that when the
distribution of firm sizes is heavy-tailed, the volatility of total market returns
(or any weighted sum of individual firms’ returns, such as the return on a stock
market index) converges to zero at a rate that is slower than the 1√
n
rate pre-
dicted by the law of large numbers (Malevergne, P., and Sornette, 2009; Gabaix,
2011). Intuitively, the influence of the largest firms on the aggregate cannot be
diversified away even when the number of firms in the aggregate is very large.
I show that a similar result holds at the firm-level when firms are inter-linked.
That is, I show that when the distribution of i’s total risk exposure across the
n firms to which it is linked (CSi1, · · · , CSin) is heavy-tailed, the volatility of i’s
return decays slower than 1√
n
as n increases. Intuitively, the influence of domi-
nant suppliers and customers on firm i cannot be diversified away even when i
increases the number of linkages it has to other firms.
If returns are weighted sums of independent shocks, as in (3.1), return volatility
should be higher for firms with concentrated exposure to a few shocks, because
shocks will not average out in this case. That is, risk should be higher for firms
whose total risk exposure across j = 1, ..., n (CSi1, · · · , CSin) has a heavy-tailed
9 To see this note that the variance of entries along CSi is
V ar(CSi) = s
2
in = n
−1∑
j
(CSij − CSi)2 = n−1
∑
j
CS2ij − CSi
2
,
where CSi = n
−1∑
j CSij is the average row entry.
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distribution. It has been shown that the distribution of sector-level connectiv-
ity is heavy-tailed and can be characterized by a power law (Carvalho, 2008;
Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2010; Focardi and Fabozzi, 2004). In
Chapter 4 I show that the distribution of firm-level connectivity between listed
US firms is also heavy-tailed and can be characterized by a power law. To define
this situation formally, total connectivity has power law tails if the probability
that firm i has total connectivity ||CSi|| greater than k is proportional to k−ζi for
ζi > 0. That is
Pr(||CSi|| > k) = Pk = ck−ζi , (3.6)
where c is a positive constant; k is an integer ≥ 1 and 0 < ζi ≤ 2 is the tail
index. If the distribution of total connectivity across firms can be approximated
by a power law, and returns are given by Ri =
∑
j CSijηj, then the rate at which
return volatility decays as portfolio size increases is given by Proposition 2:
Proposition 2: Lower bound on return volatility
Let firm i be linked to n other firms with connectivity weights CSi1, ..., CSin that
follow a power law such that Pr(||CSi|| > k) = Pk = ck−ζi. If η = [η1, · · · , ηn] is
a vector of i.i.d. shocks with E(ηj) = 0 and E(η
2
j ) = σ
2 <∞, then as proven in
Appendix 3.C √
V ar(Ri) ≥ σ
n
1− 1
ζi
. (3.7)
Proposition 2 shows that the volatility of firm i’s returns is directly related to
the structure of its linkages to other firms. Specifically, the tail parameter of
the distribution of firm i’s connectivity (ζi) determines the rate at which shocks
directly and indirectly hitting10 firm i are diversified away. It sets a lower bound
for the return volatility of the form σ
f(n)
, where the denominator f(n) controls
the rate of decay in return volatility. Higher ζi means that returns converge to a
lower variance distribution as n → ∞. For example, if the distribution of total
exposure to transmitted shocks across j = 1, ..., n (i.e. CSi1, · · · , CSin) has finite
variance (ζi = 2), then return volatility decays according to
1√
n
. In contrast, if
the distribution of total exposure has heavy-tails, and 0 < ζi < 2, return volatility
10 Indirect shocks are those that initially hit a firm other than firm i, but are transmitted to
firm i via its economic linkages.
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decays much slower than 1√
n
, at the rate n
1− 1
ζi .
Similar results have been proven by Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi
(2010) and Carvalho (2008) in the context of GDP volatility in a multi-sector
economy. Their estimates of the distribution of connectivity across sectors of the
US economy using Bureau of Economic Analysis’s input-output accounts from
1972 to 2002 show that ζ ≈ 1.2 (Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-
Salehi, 2011). The magnitude of this difference is economically significant. For
example, if a portfolio expands from 5 to 500 firms, under a Gaussian assumption
one would expect a ten-fold decrease in return volatility. However, if the distri-
bution of the weights is heavy-tailed with ζ = 1.2 there will only be a two-fold
decrease in volatility. Thus, Proposition 2 shows that volatility decays signifi-
cantly slower when the distribution of total risk exposure has heavy-tails. For
ζ < 2 a small number of firms (assets) emerge as dominant risk exposures, and
shocks to these firms (assets) may be non-diversifiable.
Summary Transmitted idiosyncratic shocks are only likely to be diversifiable
if a firm does not have any dominant suppliers or customers; where a firm has
a dominant supplier (customer) if the share of input supply (sales revenue) from
the largest supplier (customer) remains bounded away from zero as the firm adds
more suppliers (customers). The theory above shows that economic linkages
can influence returns via a process of shocks passed on from suppliers and/or
customers failing to average out.
3.2.4 Simulation of returns in common networks
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 show how the structure of inter-linkages de-
termines the way in which independent firm-level shocks to linked firms affect
residual returns. In particular, if the distribution of both the total connectivity
(CSi1, · · · , CSin) and firm-level shocks have finite variance, then returns will be
normally distributed and return volatility decays at the rate 1√
n
. On the other
hand, if either total connectivity or the shocks follow a heavy-tailed distribution,
then returns may not be normally distributed, and return volatility is likely to
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decay much slower than 1√
n
.
I use Monte Carlo simulation to analyze the effect of different structures of inter-
linkage on the shape and the volatility of the return distribution. I also investi-
gate the affect that changing the influence of linkages has on return correlation.
Specifically, I assess whether Proposition 1 and 2 predict the shape of the return
distribution and the rate at which firm-level shocks are diversified away in three
common networks. The different networks shown in Figure 3.8 represent stylized
market arrangements.
A Star network consists of one central firm to which all other firms are con-
nected. This central firm provides a common connection point through which
shocks spread to all firms. This structure arises when the central firm is a very
large firm, with dominant market share in an industry or product crucial to
other firms in the portfolio. For example, within a large credit portfolio, Egloff
and Leippold (2007) find that Star-type structures are common in the retail and
real estate industries, as a few large retail companies (real estate firms) act as
hubs to many suppliers (renters). In a Ring network each firm has one sup-
plier and one customer, such that there is a single continuous pathway between
any two firms in the network. This structure arises when firms rely on a single
supplier, rather than a diversified supplier network, for example in a vertically
integrated company or a conglomerate. Finally, in a Balanced network each firm
is equally connected to all other firms in the network. The Balanced structure
corresponds to a situation where firms have a diversified supplier network, with
multiple suppliers, rather than a single supplier. Importantly, the distribution of
risk exposure across j = 1, ..., n (CSi1, · · · , CSin) is different in each case. The
networks in Figure 3.8 are ordered from most heavy-tailed to least heavy-tailed,
i.e. ζStar < ζRing < ζBalanced. In the Star exposure is heavily concentrated on firm
2 so the distribution of risk exposure is heavy-tailed and ζStar  2. In the Ring
and Balanced network the distribution of risk exposure is more uniform, so ζ is
closer to 2.
I simulate returns using (3.1) and measuring the sensitivity of the return dis-
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tribution to: the size of the portfolio, the network structure and the distribution
of firm-level shocks. Star, Ring and Balanced networks representing portfolios
with 4, 10, 20, 40, 70 and 100 firms are constructed11. To imitate diversifica-
tion of a fixed dollar amount across an increasing number of counter-parties, the
total first-order exposure is held constant (
∑
j wij = 0.9) as the portfolio size
is increased. For example, in the Balanced network with 4 firms, all entries are
equal to 0.9
4
but with forty firms, all entries are equal to 0.9
40
. Initially I set α = 1
to explore sensitivity to W , n and η. In the section below titled ‘Asymmetric
correlations’, however, α is allowed to vary.
For each network returns are simulated for three different distributions of η, all
with E(η) = 0:
• A standard normal distribution, i.e. η ∼ N(0, 1)
• A uniform distribution with mean zero and unit variance, i.e. η ∼ U(−1.732, 1.732)
• A Student’s t distribution with 1.5 degrees of freedom, i.e. η ∼ t(1.5)
Note that the first two distributions have variance of 1, while the Student’s t
distribution with 1.5 degrees of freedom has infinite variance12.
Chi-square goodness-of-fit and Jarque-Bera test statistics are used to test the
null hypothesis that returns are normally distributed. These tests complement
each other as the Chi-square test is based on mean and variance of the observed
distribution, while the Jarque-Bera test is based on skewness and kurtosis. For
finite variance shocks, the results are based on 104 simulated vectors of length
n. The robustness of results to the number of simulations was tested by using
102/103/104/106 simulated vectors. The results of the Chi-square and Jarque-
Bera tests are robust to the size of the simulated error vector. For infinite vari-
ance shocks (i.e. Student’s t distribution with v = 1.5 degrees of freedom) 106
simulations were used for each firm, as 106 or more observations are required to
11 Campbell et al. 2001 find that in the period 1986 to 1997 reducing idiosyncratic risk to 5%
of excess standard deviation required almost 50 stocks.
12 As, if Y follows a t distribution with n degrees of freedom, E(Y k) exists only for k < n
degrees of freedom.
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observe the tail behavior in heavy-tailed data sets (Borak, Wolfgang, and Weron,
2005).
Simulation of finite variance shocks
Normal and uniform shocks were simulated for networks, with 4, 10, 20, 40,
70 and 100 firms. I calculated returns using (3.1) and tested whether returns
were normally distributed and whether return volatility and diversification of
risk varied across different networks. The qqplots in 3.4 and the Chi-square and
Figure 3.4: qqplots for Star, Ring and Balanced networks of size n = 20 and n =
100 with normal shocks η ∼ N(0, 1). The qqplots show that when the
idiosyncratic errors shocks are normally distributed, returns are normally
distributed in all network structures.
Jarque-Bera tests confirmed that when firm-level shocks are normally distributed,
returns are normally distributed regardless of the network structure or size. The
variance of returns, however, is noticeably higher in the Star network, even when
n = 100. Figure 3.5 contains qqplots of returns generated by (3.1) when the firm-
level shocks have a uniform distribution on (−1.732, 1.732). The statistical tests
of normality corresponding to these qqplots confirm that when firm-level shocks
have a uniform distribution, returns are not normally distributed in any of the
networks. Returns are closest to being normally distributed in the Ring and
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Figure 3.5: qqplots for Star, Ring and Balanced networks of size n = 20 and n = 100
with uniform shocks η ∼ U(−1.732, 1.732). The qqplots show that when
the idiosyncratic errors shocks are uniformly distributed, returns appear
normally distributed in the Ring and the Balanced networks, but not in
the Star network. Deviations from normality are most noticeable in the
tails of the return distribution.
Balanced structures, and least so in the Star structure. These results support
the mathematical reasoning in Proposition 1 because the Star has the highest
ratio of Max(CSij) to ||CSi||2. The qqplots in Figure 3.5 illustrate that when
the idiosyncratic errors have a uniform distribution, the largest deviations from
normality occur in the tails of the return distribution. The Jarque-Bera test and
Chi-square tests both reject the null hypothesis of normality, with p-values well
below 0.05 in almost all cases.
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Table 3.1 shows the mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis of the return dis-
tribution for firms 1 and 2 in each network when ηis a uniform r.v. with mean
0 and standard deviation of 1 (i.e. η ∼ U(−1.732, 1.732)). The mean return is
approximately the same in all networks because all of the row sums in W (and
therefore all of the row sums in CS) are equal13. However, the variance is signif-
icantly higher in the Star network than in the Ring or the Balanced networks.
The difference in return variance between the Star and the Ring and Balanced
networks becomes larger as n increases. In the Star, adding more firms connected
to the same hub does not reduce the return variance at all. On the other hand,
adding more firms to the Ring reduces variance by a factor of 1.25 (from 6.72 to
5.37) as n increases from 20 to 40, and by a factor of 1.28 (from 6.72 to 5.26)
as n increases from 20 to 100. In the Balanced structures, variance reduces by a
factor of 1.73 (from 5.85 to 3.38) as n increases from 20 to 40, and by a factor
of 3 (from 5.85 to 1.95) as n increases from 20 to 100. As a result, risk adjusted
returns are lower in the Star network than in the Ring or Balanced networks.
Figure 3.6 show the standard deviation of residual returns in the three net-
work for portfolios with 4, 10, 20, 40, 70 and 100 firms. As n increases, return
variance declines significantly slower in the Star network than in the Ring or
Balanced networks. The unmarked solid line in Figure 3.6 shows the volatility
predicted by the law of large numbers. In the Balanced network returns decline
very close to the rate predicted by the law of large numbers. In the Star net-
work, however, return volatility decays slower than the rate predicted by the law
of large numbers. Figure 3.6 confirms the result of Proposition 2, as it shows
that volatility decays significantly slower in structures, like the Star, where the
distribution of connectivity is heavy-tailed.
Simulation of heavy-tailed shocks
The simulations were repeated for heavy-tailed shocks, in particular η ∼ t(1.5).
For simulating heavy-tailed r.v.s, it is appropriate to use 106 simulations (Borak,
Wolfgang, and Weron, 2005). I observed returns in networks of size 4 and 20
13 Only when si =
∑
j wij is the same for i = 1, · · · , n will ||CSi|| be the same for i = 1, · · · , n.
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Figure 3.6: Standard deviation of returns against number of stocks in different net-
works. This figure shows the rate at which return volatility declines in
the Star, Ring and Balanced networks vs. the rate predicted by the law of
large numbers (shown by the unmarked solid line). In the Balanced net-
work, risk is diversified away at a rate that is close to the rate predicted by
the law of large numbers. In the Star network, however, return volatility
decays much slower than the rate predicted by the law of large numbers.
firms. Panel A of Table 3.2 contains the sample moments of the shock distribu-
tion for four different firms, η1 to η4. These firm-level shocks have a Student’s
t distribution with 1.5 degrees of freedom. While the mean shock is still zero,
the variance, skewness and kurtosis are much higher than the previously simu-
lated normal and uniform distributions, due to the occurrence of tail events. The
variance, skewness and kurtosis are also significantly different across firms. For
example, η1 and η3 have long positive tails (high variance and positive skew),
while η4 has a long negative tail (high variance and negative skew).
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Table 3.2 contains the mean, sample variance and risk adjusted return when
shocks have a t distribution with 1.5 degrees of freedom. Even with 106 simu-
lations in each firm-specific shock vector, there are significant differences in the
second, third and fourth moment of the distribution of shocks across firms (e.g. η1
has a large positive skew of 303.6, while η4 has a large negative skew of −121.5).
Tests of normality rejected the null hypothesis that returns were normally dis-
tributed in all cases. Table 2 shows that deviations from normality are highest
in the tails of the distribution. When firm 2 is the central firm in the star, vari-
ance is highest in the Star and risk-adjusted returns are the lowest. However,
when the central firm in the Star has a large positive tail event (e.g. firm 3 in
Table 3.2 has a large positive tail event, as the skewness of η3 is 171.9 and the
kurtosis of η3 is 162666), risk adjusted returns are higher in the Star than in the
Ring and Balanced structures. As illustrated in Table 3.2, changing the central
firm in the Star from firm 2 to firm 3 (shock distribution with a longer positive
tail) increases the risk adjusted return from 0.02% to 0.14%. On the other hand,
when the central firm is shifted from firm 2 to firm 4 variance increases drasti-
cally from 15933 to 43031, as η4 has a longer negative tail than η2. Depending on
the tail properties of the shock to the central firm in the Star, it can either ex-
hibit higher or lower risk adjusted returns than the Ring and Balanced structures.
In summary, when the variance of firm-specific shocks is infinite, the occurrence
of tail events dominates the return distribution. Table 3.2 shows that there is a
large range in the sample variance of returns across firms in all structures, because
tail events mean that the distribution of shocks to each firm is highly variable.
As proven in Ibragimov and Walden (2007), when shocks are heavy-tailed, diver-
sification may increase value at risk. Similarly, the simulation results imply that
when shocks are heavy-tailed less diversified structures, such as the Star, may
reduce value at risk. The simulations imply that Proposition 1 and 2 only apply
when shocks have finite variance.
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Asymmetric correlations
In this section, I examine return correlation asymmetry in Star, Ring and Bal-
anced networks. Importantly, I illustrate that the network structure can explain
shifts in conditional correlation that are as significant as those related to down-
side market movements. Correlations in stock returns conditional on ‘downside’
market movements are, on average, higher than correlations implied by a nor-
mal distribution; while correlations conditional on ‘upside’ market movements
are not significantly different from those implied by a normal distribution (Ang
and Chen, 2002; Longin and Solnik, 2001). Proposition 2 implies that exceedance
correlations will be higher when the distribution of a portfolio’s connectivity to
its counterparties is heavy-tailed (because return volatility will be higher that of
a normal distribution).
Regime-shifting (RS) models best replicate empirically observed stock correla-
tions (Ang and Chen, 2002). In order to model changes in the substitutability
of linkages, therefore, a RS specification of the joint return distribution in (3.1)
is simulated as follows. If α is low, the W matrix has little influence on returns
in (3.1); if α is high, W has a large influence on the outcome of (3.1). In the
simulations above, α was set equal to 1 in order to explore the issue of network
structure and the distribution of η for fixed levels of α. In order to simulate RS
influence of linkages, I set α equal to a function of the average level of risk, such
that:
α =
{
.99 η¯ ≤ E(η) = 0
.01 η¯ > E(η) = 0
Where η¯ is the average firm-specific shock or η¯ = n−1
∑n
j=1 ηj. As firm-level
shocks are assumed to be i.i.d. with E(η) = 0, η¯ ≤ 0 represents a ‘bear’ market
as shocks are more negative than the mean. In a bear market I assume that
shocks are transmitted strongly through links, so α = .99. Conversely if η¯ > 0,
this represents a ‘bull’ market in which linkages are substitutable so shocks are
not transmitted strongly, so α = .01. This specification of α is also consistent
with situations where firms are more likely to pass on negative shocks to their
customers and/or suppliers than to pass on positive shocks. To quantify how
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Figure 3.7: Exceedance correlations of firm 1 and firm 2 returns in the Star, Ring
and Balanced networks of size n = 100, with regime switching weights
(α = .99 if η¯ ≤ E(η) = 0; α = .01 if η¯ > E(η) = 0) and normal shocks
η ∼ N(0, 1). The plot contains exceedance correlations between firms
in each of the different networks, defined as corr(x, y|x > ν, y > ν) for
ν > 0; and corr(x, y|x < ν, y > ν) for ν < 0. The p-value in the legend is
from the test of correlation asymmetry proposed by Hong, Tu and Zhou
(2007). p < 0.05 indicates significant correlation asymmetry.
RS affects return correlations in different networks, I calculated the correlation
between returns conditional on returns being above or below a certain level using
the conditional correlation proposed in Ang and Chen (2002). I.e. a correlation
at an exceedance level ν is defined as the correlation between two variables when
both variables register increases or decreases of more than ν standard deviations
away from their means, such that
ρ+c (ν) = corr(x, y|x > ν, y > ν); ν > 0ρ−c (ν) = corr(x, y|x < ν, y > ν); ν < 0
I also test whether the conditional correlations are symmetric using the test pro-
posed by Hong, Tu, and Zhou (2007) 14 with null hypothesis
H0 : ρ
+
c (ν) = ρ
−
c (ν).
14 These tests were performed using code written by Andrew Patton, available at:
http://econ.duke.edu/ ap172/code.html
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Figure 3.7 plots the exceedance correlation between ε1 and ε2 in the Star, Ring
and Balanced networks of size 100, when firm-level shocks follow a standard nor-
mal distribution. The results show that in both regimes return correlation is
highest in the Star and lowest in the Balanced structure.
In addition, the Ring and Balanced structures display regime switching, with
correlation being significantly lower in the Ring and Balanced structures when
α = 0.01 (ν > 0). The drop in correlation in the ‘bull’ regime is most noticeable
in the Balanced structure. This is because the Balanced structure offers the best
averaging out of shocks; so when the portion of shocks passed on is small, shocks
are almost fully diversified away.
Put another way, the higher influence of inter-linkages in bear markets (α = 0.99
if ν < 0) creates a significant increase in correlation in the Ring (p = 0.00) and
Balanced (p = 0.00) networks, but not in the Star network (p = 1.00). In the
Star, correlation between outer firms and the central ‘hub’ firm is high at all
times because there is almost no averaging out of shocks to the central firm (firm
2 in Figure 3.8). So even if shocks to the central firm are only passed on with
probability α = 0.01, correlation between all firms and the hub is high.
Summary of regime switching simulations
In summary, both the economic regime and the structure of linkages affects the
level of return correlation; so shifts in either the regime and the structure of link-
ages can cause correlation between asset returns to increase or decrease sharply.
It is important to note that the increase in correlation that occurs moving from
a Balanced structure to a Star structure, in either regime, is much larger than
the increase in correlation in ‘bear’ markets within a fixed structure. The re-
sults highlight the over-arching effect of the structure of inter-linkages on return
volatility and dependence.
The simulation results illustrate that correlation increases when: a) there is a
shift from less concentrated to more concentrated structure in any regime or b)
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there is a regime shift from bull to bear market regimes, but only in structures
that are not highly concentrated. Vice versa, correlation drops when a) there is
a shift from a highly concentrated structure to a less concentrated structure in
any regime or b) the regime shifts from bear to bull markets in structures where
there are no dominant firms.
These results provide some insight into why correlation may drop suddenly in
financial crises (as noted in Gai and Kapadia (2010)). In a financial crisis, links
between assets (such as credit provision or trade links) frequently break down
due to non-linear changes in asset values, default events and/or abrupt changes
in liquidity. Many of these events ‘break’ trade linkages. For example, in periods
of high volatility trading often stops abruptly due to fear or externally imposed
market restrictions. This ‘breaking’ of trade linkages can change the structure of
links between assets from concentrated to unlinked. As explained above, unlinked
structures offer better averaging out of shocks than concentrated structures (the
law of large number applies in unlinked structures) so correlation falls.
3.3 The influence of linkages on asset prices
A fundamental principle of asset pricing is that competitive markets do not permit
profitable arbitrage opportunities to remain unexploited (Ross, 1976). In the
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) developed by Ross (1976), the asset market has
a K factor structure if
Ri = E(Ri) + βi1f1 + ...+ βiKfK + υi (3.8)
where E(Ri) is the mean return on asset i and the factors f1, · · · , fK are uncor-
related with the residual return υi, which is uncorrelated across firms.
If the market does have a K factor structure then the covariance matrix of the
total returns (not just the idiosyncratic component of returns), ΣN, may be de-
composed as follows
ΣN = BNB
′
N + DN
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where BN is the N by K matrix of factor loadings and DN is a diagonal matrix.
In addition, Ross (1976) proved that if (3.8) holds, and residual returns are
strictly uncorrelated, then the mean returns are approximately linear functions
of the factor loadings, i.e.
E(Ri) ≈ Rrf + τ1βi1 + ...+ τKβiK (3.9)
where Rrf is the risk-free rate.
In practice however there is usually some correlation between residual returns
after allowing for systematic factors affecting all assets. For example, a few firms
in the same industry might have industry-specific components to their returns
which are not pervasive sources of uncertainty for the whole economy. For ex-
ample, awarding a defense contract to one aerospace firm might affect the stock
prices of several firms in the industry. The requirements for a strict factor struc-
ture, as proposed by Ross (1976), are not met in this case. Chamberlain and
Rothschild (1983), however, develop an ‘approximate factor model’ and show
that the pricing equation (3.9) holds so long as there is a sequence [βi1, ..., βiK ]
∞
i=1
such that for any N ,
ΣN = BNB
′
N + RN
where RN is a sequence of matrices with uniformly bounded eigenvalues. In
other words, as the number of assets N approaches ∞, the portion of the vari-
ance of returns not explained by the K factors becomes negligible (as it is a finite
number, bound above, divided by a total that is approaching ∞). That is, for
pricing purposes the stochastic structure of returns is determined by K factors
and everything else may be ignored. Approximate factor models only require
that the law of large numbers applies, so the proportion of the correlations that
are different from zero approaches zero as the number of assets increases (Con-
nor and Korajczyk, 1993). If idiosyncratic risk averages out in this way, returns
are well-represented by a linear combination of systematic risk factors (Ingersoll,
1984). On the other hand, when the proportion of aggregate risk explained by
idiosyncratic sources is not negligible, idiosyncratic risk does not average out and
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can significantly contribute to aggregate risk.
When firms are linked however, there are cases in which the weaker approximate
factor model condition is not met. To show this I will prove that Proposition
2 implies that for some structures of linkage, shocks (initially hitting only one
firm and then) transmitted via linkages can explain a significant proportion of
aggregate variance, even in large portfolios. Equation (3.7) shows that for some
network structures RN is not bound above, implying that mean returns are not
necessarily linear functions of only the loadings on systematic factors.
To begin, recall Equation (3.4) defines the elements of the variance-covariance
matrix of residual returns. That is, if the idiosyncratic shocks are independent
but not necessarily identical, with variance E(η2i ) = σ
2
i for all i = 1, ..., n then:
Cov(yi, yl) =
n∑
j=1
CSijCSljσ
2
j .
In matrix form this is
Σ = CSΨCS′
where CS = (I− αW)−1 and Ψ is the diagonal variance-covariance matrix of id-
iosyncratic shocks, with elements σ2j along the diagonal. I now show that Propo-
sition 2 implies that the lower bound on Σ is Ψn
2
ζ
−2 and that this in turn implies
that for some values of ζ (i.e. for some heavy-tailed structures of connectivity)
the eigenvalues of Σ (the covariance matrix of returns) are unbounded above.
To see this note that,
Σ ≥ Ψn2ζ−2 =⇒ Σv = λv ≥ Ψvn2ζ−2. (3.10)
where v is an eigenvector of Σ and λ the corresponding eigenvalue. So if ζ < 1,
then λv ≥ Ψvnc where nc > 1 and is increasing, so terms in the covariance matrix
and the corresponding eigenvalues are not bounded above, because they will keep
increasing so long as n increases. On the other hand, if ζ ≥ 2, the law of large
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numbers implies reduction of aggregate variance at rate at least n−1 as n → ∞.
In this case the covariance matrix and corresponding eigenvalues are bounded
above, because as n → ∞, n−1 → 0, so Σ will converge to a finite number. For
values of 1 ≤ ζ < 2, there is some averaging out of idiosyncratic shocks, but at
a rate slower than the law of large numbers. In these cases the upper bound on
the eigenvalues is large and dependent on n.
Summary In some structures of inter-linkage, shocks transmitted via inter-
linkages can affect a significant number of units, even in large portfolios. This
means that it is not reasonable to ignore this source of risk when pricing assets.
This transmitted risk can be considered to be a half-way case between systematic
risk factors (which affect all units) and idiosyncratic risk factors which only affect
one unit. Therefore the theory builds the case for including a factor capturing
exposure to transmitted shocks into factor models of assets prices.
That is, the APT pricing equation (3.9) will not hold when the distribution of
connectivity in inter-firm networks is heavy-tailed because this induces significant
cross-sectional dependence in residual returns. By pulling this source of cross-
sectional dependence out of the residual term, however, the results from APT
will apply as the new residuals will be independent. The testable hypothesis that
follows from this theory is that the structure of inter-firm connectivity (which is
captured by the CS matrix) influences asset returns. In other words, the results
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in Section 3.2 imply that βi,K+1 6= 0 in the following equation 15
Ri = E(Ri) + βi1f1 + · · ·+ βiKfK + βi,K+1f(CS) + τi. (3.12)
3.4 Summary
The crux of the theory in this chapter is that when firms are inter-linked, the
shocks transmitted via inter-firm linkages may be non-diversifiable in some net-
work structures. This means that economic linkages can influence returns via a
process of shocks passed on from suppliers and/or customers failing to average
out. I prove that it is the structure of inter-linkages between firms that deter-
mines whether or not shocks transmitted via linkages influence returns. I show
that transmitted shocks are only diversifiable if a firm does not have any domi-
nant suppliers or customers16.
The testable hypotheses arising from the theory developed in this chapter (in
particular from Equation (3.4), Proposition 1 and Proposition 2) are that the
structure of a firm’s linkages significantly affects its mean returns, return volatil-
ity and return correlation. Equation (3.4) implies that the degree of a firm’s
15 Another way to frame this problem is to note that a strict factor model can be used if it
is possible to extract the cross-sectional dependence from the residual returns, so that the
transformed residual returns are independent. This is possible because the covariance of
residual returns can be expressed as
Σ = CSΨCS′ = (CS− I)Ψ(CS− I)′ + Ψ
where Ψ is a diagonal matrix. Therefore if (CS− I)Ψ(CS− I)′ is removed from the residual
term, the return equation becomes:
R = E(Ri) + βF + γ(CS− I)(CS− I)′ + τ . (3.11)
16 A firm has a dominant customer (supplier) if the share of sales revenue from the largest cus-
tomer (input supplied by the largest supplier) remains large as the firm adds more customers
(suppliers). For example, Walmart is likely to be a dominant customer of many US firms
due to their large share of the retail market. Therefore the theory would predict that shocks
to Walmart will influence the stock returns of those firms that rely on Walmart for a large
share of their sales revenue because these shocks will not average out in the cash-flow of the
supplier firms.
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linkages affects its mean returns, that the concentration of a firm’s total connec-
tivity affects its return volatility and that the linkage ‘distance’ between two firms
affects their return correlation. Proposition 2 implies that the tail parameter of a
firm’s degree distribution determines the rate at which shocks to linked firms are
diversified away. Finally, the reduced form of the theoretical model corresponds
to a factor model of stock returns; and the theory implies that factor models of
returns should be extended to include a factor representing the portion of shocks
transmitted via linkages that is non-diversifiable.
In the next chapter I describe the methodology and data used to empirically
test these hypotheses. In chapters 5 and 6 I develop statistical measures and
models of linked firms’ returns (that follow directly from the theory developed in
this chapter) and formally test these hypotheses.
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3.A Necessary and sufficient conditions for a so-
lution
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique solution to (4)
are those that guarantee a unique solution to CS = (I− αW)−1. This problem
has been studied extensively in the economic literature, in the context of neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the inverse of (I −A)−1, where
I denotes the identity matrix and A is a matrix of Minkowski-Leontief type, i.e.
with row sums less than one (Rosenblatt, 1957). A simple extension of the Theo-
rem of Rosenblatt (1957) is used to prove necessary and sufficient conditions for
the existence of a unique solution to (4).
Recall, at the firm level, CSij expresses the aggregate influence of a shock to
firm j on firm i, transmitted via the links wij, over an infinite number of itera-
tions through the network. Specifically
CSij =
∞∑
m=0
αm(Wm)ij
=
∞∑
m=0
αm
n∑
r=1
(Wm−1)irwrj, (3.13)
where all elements of CS are greater than or equal to zero, as 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ wij ≤ 1 for all pairs (i, j). Existence of the inverse matrix CS, is equivalent
to the condition that the infinite sum above converges to a finite number. Note
that CSij will approach ∞ in situations where (Wmij does not converge to zero
as m increases. The only way the series
∑∞
m=0 α
m(Wm)ij can diverge is if there
are one or more transition paths 17 from i to j where all of the weights along
the path are equal to one. For example, if firm i is connected to firm j via the
path wis, wsr, wrj, wji, and all of these weights are all equal to one, CSij = ∞
because (Wm)ij does not converge to zero as m increases. Conversely, the above
infinite series will converge if the terms αm(Wm)ij are zero for m sufficiently large.
17 E.g. if wis, wsr, wrj , wji > 0, there is a transition path from i to j via s and r.
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Mathematically, this condition is satisfied when either α < 1 or (Wm)ij < 1.
From Theorem 1 from Rosenblatt (1957), it follows that (Wm)ij < 1 so long
as wkl < 1 for at least one firm along each possible transition path between i
and j. Essentially this condition guarantees that the infinite geometric series∑∞
m=0 α
m(Wm)ij converges to a finite number because (W
m)ij converges to zero
as m increases, for all pairs (i, j). Thus the inverse of the matrix (I−αW ) exists.
A sufficient condition for the existence of CS is that all of the row sums of
W are less than one. Alternatively, the necessary and sufficient condition is that
wkl < 1 for at least one firm along each possible transition path between i and j;
which can be checked by scanning the W matrix for elements equal to one, and
checking sequentially:
•if wik = 1, then wki < 1 and either:
•all terms in row k of W are less than one, or
•if row k of W contains one entry wkl = 1, then:
•if wkl = 1, then wlk < 1 and either:
•all terms in row l of W are less than one, or
•if row l of W contains one entry wlm = 1 etc.
This guarantees that the necessary condition that wkl < 1 for at least one firm
along each possible transition path between every pair of firms (i,j). Theoreti-
cally, this is a more restrictive condition, but it is unlikely to be restrictive in
practice as in real business networks it is very rare to encounter a firm i that is
completely dependent on a supplier s such that wis = 1. More realistic levels of
inter-connection might be in the range of 10% to 50%. Taking the upper limit of
that range, one can see that idiosyncratic shocks will dampen quite quickly, as
.52 = .25, .53 = .125 and .54 = .0625. This ‘back of the envelope’ reasoning sug-
gests a second order approximation to CS should be reasonably accurate. This
implies that the influence weights αwsj would most likely be much less than one
for all j. Furthermore, the sufficient condition for the existence of CS, that the
row sums of W are less than one, almost surely holds in most portfolios; because
a firm cannot get more that 100% of its revenue from other firms in the portfolio,
and that if firms are linked to any firms outside of the portfolio then the row
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sums of W should be less than one.
3.B Network theory and economic modeling
This Appendix introduces the basic mathematical concepts and notation required
to model the transmission of shocks between linked sectors, firms and/or assets.
First I show how graph theory and matrix algebra can be used to model how
shocks are transmitted through a network. I explain how concepts from input-
output modeling (used to analyze the flow of intermediate goods throughout
the economy) can be down-scaled to the firm level. The final section presents
original work showing how inter-firm supply networks can be usefully described
using these concepts. I build a dataset of firms’ principal customers using account
disclosures to identify the network of economically related firms that have listed
stock on North American exchanges. I analyze the dynamic structural properties
of these inter-firm networks from 1990 to 2010 and show that the distribution of
firms’ supply chain connectivity is fat-tailed.
3.B.1 Basic network theory
Graph theory is a type of mathematics used to model pairwise relations between
objects. A graph in this context is a collection of nodes connected by vertices (or
edges). A graph may be undirected, meaning that there is no distinction between
the two vertices associated with each edge, or its edges may be directed such
that the vertex indicates a flow from one node to another. Vertices may also be
weighted in order to indicate the strength of a connection between two nodes e.g.
weights can represent the volume of a flow between two nodes. A directed graph
with weighted vertices is called a network.
Networks and adjacency matrices
Formally, a network is defined as follows. Let N be a set of n nodes i = 1, · · · , n
and W be an n by n matrix containing the vertex set of all relations wij where
wij > 0 if node i is connected to node j, and wij = 0 otherwise. Note that
wij 6= wji as the graph is directed. In this case, W defines the network (or
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weighted directed graph) of the set of nodes i = 1, · · · , n.
In a network there is a weight associated with each edge. For example, if the
nodes represent firms then wij could be the percentage of firm i’s total sales rev-
enue that comes from firm j in one year, rather than just a binary indicator that
j is a customer of i. W, a square matrix with entries wij is called the weight
matrix. Three different weight matrices and the corresponding graphs are shown
below.
Another useful representation of the network defined by W is its adjacency ma-
trix, indicating which of the vertices are linked (adjacent). For a weighted directed
network defined by W the adjacency matrix A is a n by n matrix with elements
aij =
{
1 wij > 0
0 wij = 0.
So for a group of n nodes the adjacency matrix A is a n by n matrix where aij
is 1 if unit i is linked to unit j and zero otherwise. The adjacency matrix defines
the unweighted graph which is a representation of the network. (As networks
are directed graphs, the adjacency matrix is usually asymmetric; however, for
undirected graphs the adjacency matrix is symmetric.)
3.B.2 Measures of network structure
Measures of network structure describe connectivity within a network at the unit,
pairwise or network level. The properties of any network are determined by W.
W is the basis for most measures of connectivity, however the adjacency matrix
A is also used to describe network structure. I now review common measures of
network structure.
The degree of a node is the number of edges it has linking it to other nodes.
In a directed graph, in-degree is the number of edges in to the node, and out-
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Figure 3.8: The weight matrices and graphs for Star, Ring, and Balanced networks,
each with four firms.
degree is the number of edges out of the node. That is
din(i) =
∑
j
aij
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and
dout(i) =
∑
j
aji
In this thesis, the units in the network represent economic sectors or firms and
the edges represent the flow of intermediate goods between sectors, or the flow of
cash between firms. In an inter-firm network, firm i’s in-degree can be thought
of as the number of units paying cash (in) to firm i, and firm i’s out-degree can
be thought of as the number of units to which firm i pays cash (out). In a supply
chain, it is assumed that goods and services flow in the opposite direction to cash,
so cash is assumed to flow from customers to suppliers. So in-degree represents
the number of key customers paying cash to the (supplier) firm, and out-degree
represents the number of key suppliers requiring payment via cash-flow out of the
(customer) firm. Second order degree is defined as
d2in(i) =
∑
j
aijdin(j)
And nth order degree, which counts how many firms are linked in n steps, as
dnin(i) =
∑
j
aijd
n−1
in (j).
The degree distribution P (k) is a discrete probability distribution of degrees
across nodes i.e. P (k) is the probability that a randomly chosen node has de-
gree k. The mean of the degree distribution is sometimes used as a measure of
total connectivity in a network. However, degree is a property that belongs to
one node. In contrast distance is a property relating to two nodes. In directed
networks the net-degree is given by dout(i)− din(i) =
∑
j aji −
∑
j aij.
The distance between two nodes i and j, is the smallest number of edges between
i and j. In a weighted network, the entries in the weight matrix W measure the
one-step distance between i and j. The ij’th entry of Wn measures the n-step
distance between i and j.
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Finally, different measures have been proposed for how central each node is in
a network and for identifying the most central (or influential) node or group of
nodes. These measures include centralities of degree, centralities based on the
column sums of the Leontief matrix (i.e. the status measure or rank prestige
index in Katz (1953) or eigenvector based centrality measure in Bonacich (1987).
Note that these measures are also based on manipulations of A or W. So, once
the adjacency matrix of an economic or financial network has been mapped out,
measures of centrality can be adapted and used to identify the most influen-
tial nodes within a network. Theory-based measures of structure for firm level
networks are developed in Chapter 5.
3.B.3 Input-output modeling of economic networks
The outputs of one economic sector (e.g. agriculture, mining, manufacturing) are
often used as inputs in the production of other sectors. For instance, the retail
sector relies heavily on the wholesale sector to provide the goods they sell onto
end customers. These linkages between sectors provide a mechanism for transmis-
sion of shocks across sectors. A number of papers have considered the importance
of such inter-linkages between sectors on the volatility of aggregate output and
the correlation between different sectors’ output (Horvath, 2000; Dupor, 1999;
Schonbucher, 2000; Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2010). This papers
all used multi-sector models of production (input-output models) to investigate
the relationship between inter-sector linkages and fluctuations in aggregate out-
put.
Input-output (IO) models represent the flow of intermediate goods between sec-
tors within an economy using tools from graph theory. The general set-up of
these models involves n sectors. The linkages in IO models are the directed flow
of intermediate input and output goods between the n sectors. These linkages
are captured in the matrix W. W (with elements wij) captures the structure of
a weighted, directed inter-sector network. wij corresponds to the value of units
from sector j that sector i must use in order to produce 1 unit of its own out-
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put18 (or the share of sector i’s total output that is supported by input supplied
by sector j.) Alternatively, the weights may be defined in terms of revenue or cost
share. For example, wij, can be defined as the share of sector i’s total revenue
(operating expense) received from (attributed to) sector j.
The expected input-use matrix W¯ can be decomposed into an adjacency matrix
A and a diagonal matrix D which defines the average scale of all of i’s supplier
transactions. That is, if W and A are n by n matrices defined as above, then:
W¯ = A ∗D
where A is the adjacency matrix and D is a diagonal matrix with diagonal el-
ements γj =
∑n
i=1 wij∑n
i=1 aij
. W and W¯ have the same column sums. For example, if
sector j had 5 key inputs and Wj =
∑n
i=1wij = 0.9 (i.e. the degree of returns to
scale in inputs for sector j is 90%), then γj =
0.9
5
.
Aggregate output in an input-output model Static IO models produce
equilibrium solutions for output of the form19:
y = Wy + ε
where y is a vector consisting of an aggregate outcome, such as output, value
added or income, for the n sectors i = 1, ..., n ; W is a matrix capturing the
direct interactions between units, as above, and ε is a vector of independent,
idiosyncratic shocks to each sector i = 1, ..., n.
In order to ensure a solution in equilibrium, the matrix (I − W ) must be in-
vertible. The common assumption made in these models is that the total of all
input shares (the row sums) in W are less than or equal to one, i.e.
∑
j wij ≤ 1.
18 Firm i a said to be downstream of firm j if wij > 0 because a negative shock to firm j will
raise the price of j’s output and have consequences for all sectors downstream that rely on
j to supply them with input goods (Long and Plosser, 1987).
19 A detailed proof of the competitive equilibrium in the economy is provided in Shea (1991),
Section II.
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In this case, models of this form may be re-arranged to form the solution:
y = (I−W)−1ε (3.14)
Where the vector of aggregate outcomes y = [y1, · · · , yn] for i = 1, ..., n is a
weighted sum of the independent, idiosyncratic shocks to units i = 1, ..., n, and
the matrix (I −W )−1 is referred to as the Leontief matrix. The Leontief matrix
represents the total direct and indirect effects of shocks on production, which can
be seen by expanding the Leontief matrix as follows
(I−W)−1 = I + W + W2 + · · · .
So (I−W)−1 can be decomposed into: initial effects (I), the direct effect (W)
and indirect effects (W2 + W3).)
Equation (3.14) establishes a clear relationship between aggregate output, y,
and the structure of input-output linkages, captured by W. It is possible to
generalize the model so that the shocks have an aggregate and an idiosyncratic
component. For example (3.14) could be reframed as
y = βf + (I−W)−1ε
where β is a vector of each sectors exposure to the aggregate shock f . It is impor-
tant to note that the structure of input-output linkages becomes less significant as
aggregate shocks become more important relative to idiosyncratic shocks (Shea,
1991). For this reason it is crucial to condition on aggregate variables in order to
empirically assess the significance of inter-linkages for aggregate outcomes (Shea,
1991).
The matrices A, W and (I−W)−1 can be used to characterize sectors by the
number of distinct inputs they use and/or supply. For example, Carvalho (2008)
characterizes sectors by the number of distinct inputs they use. The number
of inputs used by sector j is the sum of the elements in the jth column of A:∑n
i=1 aij, i.e. the out-degree of sector j.
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In the framework an IO model, each sector has two kinds of economic effects
on other sectors in the economy: demand and supply effects. When sector i
increases its own production, this increases the demand for inputs from other
sectors. This demand is referred to as customer linkage. Increased production
in sectors with higher than average customer linkages induces the most demand
for production from other sectors. Vice versa, an increase in production by other
sectors leads to additional output required from sector i in its role as a supplier
of inputs to these sectors. This supply function is referred to as supplier linkage.
High degree of supplier linkage means that the sectors production is more sensi-
tive to changes in other industries’ output (Guo and Planting, 2000).
The simplest measure of customer linkage is the sum of the elements in the jth
column of W. Since the elements of W are measures of direct effects only, this
is called direct customer linkage:
γCL(j) =
n∑
i=1
wij
where 1 > wij ≥ 0 are the elements of the n by n matrix W. In terms of
monetary transactions, γCL(j) is equal to the value of total intermediate inputs
for sector j divided by the value of j’s total output. In matrix form, the row
vector CL = [γCL(1), · · · , γCL(n)] is
CL = i′W
Where i′ is a 1 by n row vector of ones.
Second, since the elements of L = (I−W)−1 are measures of total (direct and
indirect) effects, the sum of the elements in the jth column of L measures total
customer linkage of j:
γTBL(j) =
n∑
i=1
lij
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Table 3.3: Measures of direct and total linkage derived from the weight matrix
Customer
linkage
(in-degree)
supplier
linkage
(out-degree)
Direct i′W i′W′
Total i′L i′L′
where lij is the ij’th element of (I−W)−1. The customer linkage measures quan-
tify the exposure of a sector j to sector-specific shocks to the sectors from which
it purchases inputs.
The corresponding measures of supplier linkage are comprised of the row sums of
W and (I−W)−1 as shown in Table 3.3. Table 3.3 illustrates that linkage mea-
sures based on a Leontief matrix are fundamentally different to distance measures
based on (weighted or unweighted) adjacency matrices, because they represent to-
tal connectedness, rather than direct connectedness. (As L = I + W + W2 + W3 + · · ·
which can be decomposed into: initial effects (I), the direct effect (W) and indi-
rect effects (W2 + W3).)
Various normalizations of these linkage measures have been proposed. The most
straightforward normalization involves dividing each sectors linkage measure by
the simple average of the corresponding measure across all sectors. Sectors with
above average linkage will have measures of C¯L or S¯L greater than one. Finally,
there is no consensus in the literature as to whether or not diagonal elements
of W or L should be included or netted out of calculations (Miller and Blair,
2009). This depends to a large extent on the purpose of the investigation. If the
research question relates to the units linkages to the rest of the economy, then
it is appropriate to subtract or exclude the diagonal ‘self-linkages’. However, if
some measure of total linkage, including self-linkages is being studied, then the
diagonal elements should be included.
In summary, IO analysis uses standard measures of connectedness from graph
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theory (in-degree and out-degree) to measure the economic connectedness of sec-
tors (supplier linkage and customer linkage). Measures of direct connectedness
can be derived using the adjacency matrix A or the weight matrix W matrix,
whereas measures of total connectedness are derived from the Leontief matrix
(I−W)−1.
3.C Mathematical proofs of main results
Proof of Proposition 1 If η is a vector of n i.i.d. idiosyncratic shocks with
E(ηi) = 0 and E(η
2
i ) = σ
2 <∞, then E(εi) = 0, and E(ε2i ) =
∑n
j=1CS
2
ijE(η
2
j ) =∑n
j=1 CS
2
ijσ
2.
Define zi =
εi
||CSi||2 =
∑n
j=1
CSij
||CSi||2ηj; where ||CSi||2 =
√∑
j CS
2
ij. Then by
the LF Theorem, zi converges to a normal distribution if the following expression
approaches zero, as n approaches infinity:
lim
n→∞
n∑
j=1
E
[
CS2ij
||CSi||22
η2j ; |
CSij
||CSi||2ηj| > δ
]
= lim
n→∞
n∑
j=1
CS2ij
||CSi||22
E
[
η2j ; |ηj| >
δ||CSi||2
CSij
]
(3.15)
As Pr(|ηj| > ∞) = 0, the limit of the above expression will be zero as n ap-
proaches infinity if δ||CSi||2
CSij
approaches infinity so (3.15) approaches zero and the
LF condition holds.
Given δ||CSi||2
CSij
→ ∞ iff CSij||CSi||2 → 0, it follows that: if
CSij
||CSi||2 → 0 as n → ∞
for all j = 1, ..., n, then εi||CSi||2 → N(0, σ2).
For a single firm i, the condition above must hold for all firms j = 1, ..., n.
Rather than checking the condition for each firm j = 1, ..., n individually, note
that the returns of firm i are asymptotically normal (i.e. εi||CSi||2 → N(0, σ2)) if
the following condition holds:
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maxj(CSij)
||CSi||2 → 0 as n→∞
Because if
CSij
||CSi||2 < a and a approaches zero, then 0 ≤
CSij
||CSi||2 < a → 0. Finally,
for multi-variate normality across the entire portfolio, the above condition must
hold for each firm i = 1, ..., n.
To prove the situations in which the distribution of returns is not normal, I
apply Proposition 1 to the distribution of zi =
εi
||CSi||2 .
Recall zi has an asymptotically normal distribution if and only if:
lim
n→∞
z2i
∫
|zi|>Z p(z)dz∫
|zi|>Z z
2
i p(z)dz
= 0
Next note that zi has an asymptotically normal distribution if and only if:
lim
n→∞
∫
|zi|>Z
p(z)dz = 0
As zi =
∑n
j=1
CSij
||CSi||2ηj this condition is equivalent to
lim
n→∞
∫ n∑
j=1
CSij
||CSi||2ηj1
[
CSij
||CSi||2ηj > Z
]
dz = 0
Where 1 is the indicator function, taking value 1 if
CSij
||CSi||2ηj > Z and 0 otherwise.
So, as above, in situations where
maxj(CSij)
||CSi||2 9 0 as n→∞ then the distribution
of εi, when it exists, is not normal. QED.
Proof of Proposition 2 Let η be a vector of i.i.d. shocks with E(ηi) = 0,
V ar(ηi) = E(η
2
i ) = σ
2 < ∞ and Cov(ηi, ηj) = 0 for i 6= j. Let CSij ∈ [0,∞) be
the ij’th element of the matrix CS = (I− αW)−1 where the elements of W, wij
are r.v.s ∈ [0, 1) and ∑j wij ≤ 1. W is independent of η, i.e. Cov(wij, ηk) = 0 for
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all i, j, k. As in (3.1), Ri =
∑n
j=1CSijηj so
V ar(Ri) = V ar(
n∑
j=1
CSijηj)
=
n∑
j=1
V ar(CSijηj)
=
n∑
j=1
E(CS2ij)E(η
2
j )
= σ2E(||CSi||22)
≥ σ
2
n
E(||CSi||2),
where the third expression follows from the fact η and CS are independent and
E(ηi) = 0, and the last inequality follows from ||CSi||2 ≥ ||CSi||√n . Assume ||CSi||
has power law tails such that
Pr(||CSi|| > k) = P (k) = ck−ζ ,
where c is a positive constant, k is an integer k ≥ 1 and ζ > 0 is the tail index.
Let B = b1, · · · , bm be the set of values that ||CSi||2 can take, ordered such that
bk+1 > bk for all k. It follows that:
E(||CSi||2) =
m∑
n=1
bnPr(||CSi||2 = bn)
=
m∑
n=1
bn
[
Pr(||CSi||2 > bn−1)− Pr(||CSi||2 > bn)
]
=
m−1∑
n=0
(bn+1 − bn)Pr(||CSi||2 > bn)
=
∫ m−1
0
Pˆ (b) db
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Where Pˆ (b) = Pr(||CSi||2 > b) = P (
√
b) = c(
√
b)−ζ . Substituting t =
√
b gives:
E(||CSi||2) = 2
∫ an
0
tP (t) dt
= 2c
∫ an
0
t1−ζ dt
≥ a
2−ζ
n
2− ζ ,
where an = inf(y : Pr(||CSi|| > y) ≤ n−1) is the largest term in the range
of ||CSi||. The probability that any realization is greater than the largest of n
possible realizations is ≈ n−1. I.e. Pr(||CSi|| > an) = ca−ζn = n−1; therefore
an ∝ n
1
ζ and a
2−ζ
n
2−ζ ∝ n
2−ζ
ζ .
Proposition 2 follows by inserting this expression into the first inequality. That
is:
V ar(Ri) ≥ σ
2
n
E(||CSi||2)
≥ σ2n 2−ζζ −1 = σ2n 2ζ−2 (3.16)
So
√
V ar(Ri) ≥ σn
1
ζ
−1 if 1 < ζ < 2 and
√
V ar(Ri) ≥ σn− 12 if ζ ≥ 2. QED.
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Chapter 4
Research methodology and data
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, I developed a theoretical model of how inter-linkages between firms
influence the mean, variance and correlation of stock returns. I showed that the
structure of economic linkages influences the volatility of returns in certain inter-
firm network structures. That is, when the structure of economic linkages is very
concentrated, such that a few firms are much more connected than all others,
shocks to the most connected firms dominate the distribution of aggregate re-
turns. I also showed that the reduced form of this model was a factor model of
stock returns extended to include a factor capturing non-diversifiable transmitted
shocks.
In this Chapter I present the research methodology and data used to answer
the second and third research questions. Section 2 outlines the research method-
ology used in Chapters 5 and 6. Section 3 and 4 outline the source of the data on
economic linkages and the procedures for extracting this data from the Compus-
tat/CRSP database. Section 5 summarizes the main characteristics of economic
linkages between the firms on the Compustat/CRSP database and how the struc-
ture of economic linkages has changed over the period 1990 to 2010.
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4.2 Research methodology
I develop a general framework for identifying and modeling situations in which
shocks spread via inter-firm linkages influence asset prices and/or aggregate mar-
ket fluctuations. I show that the ‘diversification’ argument supporting the irrel-
evance of idiosyncratic shocks (initially hitting only one firm) does not hold in
certain network structures when shocks can be transmitted via linkages. The
central theoretical result in Proposition 2 establishes a direct relationship be-
tween the rate at which shocks are diversified away as portfolio size increases,
and the structure of links between units in the portfolio. Second, I develop the
implications of this result for asset pricing by showing that the conditions of Ap-
proximate Factor Models (i.e. upper bounds on the eigenvalues of the covariance
matrix of idiosyncratic shocks) can be directly translated into conditions on the
structure of inter-linkages.
The modeling of inter-linkages is achieved through an extension of factor models
of stock returns. I extend Equation (3.1) to allow for the transmission of system-
atic shocks directly hitting each firm, as well as direct idiosyncratic shocks, and
derive the following structural model of returns when assets are inter-linked
R = CS(βF + η) = CSβF + (CS− I)η + η (4.1)
Where R is a vector of returns for assets i = 1, · · · , n, F is a vector of K system-
atic risk factors with N by K loading vector β; CS is a N by N matrix of total
(direct and indirect) inter-firm linkages with entry CSij = c if firm j provides
c% of firm i’s cash-flow through direct and indirect sources; and η is a vector of
direct idiosyncratic shocks to assets for assets i = 1, ..., n.
I test whether an increase in the strength of the economic linkages between firms
increases the pairwise correlation between linked firms’ returns after controlling
for systematic risk factors. Assuming that idiosyncratic shocks are i.i.d. Equation
(4.1) implies that the correlation between two firms’ returns, after controlling for
94
4.2 Research methodology
systematic risk factors is:
ρik ≈
∑
j(CS − I)ij(CS − I)kj√∑
j(CS − I)2ij(CS − I)2kj
(4.2)
So the influence of linkages on return correlation can be empirically assessed by
estimating the parameters of the following equation:
ρik = cik + βFF + βDISTDISTik (4.3)
where cik represents industry pair fixed effects, F is other common factors caus-
ing correlation, and DISTik is linkage distance between i and k, measured by the
ik’th term of (CS − I).
Second, I extend a factor model of asset returns (as in Fama and French (1993);
Daniel and Titman (1997)) to test whether the risk exposure from inter-firm link-
ages is priced with a risk premium. Similar to (4.1), I assume that asset returns
are generated by
Rit = Et−1(Rit) +
K∑
k=1
βi,kFk,t + εit (4.4)
where Rit, i = 1, · · · , N and t = 1, · · · , T is the excess return (over the risk-free
rate) of stock i at time t; Et−1(Rit) is the risk premium of asset i; βi,k is firm i’s
loading on factor Fk, where Fk,t is the realization of factor
1 k = 1, · · · , K at time
t; and the noise terms εit are assumed to be mean zero, i.i.d. over time, but are
allowed to be cross-sectionally correlated across stocks.
If the errors are mean zero and i.i.d., and all relevant factors have been correctly
identified, it follows under the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) Ross (1976) that
the risk premium of asset i is a linear function of stock i’s betas, that is
E(Ri) = α +
K∑
k=1
βi,kγk (4.5)
1 Common specifications of factors include: MKTt, the excess return on the market portfolio
(S&P 500) at time t, and the Fama-French SMBt and HMLt factors.
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where βi,k is firm i’s loading on factor Fk, and γk is the risk premium associated
with factor k. As argued in Section 3.3, however, when Σ = RN is not bound
above, equation (4.5) should be extended as follows:
Et−1(Rit) = α +
K∑
k=1
βi,kγk + CONCi,t−1γCONC +DEGi,t−1γDEG. (4.6)
where CONCi,t−1 is a measure of the concentration of firm i’s total connectivity
and DEGi,t−1 is a measure of the degree of firm i’s total connectivity. By includ-
ing these proxies for exposure to transmitted shocks in the pricing equation (in
addition to exposure to K common factors) I test the hypothesis that linkages
are significant in addition to systematic factors by testing the null hypothesis
γCONC = γDEG = 0.
I also examine how the concentration of firm i’s total connectivity and the degree
of firm i’s total connectivity influence average returns over time. The hypothesis
that structure of a firm’s supply linkages influences its returns over time is tested
by fitting the following time-series regression for each portfolio:
Ri,t = αi+
K∑
k=1
βi,kFk,t+
M∑
m=1
βi,mX
m
i,t−1+βi,CONCCONCi,t−1+βi,DEGDEGi,t−1+εi,t
(4.7)
where Rit is the excess return for stock i at time t; αi is the time-fixed non-
systematic premium; βi,k is firm i’s loading on systematic factor Fk ∈ F; βi,m is
firm i’s loading on firm characteristic Xmi,t−1 e.g. βi,CONC is firm i’s loading on
the concentration of economic linkages CONCi,t−1 and βi,DEG is firm i’s loading
on the degree of economic linkages DEGi,t−1. To check whether time series varia-
tion in returns depends on the concentration of a firms supply linkages, I estimate
Equation (6.2) and test the null hypothesis βi,CONC = βi,DEG = 0. A full expla-
nation of the return generating process and justification of this methodology is
provided in Chapter 6.
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4.3 Data on inter-firm linkages
The key measure of inter-firm linkages developed in Chapter 3 and in the pre-
vious section was the matrix CS = (I− αW)−1, a matrix capturing direct and
indirect inter-firm linkages, whose ij’th element CSij is the share of firm j in
providing firm i’s total sales revenue through direct and indirect linkages. In this
section I outline the data that I use to construct the total connectivity matrix CS.
Data on the economic linkages between firms is obtained from the Compustat
Segment files. These files contain annual account disclosures under FAS 131
which list the identity of all customers that account for 10% or more of the firm’s
total sales revenue. In 1997, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
issued FAS No.131 to mend the shortcoming of FAS No.14. Both of these stan-
dard relate to breaking total account items into major business segments. Under
both standards, reportable segments are operating segments that report any of
the following:
• Revenues (including inter-segment revenues) of at least 10% of total rev-
enues (including inter-segment revenues) of all reported operating segments
• Profit (loss) of at least 10% of the combined profit (loss) of all operating
segments reporting a profit (loss)
• Assets of at least 10 percent of the combined revenues, profit or loss, or
assets of all operating segments.
A reportable segment may aggregate two or more operating segments if their
products and services, production processes, type of customer, distribution, and
regulatory environments are similar. Reportable segments must total at least
75% of external revenues. Under both standards, revenues from each external
customer accounting for 10% or more of the enterprize’s revenues must be dis-
closed; however the identity of the customer firm need not be disclosed. In sum-
mary, whenever 10% or more of a company’s revenues is derived from a single
customer the company must disclose that it has a ‘major’ customer. The identity
of the ‘major’ customer need not be disclosed. This information is only required
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in annual statements not interim statements.
Major differences between FAS 131 and FAS 14 was a shift from defining seg-
ments based on Standard industry classifications to defining operating segments
on the basis that is used internally for decision-making (i.e., ”the management
approach”). Some argue that FAS 131 increased both the quantity and quality of
segment disclosure because management style reporting better reflects business
risk and has improved future earnings prediction (Ettredge, Kwon, Smith, and
Zarowin, 2005). On the other hand, others argue that the management approach
is less consistent and more easily manipulated (Springsteel, 1998). Companies
are likely to manipulate the rules in order to avoid disclosing information that
would threaten their competitive advantage in any way (Springsteel, 1998). To
avoid complications that may arise from the change in disclosure rules, the sample
period starts in 1990 because Compustat has restated key customer disclosures
back to this date under FAS131.
Figure 4.1 shows the ‘key customer’ linkages between listed US firms recorded
on the Compuststat/CRSP database in 1990. The arrow is in the direction of
cash-flow, from customer to supplier. The figure illustrates that there is signifi-
cant heterogeneity in the role of individual firms as key customers. There are a
few ‘hub’ firms, that are major customers to a lot of different suppliers (i.e. about
10 customer firms with links to around 100 suppliers each) but the majority of
supplier firms have the same number of key customers (i.e. the vast majority of
firms shown have only 1 or 2 connections). For example, in the graph above from
1990, the major customer firms had up to 110 suppliers. The 5 firms with the
greatest number of reliant suppliers were:
• AT&T INC, 110 reliant suppliers
• GENERAL MOTORS CO, 99 reliant suppliers
• SEARS HOLDINGS CORP, 97 reliant suppliers
• WALMART STORES INC, 93 reliant suppliers
• FORD MOTOR CO, 91 reliant suppliers
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Figure 4.1: The major economic linkages between the stocks in the CRSP/Compustat
sample in 1990. The arrow points from key customer to supplier in the
direction of cash-flow.
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In contrast, in 1990 the greatest number of key customers disclosed was 10. These
observations suggest that the firms disclosed as key customers are larger on av-
erage than the subset of reliant suppliers. And that a few large customer firms
tend to dominate suppliers customer base.
4.4 Procedure for extracting data on key cus-
tomers
Key customer disclosures under FAS 131 are contained in the Compustat industry
segment files, but not in an immediately usable format. What is generally listed
is an abbreviation of the customer’s name, which can vary across reporting firms
and/or years. For example, the listed company ‘Royal Dutch Shell PLC’ was
listed by different firms, ‘Shell Oil’, ‘Shell PLC’, ‘Shell PLC’ and ‘Royal Shell
CMB’. Abbreviations typically took one or more of the following forms:
• Vowels or endings were removed from words
• Suffixes ‘PLC’, ‘LTD’ etc. were frequently dropped off words
• A key word was used rather than the full name e.g. ‘Shell’ rather than
‘Royal Dutch Shell PLC’.
To link the customer abbreviations with full company data, I used a multi-step
procedure which proceeded as follows:
• Exact matches were removed from the data
• Punctuation marks and company endings such as ‘PLC’, ‘LTD’ etc. were
removed from words. The next set of matches were removed
• An algorithm was run that compares the number and order of the letters
in the abbreviation to those in the standardized company names listed on
Compustat, the five company names from Compustat most likely to corre-
spond to the abbreviation
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• A second algorithm was run that compares the Levenshtein distance be-
tween abbreviated names the standardized company names Levenshtein
distance is a metric for measuring the amount of difference between two
sequences (i.e. an edit distance). The Levenshtein distance between two
strings is defined as the minimum number of edits needed to transform one
string into the other, with the allowable edits being insertion, deletion, or
substitution of a single character. The five company names from Compustat
most likely to correspond to the abbreviation were returned.
• Finally, visual inspection of the abbreviated records compared to closest 10
matches was used to manually link records where there is an almost certain,
distinct match.
In instances where more than one company name could correspond with the
abbreviation, I identify the customers using the Compustat industry segment in-
formation as follows: a) if one company had disclosed the same supplier in several
consecutive years, it was often the case that the full name had been disclosed in at
least one of the years b) alternatively, it was also possible to identify the customers
using the industry segment information and the other type of customers disclosed
by the firm. For example, ‘General Nutrition Centers’ or ‘GNC’ is a Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania-based American commercial enterprize focused on the retail sale of
health and nutrition related products. Several firms listed ‘Gen Nut’ or ‘GNC’ in
their customer disclosures. To be sure this referred to General Nutrition Centers
the other customer disclosures of the firms were examined. They included ‘Tree of
Life’ (A health food distribution company); General Nutrition Center; ‘Hollister’
(Hollister Incorporated is an independently-owned global company that develops,
manufactures and markets healthcare products, servicing over 90 countries) and
‘Maersk’.
Abbreviations still without matches using the above methods fell into one of
the following categories:
• The company was a subsidiary of a larger parent company
• The company had undergone a merger, acquisitions or name change
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• The company was government owned, privately owned or overseas listed.
If one or more of these conditions applied, the abbreviated name could not be
linked to an official name by either of the text matching algorithms.
To identify matched within these groups, it was necessary to research the com-
pany information and history to identify its ownership structure, the international
exchanges on which its stock were listed and/or any mergers or acquisitions in the
companies history. This process was time consuming as it involved researching
one or more sources of information: the company’s website, Bloomberg Business-
week records and/or SEC filings. For this reason, only companies with more than
5 entries were followed up, and the following actions were taken:
• If the company was a subsidiary of a parent company, it was linked to the
name of the parent
• If the company had undergone a merger or acquisition its historical account
data may be changed, and the company it is linked to will depend on the
type of merger as explained in the next section
• If the company had undergone a name change, it was linked to the Com-
pustat record for the new name
• If the company was government owned, privately owned or overseas listed
it was assigned a code to this effect (i.e. govt, private or overseas).
• If it was not possible to be almost certain that two records matched they
were not linked.
Disclosed links that could not be matched
It is necessary to make some assumptions regarding the existing links. A neces-
sary assumption is that the accounting information is accurate, such that where a
link is disclosed it exists, and where the information indicates no links none exist.
Table 4.1 shows the number of successful matches in each year. For example,
in 1990 the customer segment files contained 6,249 key customer disclosures, for
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Table 4.1: Total number of records on the Compustat FAS 131 Customer Files from
1989 to 2010, broken down into those matched to other listed firms and
those that could not be matched to other listed firms.
Year Unmatched Matched Total
1990 3940 2309 6249
1991 4214 2518 6732
1992 4711 2704 7415
1993 5118 2865 7983
1994 5382 2959 8341
1995 6067 3231 9298
1996 6123 3405 9528
1997 5716 3078 8794
1998 5881 2949 8830
1999 4931 2545 7476
2000 5373 3081 8454
2001 5133 2932 8065
2002 5184 3042 8226
2003 5075 2792 7867
2004 4994 2860 7854
2005 4877 2811 7688
2006 5012 2726 7738
2007 4977 2602 7579
2008 5204 2523 7727
2009 5287 2426 7713
2010 5603 2161 7764
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics for cleaned (1% winsorised account values) book equity,
sales revenue and key account ratios for supplier firms on the Compustat
FAS 131 Customer Files
Book
equity
Sales Book
leverage
Payables
ratio
EBITDA
:TA
Sales:
TA
Unmatched
Mean 389 717 5.24 0.32 0.01 1.10
S.d. 2,468 4,070 296.37 5.31 0.42 0.94
Matched
Mean 577 1,071 4.95 0.25 0.04 1.09
S.d. 3,521 4,691 112.16 2.13 0.63 0.84
Total
Mean 455 841 5.14 0.30 0.02 1.10
S.d. 2,884 4,302 247.66 4.45 0.50 0.91
firms in the Compustat sample. I was able to match 2,309 (or 37%) of them to
other firms alive in the merged CRSP / Compustat database in the same year,
however 3,940 (or 63%) of these links could not be matched. Many firms did not
disclose the name of the supplier or were linked to a firm that was company was
government owned, privately owned or overseas listed2.
In order to check that these missing links did not bias the results, I checked
that the average characteristics (firm size, industry etc.) of firm for which I was
able to match links was not significantly different from the firms for which I could
not match the links. This is to check that by only including firms for which links
could be identified, I am not introducing sampling bias. This table shows that, on
average, the suppliers with matches to other listed firms in the merged CRSP /
Compustat database had higher Book Equity and Sales than the suppliers whose
key customers could not be matched (because they were unlisted firms, overseas
listed firms, privately owned, not disclosed, or government departments). The
accounting ratios were similar however. T-tests between the two sample means
2 By ignoring links to government owned, privately owned or overseas firms the results are likely
to under-estimate the economic impact of linkages on listed US firms, as shocks transmitted
via these third parties may be influential. This under-estimation should be less pronounced
for links to government because the default risk of the government is lower than that of
private firms, so government links are less likely to be a channel of contagion.
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showed the difference in suppliers’ average BE, sales and EBITDA: TA was signif-
icant, however the difference between suppliers’ book leverage, payables financing
and sales: total assets was not. This suggested that larger firms are more likely
than small firms to have customers that are listed firms; conversely this may be
because listed firms prefer to choose larger, more profitable firms as their suppli-
ers.
In summary, the procedure for identifying matches should not bias the regres-
sion results because the matching procedure was comprehensive, the explanatory
accounting ratios were not significantly different amongst the matched sub-sample
and I also control for firm size in the regressions. However, the results need to be
interpreted in light of the fact that as the sub-sample is pairs of listed suppliers
with listed customers, and this sample does not necessarily reflect the broader
set of supplier firms (e.g. servicing government or unlisted clients).
Reasonableness checks on economic linkage measures extracted from
the accounts
While FAS 131 disclosures identify important customers, it is not necessarily the
case that these customers are, conversely, reliant on the supplier. That is the
text-matching process cannot necessarily be reversed to identify dependent sup-
pliers. For example, a small primary production firm may derive a large portion
of its revenue from a larger upstream customer; however the larger customer is
unlikely to be reliant on the small supplier. Because of the asymmetry in firm
size, just because A sells goods to B worth more that 10% of A’s revenue, this
does not mean that the goods sold are a significant proportion of B’s total in-
puts. If B is much larger than A, goods worth 10% of A’s revenue could be a
very small portion of B’s total inputs. Alternatively, if B is much smaller than
A, and A supplies a significant proportion of B’s total inputs, the value of 10%
of B’s total inputs may be less than 10% of A’s revenue so A will not report B
as a significant customer and this information will not be reported under FAS 131.
Therefore FAS 131 disclosures are only reliable for measuring upstream effects
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(i.e. the economic activity induced by the expenditure of certain firms in their
role as major customers) because firms are required to disclose information on
customers to which sales represent more than 10% of total sales revenue or prof-
its, but not significant supplier linkages. Downstream effects were estimated by
inverting the key customer disclosures. However, since FAS 131 require firms to
report major customers but not major suppliers inverting the links generates an
incomplete sample of ‘key suppliers’. I.e. downstream effects of shocks to firms’
suppliers cannot be reliably measured for the whole sample using the Compustat
data because there is asymmetry in the way that customer and supplier effects
are reported. I address this issue by using the ratio of supplier sales to a given
customer to the customer’s cost of goods sold to identify ‘dependent customers’.
Customer firms in which the supplier sales received are a large proportion of to-
tal cost of goods sold should, all other things being equal, have cash flows more
affected by shocks to these ‘major’ suppliers3.
Like Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) and Fee and Thomas (2004), I
define a ‘dependent customer’ as a firm with a single supplier representing more
than 1% of its total cost of good sold. In order to test the robustness of the
results and whether the affect of linkages on real activity and stock returns runs
just from customers to their suppliers or both ways, I create sub-samples of ‘de-
pendent customer’ and their key suppliers using two alternative thresholds for
sales/cogs (1% and 5% of the customer’s total cost of goods sold). The results
are re-run using these sub-samples to test if the relationship between linkages and
correlation is affected by removing the ‘weaker’ economic links.
3 Cohen and Frazzini (2008) identify ‘key suppliers’ by identifying customer firms in which
the supplier sales received are a large proportion of market equity. They reason that, ceteris
paribus, cash flows should be more affected by shocks to suppliers that are a large proportion
of market equity. They fit models with an indicator (equal to one) if the ratio of total sales
from the supplier to the customer’s total market capitalization at the end of the previous
month is greater than the 75th percentile of all firms in that calendar month. This approach
sets a threshold for suppliers that is not consistent with the threshold for customers because
it is relative to other firms, whereas the threshold for customers is absolute as it is fixed
at 10 percent of the revenues, profit or loss or assets.(Specifically the segment files contain
discloses the monetary value of the transaction (salescs) between A and B when salescs is
more than 10% of A’s revenue).
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics for 1st order customer linkages (CLs), 1st order sup-
plier linkages (SLs), total CLs, total SLs, and the concentration of SLs and
CLs
1990 to 2010 Mean S.D. Skew Kurt Min Max
1st-order CL 0.83 1.55 4.56 44.18 0 34.0
1st-order SL 1.36 6.52 16.15 396.64 0 247.0
Total CL 1.18 0.34 4.58 41.99 1 7.8
Total SL 1.30 1.46 15.90 383.26 1 58.0
Conc. CL 0.31 0.40 0.72 1.80 0 1.0
Conc. SL 0.22 0.37 1.34 3.10 0 1.0
The main criteria for the sub-sample of dependent customers was that cost of
goods bought from the supplier is greater than 1% (or 5%) of the customers’
cost of goods sold4. In summary, the sub sample of dependent customers was
extracted from the final matched set of customers and suppliers by calculating
the ratio of customer purchases from the supplier (salecs) to the customers’ cost
of goods sold. All entries where salecs was missing or less than 1% of cost of
goods sold were deleted, in addition all firms with book equity less than zero and
all financial firms were deleted. The resulting sub-sample of dependent customers
had 9, 616 annual observations for 2, 180 unique firms. The linkage measures for
this sample are summarized in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 shows that the sub-sample of dependent customer firms has higher
average degree of first-order and total customer and supplier linkage (CL and
SL respectively), and that their linkages are more concentrated than the sam-
ple based on dependent suppliers (p=0.000 in all pairwise t-tests comparing the
means from the full sample to the mean from the sub-sample). However, the
shape of the distribution of the linkage measures (1st-order CL, 1st-order SL,
Total CL, Total SL) is similar in both samples. Significantly, even in the sub-
sample of dependent customers the distribution of the number of supplier linkages
4 In addition, the selection criteria also included: a) the supplier must disclose the amount of
sales to the supplier and the customer firms must disclose cost of goods sold, b) customer
firms with negative Book Equity were excluded in order to eliminate firms in financial distress
from the sample.
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(out-degree) is more heavy-tailed than the distribution of the number of customer
linkages (in-degree). These summary statistics tend to support the finding that a
small number of extremely large ‘customer’ firms dominate the sources of revenue
of most listed firms. In other words, the source of revenue for listed firms (in their
role as suppliers of intermediate inputs to other firms) are concentrated.
4.5 The structure of linkages between firms with
securities listed on US exchanges 1990 to
2010
In this section I characterize the structure of cash flows along supply chains be-
tween the U.S. listed firms on the intersection of Compustat and CRSP between
1990 and 2010. I analyze the degree and structure of customer linkages (the
source of a firm’s sales revenue) and the degree and structure of supplier linkages
(the source of a firm’s sales expense).
The pairwise linkages between supplier and customer firms available in the Com-
pustat/CRSP database can be mapped onto a network where each node is a firm
and each edge represents cash flow from customers to their suppliers. The annual
disclosures made between 1990 and 2010 to calculate an adjacency matrix At for
each of these years (t = 1990, · · · , 2010). The (i, j)’th entry of At, aij,t, is 1 if i
disclosed j as a key customer in year t and 0 otherwise. In a firm-level network,
the set of nodes that make up the network is comprised of n firms, and the edge
set is the subset of all ordered pairs of vertices fi, fj, with fi, fj ∈ F . At gives
the set of all adjacency relations, fi → fj between elements of the set of all firms
that defines a directed inter-firm network.
To analyze the characteristics of economic linkages more formally, concepts from
network theory can be adapted to measure the degree of connectivity between
firms along supply chains. Let the units in the network represent firms and the
edges represent cash-flow between firms. In this sense, firm i’s in-degree can be
thought of as the number of units paying cash (in) to firm i, and firm i’s out-
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degree can be thought of as the number of units to which firm i pays cash (out).
In a supply chain, it is assumed that goods and services flow in the opposite
direction to cash, so cash is assumed to flow from customers to suppliers. The
in-degree represents the number of key customers paying cash to the (supplier)
firm, and out-degree represents the number of key suppliers requiring payment
via cash-flow out of the (customer) firm. In addition the term supplier linkage is
used to indicate the connection of a firm to another firm to which it purchases
inputs and pays money (customer to supplier) and customer linkage is used to
indicate the connection of a firm to another firm to which it supplies inputs and
receives money (supplier to customer) or the number of key customers.
Figure 4.2 gives a snapshot of the adjacency matrices describing supplier-
customer linkages in 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. Dots in the figure correspond
to a significant link between supplier i and customer j (or a flow of cash from j
to i), provided firm j represents 10% or more of firm i’s total sales. These ma-
trices are sparse as the majority of firms in the CRSP/Compustat intersection
have no key customers that are listed firms. The axes contain the full set of all
firms in the sample alive at any time within 1990 to 2010. The matrix for 1995
appears concentrated in the upper left hand corner because the supplier firms at
the bottom of the y axis are not alive yet. The progression from 1995 to 2010
shows that as new supplier firms start disclosing key customers, they tend to sell
to the same customer firms. To complement these plots, Tables 4.4 to Table 4.7
summarize the first four moments of the first-order and second-order in-degree
and out-degree distributions in each year from 1989 to 2010.
Tables 4.4 to 4.7 illustrate an increasing trend in both the average first-order
and second-order in-degree, and both the average first-order and second-order
out-degree over the period 1990 to 2010. That is, the average number of key
customers and reliant suppliers that a randomly chosen firm is likely to have has
increased over the last twenty years. This indicates an increasing dependence of
the cash-flow of listed firms in the sample on particular customers and suppli-
ers. In addition the tails of first-order out-degree, the first-order in-degree and
the second-order in-degree have become more positively skewed and heavier, as
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Figure 4.2: Plots of the adjacency matrices for the supplier-customer connections
between listed firms on the Compustat/CRSP database in 1995, 2000,
2005 and 2010. Each dot corresponds to a significant cash-flow (over 10%
of the supplier’s total sales revenue) from the row (supplier) firm i to the
column (customer) firm j.
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Table 4.4: Summary statistics from the distribution of the 1st order out-degree (num-
ber of dependent suppliers)
Mean Std
Dev
Skew Kurt Min Max
1989 0.12 1.69 45.72 2,914.52 0 136
1990 0.12 1.79 41.93 2,135.94 0 110
1991 0.12 1.8 42.54 2,208.65 0 111
1992 0.12 1.85 45.22 2,494.55 0 126
1993 0.12 1.81 44.13 2,397.12 0 125
1994 0.12 1.83 45.29 2,570.31 0 137
1995 0.13 1.87 43.00 2,319.18 0 130
1996 0.14 1.88 43.46 2,577.02 0 151
1997 0.14 1.93 44.63 2,742.90 0 159
1998 0.14 1.91 43.59 2,672.45 0 158
1999 0.14 1.88 45.30 2,991.97 0 164
2000 0.14 1.77 41.94 2,614.90 0 149
2001 0.14 1.87 49.07 3,650.63 0 175
2002 0.14 1.83 47.73 3,499.33 0 170
2003 0.14 1.94 52.40 4,320.00 0 193
2004 0.14 1.83 53.37 4,549.62 0 186
2005 0.14 1.82 53.22 4,567.39 0 185
2006 0.14 1.88 57.52 5,233.97 0 198
2007 0.14 1.93 60.72 5,746.62 0 209
2008 0.14 2.01 64.81 6,399.86 0 223
2009 0.14 2.03 63.81 6,230.63 0 224
2010 0.14 2.18 68.15 6,966.05 0 248
indicated by the increasing skewness and kurtosis over the period 1990 to 2010.
This suggests the supply chains are becoming more concentrated via a process of
the largest firms accruing more customers and suppliers, while small and medium
size firms retain the same number of customers and suppliers.
In all years the average number of dependent suppliers (out-degree) is equal
to the average number of key customers (in-degree)5; however, the out-degree
distributions have much heavier tails (higher kurtosis) than the in-degree dis-
5 This is because the data on dependent suppliers was generated by reversing FAS 131 disclo-
sures of key customers.
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Table 4.5: Summary statistics from the distribution of the 2nd order out-degree (num-
ber of dependent suppliers)
Mean Std
Dev
Skew Kurt Min Max
1989 0.03 1.74 143.36 21,703.69 0 265
1990 0.03 1.37 127.42 18,292.32 0 200
1991 0.03 1.31 115.11 15,646.74 0 184
1992 0.03 1.26 122.74 17,262.76 0 181
1993 0.03 1.29 125.1 17,737.96 0 186
1994 0.03 1.15 124.13 17,576.98 0 166
1995 0.03 0.77 71.86 6,642.86 0 84
1996 0.03 0.65 70.84 7,034.42 0 73
1997 0.03 0.87 75.27 7,784.58 0 101
1998 0.03 0.85 62.26 5,289.95 0 88
1999 0.03 0.83 41.53 1,989.57 0 52
2000 0.04 1.01 46.74 2,622.79 0 79
2001 0.04 1.13 47.77 2,592.02 0 78
2002 0.04 1.13 40.99 1,931.24 0 69
2003 0.07 2.10 48.88 2,803.36 0 156
2004 0.07 1.96 53.21 3,501.87 0 170
2005 0.06 1.59 46.73 2,609.39 0 116
2006 0.07 1.74 33.92 1,272.11 0 91
2007 0.08 1.92 35.96 1,457.31 0 106
2008 0.07 1.81 45.61 2,511.01 0 134
2009 0.06 1.94 54.26 3,517.46 0 159
2010 0.07 2.49 59.66 4,103.30 0 210
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Table 4.6: Summary statistics from the distribution of the 1st order in-degree (number
of key customers)
Mean Std
Dev
Skew Kurt Min Max
1989 0.12 0.49 5.79 55.40 0 13
1990 0.12 0.52 6.02 51.37 0 10
1991 0.12 0.52 5.99 50.13 0 10
1992 0.12 0.51 5.62 43.37 0 9
1993 0.12 0.49 5.24 36.95 0 8
1994 0.12 0.49 5.89 64.97 0 15
1995 0.13 0.51 4.77 30.45 0 8
1996 0.14 0.52 4.69 29.23 0 8
1997 0.14 0.56 5.77 51.35 0 13
1998 0.14 0.59 6.41 62.59 0 13
1999 0.14 0.70 8.60 109.87 0 17
2000 0.14 0.65 8.17 109.20 0 16
2001 0.14 0.65 7.48 86.20 0 17
2002 0.14 0.63 7.07 74.94 0 14
2003 0.14 0.68 8.26 101.51 0 15
2004 0.14 0.67 7.91 91.77 0 14
2005 0.14 0.68 8.10 97.94 0 16
2006 0.14 0.73 10.13 165.46 0 24
2007 0.14 0.76 10.71 176.20 0 22
2008 0.14 0.79 11.74 209.72 0 24
2009 0.14 0.84 12.72 243.88 0 29
2010 0.14 0.93 13.86 275.02 0 34
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Table 4.7: Summary statistics from the distribution of the 2nd order in-degree (num-
ber of key customers)
Mean Std
Dev
Skew Kurt Min Max
1989 0.03 0.24 11.76 178.34 0 7
1990 0.03 0.30 16.18 356.04 0 11
1991 0.03 0.31 16.31 375.87 0 11
1992 0.03 0.28 14.76 303.06 0 10
1993 0.03 0.25 12.35 196.94 0 7
1994 0.03 0.24 12.23 195.46 0 8
1995 0.03 0.25 14.17 289.72 0 9
1996 0.03 0.26 15.03 323.94 0 10
1997 0.03 0.30 13.94 245.12 0 9
1998 0.03 0.33 18.05 488.09 0 16
1999 0.03 0.47 30.94 1,434.89 0 32
2000 0.04 0.43 23.32 758.00 0 20
2001 0.04 0.44 20.13 651.79 0 25
2002 0.04 0.47 17.51 416.90 0 19
2003 0.07 0.83 20.60 583.60 0 40
2004 0.07 0.84 26.78 1,092.10 0 51
2005 0.06 0.64 22.25 737.18 0 31
2006 0.07 0.92 28.49 1,205.97 0 52
2007 0.08 1.02 29.25 1,243.81 0 56
2008 0.07 0.83 23.35 773.45 0 42
2009 0.06 0.88 25.61 877.59 0 44
2010 0.07 1.16 35.61 1,848.60 0 87
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tributions. This strong heterogeneity (fat tailed behavior) along the out-degree
dimension is a feature in every year of the data. It is the counterpart to the
empirically documented heavy-tailed input supply distribution in sector-level an-
alyzes (i.e. the fact that input-use matrices have a few full rows but mostly empty
rows) (Carvalho, 2008; Horvath, 2000). The heterogeneity in firms’ out-degrees
indicates that a few ‘hub’ firms have a large number of dependent suppliers, while
the vast majority of firms have no dependent suppliers. In contrast, there is far
less heterogeneity in firms’ in-degrees because almost all firms have zero or one
key customer.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate this by plotting the empirical out-degree counter-
cumulative distribution in the input-use data. The empirical CDFs indicate that
the distribution of out-degrees (i.e. number of supplier linkages) is much more
heavy-tailed than the distribution of in-degrees (i.e. number of customer link-
ages), with over 90% of matched firms having a first order out-degree of zero, but
one or two firms having an out-degree of 140 to 250 firms over the sample period.
As above, the difference between average and highest degree is less pronounced
for in-degrees, with about 70% of matched firms having a first order in-degree
of zero, about 25% having in-degree between 1 and 10 and about 5% having
in-degree of at most 40, even with links to unlisted firms included.
Heavy-tailed distribution of connectivity
Extremely heavy-tails in a distribution are usually associated with power law
behavior. Mathematically, a quantity X obeys a power law if it is drawn from a
probability distribution where the cumulative distribution function (CDF) follows
Pr(X > x) = cx−ζ (4.8)
where c is a constant and ζ > 1 is a parameter of the distribution known as the
scaling parameter6. In practice, few empirical phenomena obey power laws for all
6 The special case of ζ = 1 is known as the Zipf distribution and has somewhat unusual
properties as its moments do not exist. Therefore in this thesis, I focus on structures in
which ζ > 1. This assumption is also made by Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi
(2010); Gabaix (2011)
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Figure 4.3: Empirical cumulative distribution of first-order in-degrees (number of key
customers)
values of X, more often the power law applies only for values greater than some
minimum value of X (Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman, 2009). For example, firm
sizes in industrial countries are highly skew, such that small numbers of large
firms coexist alongside larger numbers of smaller firms. The upper tail of the
firm size distribution has often been described by a power law (Axtell, 2001; Zipf,
1949). For example, recent analysis of data on the largest 500 U.S. firms gives
ζ ≈ 1.25, whereas it is closer to 1 for many other countries (Axtell, 2001).
In the context of a supply network, let P (k) =
∑
k′ pk′ be the counter-cumulative
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Figure 4.4: Empirical cumulative distribution of first-order out-degrees (number of
dependent suppliers)
distribution (CCDF) of out-degrees, i.e. the probability that a sector selected at
random from the population supplies to k or more sectors. I say that the number
of sectors supplied (i.e. the out-degree), k, follows a power law distribution if,
the p.d.f. giving the frequency of sectors that supply to exactly k sectors in the
economy is given by P (k) = ck−ζ for ζ > 1, and k integer, k > 1. Empirical
evidence from recent work showing that the tails of the out-degree distribution
of economic sectors are well described by power laws, with scaling parameters in
the range of ζ = 1.5 (Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2010).
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In Chapter 4 (Proposition 2) I show that if the distribution of a firm’s con-
nectivity across its suppliers (customers), i.e. the firm’s out-degree (in-degree)
distribution, has power law tails then aggregate volatility in its cash-flow decreases
much slower than 1√
n
7 as the firm increases the number of suppliers (customers)
it has. Conversely, for a fixed number of suppliers (customers), as the tail param-
eter of the out-degree (in-degree) distribution drops (so that a small numbers of
its suppliers (customers) are extremely influential while most have no influence)
the volatility of cash-flow is likely to increase.
Tests of heavy-tailedness
In this section I test whether the distribution of the out-degree distributions in
the firm-level supply network data follows a power law. Linear regression (or least
squares) methods for estimating the parameters of a power-law distribution tend
to provide biased estimates for the tail parameter (Goldstein, Morris, and Yen,
2004). The maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), commonly known as the Hill
estimator8 is asymptotically normal and consistent and produces more accurate
and robust estimates (Goldstein, Morris, and Yen, 2004; Clauset, Shalizi, and
Newman, 2009). MLE permits the use of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test to
assess goodness-of-fit. The KS statistic assesses the accuracy of the goodness of
fit of the power law distribution to the data by calculating the maximum distance
between the CDFs of the data and the fitted model. I.e.
D = maxx≥xmin|S(x)− P (x)|
where S(x) is the CDF of the data for the observations with value at least xmin,
and P (x) is the CDF for the power-law model that best fits the data in the region
x ≥ xmin. The estimate ˆxmin is the value of xmin that minimizes D.
There are a number of ways to assess whether a power law is a good descrip-
7 The rate predicted by the law of large numbers.
8 Given xmin, the MLE of ζ is ζˆ = 1 + n[
∑
i ln
xi
xmin
]−1. Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman (2009)
outlines the following procedure for estimating xmin: choose the value of ˆxmin that makes the
probability distributions of the measured data and the best-fit power-law model as similar
as possible above ˆxmin. For more details see Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman (2009).
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tion of the tail behavior of the out-degree distribution. First, note that taking
the logarithm of both sides of Equation (4.8) shows that a if X follows a power-law
distribution
lnP (x) = −ζlnx+ constant
implying that it follows a straight line on a doubly logarithmic plot.
Figure 4.5 plots the logarithm of the empirical counter-cumulative distribution
function for first-order out-degrees (i.e., one minus the empirical cumulative dis-
tribution function) against the logarithm of first-order out-degrees in the years
1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. In all cases, the tail of the log-log plot of the CCDF is
approximately linear, indicating that the tails of out-degree distribution of firms
on the Compustat/CRSP database are well-approximated by a power law distri-
bution.
Formal statistical tests have also been developed to assess whether a power
law is an accurate representation of empirical data. Clauset, Shalizi, and New-
man (2009) outlines the following procedure for assessing whether empirical data
follows a power law. First, fit a power-law model to the data using MLE and
calculate the KS statistic for this fit. Next, generate a large number of power-law
distributed synthetic data sets with the same tail parameter using Monte Carlo
simulation. Fit each synthetic data set individually to its own power-law model
and calculate the KS statistic for each one relative to its own model. The p-value
is the fraction of the time the resulting KS statistic is larger than the value for
the empirical data. Table shows the results of this procedure implemented on the
empirical data on the first-order and second-order out-degree distributions of the
sample of US listed firms by year 1990 to 2010. In Table 4.8, the null hypothe-
sis of a power law being reasonable fit to the data is rejected at the 5% level if
p < 0.05. That is, it is ruled out if there is a probability of 1 in 20 or less that
we would merely by chance get data that agree as poorly with the model as the
data we have. In many years a power law provides a reasonable fit to the data. It
is interesting to note that there is considerable variation in the heavy-tailedness
of supplier-customer dependencies over time, and also a considerable difference
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Table 4.8: Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test to assess goodness-of-fit of power law to
the degree distribution
1st order out-degree 2nd order out-degree
p-value gof p-value gof
1989 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.06
1990 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.09
1991 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.08
1992 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.05
1993 0.00 0.04 0.39 0.04
1994 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.08
1995 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.06
1996 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.07
1997 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.05
1998 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.10
1999 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.07
2000 0.24 0.01 0.44 0.04
2001 0.06 0.02 0.13 0.05
2002 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.07
2003 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.08
2004 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.12
2005 0.09 0.02 0.00 0.09
2006 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.07
2007 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.07
2008 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.13
2009 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.06
2010 0.00 0.03 0.17 0.05
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Figure 4.5: Counter-cumulative out-degree distribution. Log-log plots of the CCDF of
first-order out-degrees amongst all firms listed on the Compustat/CRSP
intersection 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. The straight line in each panel
is of slope ζˆ, the MLE of ζ shown in Column 3 of Table 4.9.
between first order and second order measures.
As a power law provides a reasonable description of out-degree distributions in
over half of the years in the data, it is reasonable to estimate the tail parameter
and scaling cut-off. Table 4.9 contains the MLE estimates of the tail parameter
(ζ) and the scaling cut-off (xmin). The power law tail coefficients for the second
order out-degree distribution are slightly higher on average than the tail coef-
ficients for the first order out-degree distribution (1.811 vs 1.736 respectively).
This suggests that the distribution of first-order linkages is more heavy-tailed
than the distribution of second-order linkages. However, in both cases there is
reason to suspect that linkages interfere with diversification as the tail coefficient
of both the first and second order degree distribution is less than 2 (see Acemoglu,
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Table 4.9: Power law coefficients (xmin and ζ) fit to 1st order and 2nd order out-degree
1st order 1st order 2nd order 2nd order
ˆxmin ζˆ ˆxmin ζˆ
1989 0.007 1.782 0.002 1.719
1990 0.001 1.650 0.001 1.788
1991 0.002 1.722 0.001 1.743
1992 0.003 1.691 0.001 1.729
1993 0.001 1.626 0.001 1.708
1994 0.002 1.685 0.001 1.733
1995 0.002 1.720 0.001 1.659
1996 0.003 1.764 0.001 1.650
1997 0.002 1.693 0.001 1.765
1998 0.002 1.724 0.001 1.792
1999 0.002 1.751 0.001 1.863
2000 0.002 1.721 0.001 1.793
2001 0.003 1.755 0.001 1.798
2002 0.004 1.792 0.001 1.841
2003 0.004 1.810 0.001 1.900
2004 0.004 1.793 0.001 1.884
2005 0.001 1.714 0.001 1.871
2006 0.002 1.748 0.001 1.996
2007 0.002 1.756 0.003 1.929
2008 0.002 1.731 0.004 1.902
2009 0.002 1.770 0.003 1.851
2010 0.002 1.793 0.002 1.939
Min 0.001 1.626 0.001 1.650
Max 0.007 1.810 0.004 1.996
Avg 0.002 1.736 0.001 1.811
S.d. 0.001 0.048 0.001 0.094
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Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2011)).
4.6 Summary
This chapter outlined the research methodology and the data used to answer the
research questions that were formulated in Chapter 2. I outline a unique source
of data on economic linkages (FAS 131 accounting disclosures of key customers)
and the procedures for extracting this data from the Compustat/CRSP database.
Analysis of the main characteristics of economic linkages between the firms on the
Compustat/CRSP database showed that in all years 1990 to 2010 there were a
small number of extremely connected ‘hub’ firms (e.g. Walmart and General Mo-
tors) that were the key customers of many different (dependent supplier) firms.
Consistent with this observation, I showed that distribution of listed US firms’
out-degree (or number of dependent suppliers) follows a power law distribution,
with a very small chance that a randomly selected firm is a key customer of an
extremely large number of supplier firms.
In addition, the moments of the data and the estimated power law parameters
both indicate an increasing trend in the degree of economic linkage between listed
US firms over the period 1990 to 2010. These findings support the assumptions
of the theory in Chapter 3, and suggest that analyzing the influence of inter-
firm connectivity on asset prices is of increasing importance in modern financial
markets.
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Chapter 5
Economic linkages and return
correlation
5.1 Introduction
As shown in Chapter 3, if economic linkages are a channel through which shocks
are transmitted between firms, the transmitted shocks can create correlation in
linked firms’ returns (as customer firms will be exposed to shocks to their sup-
pliers, and vice versa). Studies have shown that economic linkages increase sec-
toral output correlation (Raddatz, 2010) and correlation in counterparties’ credit
spreads (Jorion and Zhang, 2009). In relation to stock returns, however, the
importance of economic linkages as a source of return correlation has not been
comprehensively established.
Understanding sources of correlation in returns is crucial to portfolio risk man-
agement. Return correlation may be caused by both macro and micro factors.
The returns of different assets are positively correlated due to common exposure
to macro factors such as interest rates. Models that include only macro factors,
however, cannot replicate the levels of correlation found in empirical data on
defaults (Egloff and Leippold, 2007) or the high levels of correlation in stock re-
turns during financial crises (Longin and Solnik, 2001). Micro channels, such as
economic linkages between firms, can create correlation in excess of that caused
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by macro factors (Egloff and Leippold, 2007). As such, economic linkages may
be important in explaining situations in which observed levels of return correla-
tion are higher than the expected level of correlation based on macro factors alone.
Most asset pricing studies neglect the economic links between firms underly-
ing the assets under consideration. Two event studies, however, have established
that economically linked firms have correlated returns following significant news
announcements and bankruptcy filings. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) show that sig-
nificant news announcements generate return predictability for suppliers; while
Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) show that bankruptcy filings are associ-
ated with significant negative stock price movements for suppliers. The studies
by Cohen and Frazzini (2008) and Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) are
limited, however, as they only take into account direct links between suppliers
and customers, not indirect links to firms further up or down a supply chain (e.g.
from customers’ customers). Also they only examine stock price response in a
narrow event window. This approach does not allow for the possibility that eco-
nomic linkages may create interdependence in stock returns that exists in general
market conditions, or the possibility that indirect linkages to suppliers and cus-
tomers may be important.
The central hypothesis tested in this chapter is that an increase in the strength of
the economic linkage between two firms, as measured by cash-flow along the sup-
ply chain connecting two firms (i.e. via all direct and indirect linkages between
two firms), results in an increase in their stock return correlation. I test for the
presence and significance of shock transmission via economic linkages by testing
the implications for return correlation based on the theoretical model in Chapter
3. First, I show that the shocks transmitted via inter-firm linkages increase cor-
relation between linked firms’ returns. Second, I show that as the use of trade
credit along the supply chain between two firms increases, so does correlation in
their returns. The significance of this effect remains after controlling for macro
factors, industry effects and firm-level characteristics that have been shown to
influence contagion. Finally, I show that the influence of shocks transmitted via
economic linkages on stock returns is significantly higher during recessions.
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5.2 Research method
In Chapter 3, it was shown that the transmission of shocks via economic linkages
can increase the correlation between linked firms’ stock prices. In this chapter
I empirically test the hypothesis that the transmission of shocks via economic
linkages affects stock returns, by testing whether an increase in the strength of
the linkage between two firms raises their return correlation. I also test whether
this relationship is stronger in a recession.
Regression of correlation on input-output distance
In Chapter 3 I developed a model of stock returns in a market where the un-
derlying firms are linked and there is transmission of shocks through economic
linkages between firms. To recap, let
Rt = (I− αWt)−1ηt = CStηt (5.1)
where Rt is a vector of excess returns in period t, α is a constant, Wt = cAt is
an N by N weight matrix, equal to c times the adjacency matrix At describing
the links between N firms in period t, and ηt is a vector of shocks hitting each
firm directly in period t. As in Chapter 3, at the firm-level this model is
Rit =
∑
j 6=i
CSijtηjt + ηit (5.2)
where Rit is the excess return on the stock of firm i in period t; CSt is a matrix of
the total economic linkages in period t, whose ij’th element, CSijt, is the share of
firm j in the total demand for firm i’s goods through direct and indirect linkages;
and ηt = (η1t, ..., ηNt) is a vector of i.i.d. idiosyncratic shocks for firms 1 to N .
Assuming that idiosyncratic shocks are i.i.d. Equation (5.2) implies that the
correlation between two firms’ returns, after controlling for systematic risk fac-
tors is:
ρik ≈
∑
j(CS − I)ij(CS − I)kj√∑
j(CS − I)2ij(CS − I)2kj
(5.3)
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A simple modification to equations (5.2) and (5.3) allows for the possibility that
trade credit may affect the transmission of shocks via inter-firm linkages. Let Pij
be the fraction of the supplier-customer transaction financed via trade credit (in
empirical work, Pij is set equal to i’s ratio of accounts payable to total cost of
goods sold for all of i’s customers). If this fraction has an additional effect on the
transmission of shocks, then the transmission via each direct linkage wij would be
scaled up to wij(1 + βPij), with β parameterizing the importance of trade credit.
Assuming, for data availability reasons, that Pij is constant across suppliers
(Pij = Pi∀ i), then equation (5.2) becomes
Rit =
∑
j 6=i
CS∗ijtηjt + ηit (5.4)
where CS∗ = (I− αW(I + βP))−1, and the matrix P is a diagonal matrix with
each firms trade credit ratio, Pij = Pi, on the diagonal.
The first order linear approximation of CS∗ about β = 0 is CS∗ ≈ CS + βCD,
where CS measures the strength of economic linkage between firms, and CD = CS(WP)CS
measures the credit distance between two firms (i.e. use of trade credit along the
supply chain connecting i and j). Using this approximation, the expression for
return correlation becomes
ρik ≈
∑
j CSijCSkj√∑
j CS
2
ijCS
2
kj
+ β
∑
j
CSijCSkj(c`ij + c`kj)√∑
l CS
2
ilCS
2
kl
, (5.5)
where c`ij =
CSijCDij
CS2ij
−
∑
l CSilCDil
CS2il
, where CDij is the (i, j) element of CD = CS(WP)CS,
which measures the use of trade credit the full length along the chain connecting
i and j1.
The first term of equation (5.5) corresponds to the correlation between i and
1 Raddatz (2010) proves a similar result in the context of sector-level input-output models.
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k in the absence of trade credit amplification; the second term is a weighted av-
erage of the relative use of trade credit across all j linking i and k, where the
weights are determined by the product of the direct and indirect linkages between
j, i, and k. Shocks to firm j increase the correlation between firms i and k most
when the linkages between j and i and j and k are a significant percentage of each
firm’s total cash-flow, and when the use of trade credit along the chain linking i
and k (via j) is high.
I test whether economic linkages and/or the use of trade credit affect returns
by estimating the following equation
ρik ≈ c+βCSCSik+βCDCDik+
M∑
m=1
βmFm+
L∑
l=1
βl,(s)Xil+
L∑
l=1
βl,(c)Xkl+εik. (5.6)
where ρik is the correlation between Ri and Rk, the excess return of stock i
and stock k; CSik, the measure of supply-chain distance between i and k, is the
(i, k)’th element of CSCS′; CDik, the measure of credit distance between i and
k, is the (i, k)’th element of CD = CS(WP)CS; βm is the sensitivity of return
correlation to common factor Fm; βl,(s) and βl,(c) are the sensitivity of return cor-
relation to supplier and customer firm-specific characteristic l, i.e. Xil and Xkl
respectively; and the noise terms εik are assumed to be mean zero, i.i.d.
The null hypothesis that neither economic linkages nor the use of trade credit
along supply chains affect return correlation is
H0 : βCS = βCD = 0
And the alternative hypothesis that economic linkages and/or the use of trade
credit along supply chains does influence return correlation is
HA : βCS 6= βCD 6= 0.
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Regime shifts
The model above assumes that linkages and trade credit amplify positive and
negative shocks equally. However, transmission of shocks between suppliers and
customers may be stronger in a recession, when shocks are often negative (Lang
and Stulz, 1992; Escaith and Gonguet, 2009). Neglecting asymmetry could result
in downward biased coefficient estimates (Raddatz, 2010). I test whether the
stock returns of linked firms are more correlated in a recession than in normal
times in two ways. First, equation (5.6) was estimated using only data from the
NBER recession subperiods. T-tests were used to test whether the coefficients for
the production and credit distance were significantly higher in recessions than in
the full period (growth periods). Second, I estimated (5.6) over different quan-
tiles of the correlation distribution via quantile regression to test whether the
coefficients for the production and credit distance were higher in high correlation
regimes than in low correlation regimes. The quantiles can be interpreted as a
states or a regimes; i.e. lower quantiles (lower correlation) are consistent with a
good state and higher quantiles (higher correlation) are consistent with a bad state
or regime (Baur and Schulze, 2005). A conditional correlation approach (used in
the quantile regressions) allows for asymmetry, whereas an unconditional OLS
approach (used to fit Equation (5.5)) has the advantage that it avoids endogene-
ity issues (Raddatz, 2010). I use both OLS and quantile regression approaches
to test for robustness to asymmetry and endogeneity issues.
5.3 Data and measurement of variables
5.3.1 Sample selection
The sample was selected from the set of all nonfinancial firms in the intersection
of the CRSP return files and the Compustat annual files using selection criteria
identical to Fama and French (1992). These files contain return and account
information on all firms with listed securities on the NYSE, AMEX and/or NAS-
DAQ exchanges. The sample was selected from the full intersection of CRSP and
Compustat according to the following criteria:
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• The firm must have a record in both Compustat Fundamental Annual and
CRSP files between 1989 and 2010. (1989 is the start date because disclo-
sures under FAS 131 were only restated back to 1990, but one year of extra
information is included to calculate lagged variables.)
• There must be at least 2 years or 24 months of return data on CRSP. (As
at least 20 observations should be used to calculate beta and correlation
between firms return series. Furthermore, this controls for the potential
survival/selection bias inherent in the way COMPUSTAT adds firms to its
tapes (Banz and Breen, 1986).
• Financial firms were excluded based on SIC divisions 6000-6900 i.e. firms
from the financial service industry because disclosure requirements and ac-
counting rules are significantly different for these industries (Collins et al.,
2003) and because the use and influence of leverage is not comparable be-
tween financial and non-financial companies (Fama and French, 1992).
In order to test the hypothesis of supply chain contagion, the sample is further
limited to firms that have disclosed a key customer, or have been disclosed as a
key customer, at any point during the sample period 1990 to 2010. This approach
allows me to test whether the time series variation in pairwise return correlation
is related to the time series variation in pairwise inter-firm linkages.
The final sample contained 305,500 monthly firm-pair return observations, be-
tween 15,417 unique pairs, each with an average of 20 overlapping monthly ob-
servations each2. The panel was unbalanced.
5.3.2 Dependent variable: Return correlation
To test whether inter-firm linkages are related to the pairwise correlation in stock
prices I use two alternative response variables:
2 The sample selection criteria were applied to individual firms, and ensured that individually,
each firm had 24 months of return data on CRSP. Only periods in which both firms were
alive were included in the final dataset, however. This is not problematic as 20 observations
is still OK to calculate correlations.
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• pairwise correlation in excess stock returns (Corr(ER)) and
• pairwise correlation in residual returns from the CAPM (Corr(RR)).
The first response ρij is the sample correlation between the last 24 monthly
observations of Ri − Rf and Rj − Rf . The second response ρεij controls for
exposure to the market risk factor i.e. ρεij is the sample correlation between the
last 24 monthly observations of the residual returns
εˆit = Rit − βˆitRMt
where βˆit is calculated by taking the sample correlation between Ri and Rm
over the past 24 monthly observations (similar to Fama and French (1992) who
estimate β using the past 24 to 60 monthly returns, as available)3.
5.3.3 Independent variables
Accounting variables
The firm-level linkage measures and control variables are taken from the an-
nual financial accounts recorded in Compustat. To ensure that the explanatory
accounting variables relate to the same historical period over which the return
correlation is calculated, I match the (past 2 year) return correlation for July of
year t to June of t + 1 with accounting data for fiscal years ending in calendar
year t − 1. This matching rules ensures that there is at least a six month gap
3 It is appropriate to use rolling betas in this case to allow for time-variation in the sensitivity
of assets to common factors that may be caused if linkages transmit macro shocks. To see
this note that (5.2) implies
Rit = βiRMt +
∑
j 6=i
CSijt(ηj + βjRMt) + ηi (5.7)
= (βi +
∑
j 6=i
CSijtβj)RMt +
∑
j 6=i
CSijηj + ηi.
so beta will be time varying if transmitted macro shocks (
∑
j 6=i CSijtβjRMt) are significant
and the linkages CSijt are time varying. This construction of residual returns is also consis-
tent with the proxy for idiosyncratic volatility, which is calculated as the standard deviation
of the εˆit as in R. and Duffee (1995); Cheung and Ng (1992); Chava and Purnanandam
(2010).
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between the accounting data and the return correlation it is supposed to explain,
and that the entire year to which the account information relates overlaps the
two year period during which the return correlation is calculated. That is, using
the standard matching rule proposed in Fama and French (1992) ensures that the
response and accounting variables relate to the same historical period4.
Adjacency matrix
Data on economic linkages between firms is obtained from the Compustat Seg-
ment files. These files contain annual account disclosures under FAS 131 which list
the identity of all customers that account for 10% or more of the firm’s total sales
revenue (described in detail in Section 4.3). These disclosures pertained to a set
of 25,595 unique firm IDs. I the annual disclosures made between 1990 and 2010
to calculate an adjacency matrix At for each of these years (t = 1990, · · · , 2010).
The (i, j)’th entry of At, aij,t, is 1 if i disclosed j as a key customer in year t and 0
otherwise. (The process for determining whether i disclosed j as a key customer
in year t is described in detail in Section 4.4).
The FAS 131 disclosures were used to form series of adjacency matrices describ-
ing the supplier-customer links between listed firms each year from 1990 to 20105
Calculating aggregate measures of linkage from the adjacency matrices is done
via the matrix manipulations explained in detail in Chapter 3. For example,
the first and second order in-degree and out-degree distributions for all firms on
the Compustat/CRSP database each year from 1990 to 2010 are calculated by
summing the entries in the rows and columns of At and A
2
t respectively
6.
4 I also tested the regression results using last available accounting information as explanatory
variables, and the main results and conclusions were not significantly different.
5 The list of pairs describes the entries in a 25, 595 by 25, 595 square adjacency matrix which
specifies the structure of the network of supply linkages between all listed firms on the
CRSP/Compustat database in each year. The construction and manipulation of these matri-
ces was based on standard principles from graph theory and economic input-output analysis
reviewed in Chapter 3.
6 Self-linkages, where firms have disclosed themselves as key customers, are removed from
the matrix by setting the diagonal elements of At to zero. Self-linkages may arise in
parent-subsidiary relationships, mergers and acquisitions or conglomerate firms. I remove
self-linkages in order to focus on shocks transmitted from other firms (rather than purely
idiosyncratic shocks hitting the firm directly).
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Economic distance and credit chain distance
Return correlation relates to the connection between pairs of firms. Note that
firm i may be connected to j directly, or through one or more other firms e.g. if
i is connected to k, and k is connected to j etc. The direct links between i and j
are the entries in the adjacency matrix At (which may take the values 0 or 1) ,
the two steps links between i and j are the entries in the matrix A2t (which may
take the values 0, 1, 2, · · · ) and so on. The total degree of linkage is the weighted
sum of all possible paths from i to j, or
CSt = (I− αWt)−1
where α is an influence weight, and Wt = cAt is the matrix of weighted con-
nections. To convert the adjacency matrix At into the total connectivity matrix
CSt I need to assume values for α and c.
FAS 131 requires listed firms disclose details of any customer accounting for 10%
or more of the enterprize’s total sales revenue in the notes to the accounts. While
not all firms provide the exact percentage of sales attributable to each key cus-
tomer, many firms did. Of the 61,246 matched records, 49,767 had disclosed
the amount of sales revenue received from each key customer. Of the firms that
disclosed this information, the ratio of key customer sales to total sales across
these firms had a mean of 19.74% and a standard deviation of 0.20%. As shown
in Figure 5.1 the percentage of sales attributable to key customers is relatively
constant over time in all industries. In most industries, suppliers get about 20%
of total sales from one key customer. In the Healthcare industry (10) this ratio
is slightly higher at around 30% of total sales.
Therefore, I assume that the percentage of sales attributable to each key cus-
tomer is constant at αc = 0.2 over firms and over time. This simplifying assump-
tion is a reasonable first step for the current purpose of testing whether these
transmitted shocks influence stock returns. But I test sensitivity of the regres-
sion results using 3 values of αc = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 to construct the total connectivity
matrix CSt = (I− αcAt)−1.
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Figure 5.1: The average disclosed percentage of total sales attributable to the key
customer by industry.
Macro, industry and firm-level controls
Return correlation can be caused by shocks that are transmitted via economic,
financial or informational linkages (Chan, Chao, and Chou, 2001). In order to test
whether increased correlation is associated with economic linkages, it is important
to control for other economic, financial and informational factors that have been
shown to influence return correlation. Several studies have found that the main
macroeconomic factors that explain stock returns are the index returns on the
stock market and interest rates (Fama and French, 1992; Aretz, Bartram, and
Pope, 2010). Therefore I include the following macro controls in the regressions:
• MktRF: The excess return on the S&P 500 index (from Kenneth French’s
website)
• RF: The term spread, or the difference between, the 10-year constant ma-
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turity Treasury bond rate (series GS10 from the Federal Reserve Board
website) and the 1-month Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates)).
In terms of economic linkages, an industry’s production and financing needs and
operating environment (concentration and stage in life-cycle) influence the like-
lihood of contagion (Raddatz, 2010; Lang and Stulz, 1992). In addition, the
correlation between two stocks may be affected by the relationship between their
underlying industries (i.e. how reliant one is upon the other due to ‘technical’
factors). Therefore, I control for own industry and industry-pair fixed effects on
returns, as well as for the market return (the systematic factor influencing asset
prices in the CAPM).
Firm financial characteristics affecting return correlation include: trade credit
and leverage. Raddatz (2010) shows that the use of trade credit, along the input-
output chain linking two industries, results in an increase in their output correla-
tion. In a similar manner, it is widely recognized that leverage amplifies contagion
(Kiyotaki and Moore, 2002; Lang and Stulz, 1992). In addition to leverage, I in-
clude controls for the following firm characteristics shown to influence returns
(based on the following Compustat account items):
• Firm size (market capitalization at last fiscal year end)
• Book-to-market ratio (the ratio of book value of equity to market capital-
ization at last fiscal year end)
• Profitability (the ratio of sales to total assets at last fiscal year end)
• Book leverage (the ratio of total debt to the book value of equity)
• Trade credit ratio (the ratio of accounts payable to total cost of goods sold).
In relation to information linkages, these may arise because stock prices are af-
fected by changing expectations about both dividends and required returns (i.e.
the unexpected stock return may be expressed as the sum of news about divi-
dends and news about future returns) (Campbell and Hentschel, 1992) . This
implies that return correlation may be caused by common factors which simul-
taneously affect either the stock’s fundamentals (expected future dividends) or
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics for the response and explanatory variables
Mean S.d. Skew Kurt Min Max
Response:
Corr(ER) 0.21 0.26 0.00 2.67 -0.74 0.97
Corr(RR) 0.17 0.26 0.03 2.71 -0.76 0.97
Linkage:
Economic (CS) 0.06 0.10 2.67 18.90 0.00 1.80
Credit (CD) 0.00 0.02 13.15 274.28 0.00 0.86
Suppliers:
Size 2,219.76 12,312.47 16.17 371.70 0.17 460,767.94
BTM 0.59 6.03 -146.50 22,042.14 -906.64 110.69
Leverage 2.20 2.51 1.42 17.67 -9.05 15.93
Payables 0.19 0.28 4.74 28.61 0.01 2.08
Profit 1.03 0.74 1.45 6.03 0.00 4.05
Customers:
Size 44,896.50 69,963.44 2.39 9.62 0.48 508,329.47
BTM 0.45 1.77 -467.33 239,497.52 -906.64 13.11
Leverage 2.74 2.01 0.82 11.98 -6.15 11.92
Payables 0.17 0.14 3.18 14.82 0.02 0.90
Profit 1.41 1.08 1.42 4.60 0.16 4.85
Variance:
Var(Supp) 0.03 0.02 1.93 8.54 0.00 0.33
Var(Cust) 0.01 0.01 3.36 19.26 0.00 0.18
Var(Mkt) 0.00 0.00 0.73 2.76 0.00 0.01
expectations across financial markets (investors required returns). Volatility and
liquidity are widely recognized to be related to investors’ required returns (Camp-
bell and Hentschel, 1992). Therefore, I include a proxy for each stock’s liquidity
and proxies for market-wide and idiosyncratic volatility as controls in the regres-
sion of return correlation on economic linkages.
5.3.4 Summary statistics
The summary statistics for the response and explanatory variables are shown in
Table 5.1. Compared to the supplier firms in the sample, the customer firms are
have larger market capitalization, higher leverage, and are more profitable.
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5.4 Empirical results
5.4.1 Preliminary test of return correlation
To establish whether the transmission of shocks via economic linkages influences
stock returns, I start by testing whether the correlation between firms’ returns is
significantly larger in years in which they are linked versus years in which they
are not linked. Testing for significant changes in bivariate correlation in crisis
periods relative to non-crisis periods is commonly used in the finance literature
as a test for the existence of contagion (see e.g. Bond, Dungey, and Fry (2006);
Forbes and Rigobon (2002)). The transmission of shocks via economic linkages is
similar to contagion, but there are some important differences. First, the channel
through which shocks spread is not a market-wide factor, it exists only between
the firms that are linked along a supply chain. Second, the transmission of the
effects of shocks from one firm to another may occur in non-crisis periods if the
channel through which the shocks passes (the chain of supplier-customer rela-
tionships) exists in both crisis and non-crisis periods. In contrast to studies of
financial contagion, therefore, I test for an increase in correlation during periods
during which two firm are linked (rather than in crisis periods) relative to periods
during which they are not linked.
The most direct way to test for significant differences in correlation across linked
and non-linked period is to exploit the time-series dimension of the data. I take
a sub-sample of all firms linked at any point during 1990 to 2010. I split the
sample into years during which pairs are linked and years in which pairs are not
linked, and I estimate:
RS = βNL(INLRC) + βL(ILRC) + INLcNL + ILcL + ε
where RS is the supplier’s monthly return, INL is an indicator that is 1 if the
customer was not linked to the supplier in a given month and zero otherwise,
RC is the customer’s monthly return, IL is an indicator that is 1 if the customer
was linked to the supplier in a given month and zero otherwise, cNL and cL are
constants and ε is the residual error. To test whether economic linkages increase
137
pairwise return correlation I test whether βNL = βL. This test is equivalent to
a Chow test for a structural break of the regression slope across linked and non-
linked years7.
The linked sub-sample is defined for each customer-supplier pair as the 12 monthly
observations preceding the annual disclosure date (i.e. the annual reporting pe-
riod) on which a link is disclosed. These observations are placed in the ‘linked’
sub-sample. A non-link year is a year when the customer and supplier are not
linked in the data. The 12 monthly observations corresponding to the annual re-
porting period in which no link is disclosed are placed in the ‘linked’ sub-sample.
In Table 5.2, Panel A shows the two year rolling correlation between excess re-
turns (ER(c)) and between residual returns (RR(c)) along with one-year lagged
customers’ excess returns (L.ER(c)) and residual returns (L.RR(c)) in linked
years. Panel B shows the correlation between excess returns and residual re-
turns, along with one-year lagged customers’ excess returns and residual returns,
in non-linked years. Panel C reports differences between link year and non-link
year correlations and the results of the Chow test of the significance of the dif-
ference.
The results confirm that there is significant increase in correlation between cus-
tomer and supplier returns in years in which they are linked. There is some
evidence of persistence in this relationship as lagged suppliers returns (L.ER(s))
significantly affect customers following period returns (ER(c)).
As a cross-check, t-tests comparing the average two year rolling correlations be-
tween linked and non-linked firms also clearly rejected the null hypothesis that
correlation between linked and non-linked firms was equal, in favor of the al-
ternative that correlation between linked firms was significantly higher than the
correlation between non-linked firms (p=0.000).
7 This test is also equivalent to the adjusted correlation test for contagion proposed by Forbes
and Rigobon (2002), comparing correlations on crisis and non-crisis periods. The Forbes and
Rigobon (2002) can be implemented within a regression framework using OLS as above, as
noted in Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez-Hermosillo, and Martin (2011).
5.4 Empirical results
Table 5.2: Return correlation and bivariate contagion tests in linked and non-linked
years.*,**,*** indicate significance with * for p < .05, ** for p < .01, and
*** for p < .001. The Chow test p-values are shown in brackets under the
coefficients.
Panel A: Linked
Correlation of excess returns Correlation of residual returns
ER(c) ER(s) L.ER(c) RR(c) RR(s) L.RR(c)
ER(c) - RR(c) -
ER(s) 0.210 - RR(s) 0.170 -
L.ER(c) 0.009 0.022 - L.RR(c) -0.009 0.009 -
L.ER(s) 0.045 0.006 0.210 L.RR(s) 0.033 0.001 0.170
Panel B: Not-linked
Correlation of excess returns Correlation of residual returns
ER(c) ER(s) L.ER(c) RR(c) RR(s) L.RR(c)
ER(c) - RR(c) -
ER(s) 0.188 - RR(s) 0.151 -
L.ER(c) 0.005 0.016 - L.RR(c) 0.001 0.007 -
L.ER(s) 0.045 0.019 0.188 L.RR(s) 0.033 0.006 0.153
Panel C: Difference
Difference and Chow test Difference and Chow test
ER(c) ER(s) L.ER(c) RR(c) RR(s) L.RR(c)
ER(c) - RR(c) -
- -
ER(s) 0.022*** - RR(s) 0.019*** -
(0.000) - (0.000) -
L.ER(c) 0.004 0.006** - L.RR(c) -0.010 0.002 -
(0.817) (0.014) - (0.063) (0.337) -
L.ER(s) 0.001 -0.013* 0.021*** L.RR(s) 0.001 -0.006 0.017***
(0.656) (0.042) (0.000) (0.809) (0.469) (0.000)
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5.4.2 Regression results
This section presents the results of the test of the hypotheses that a) increas-
ing the total degree of linkage along the supply chain between two firms increases
their return correlation and b) that, in addition, increasing the use of trade credit
along the supply chain between two firms increases their return correlation. OLS
regression was used to estimate equation(5.6)8. Robust standard error estimates
were used to control for potential heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the
model residuals.
Table 5.2 shows the robust coefficient estimates for equation (5.6), i.e. for the
correlation in excess returns of pairs of firms regressed on (1) contemporane-
ous degree of supply chain and credit linkage (2) contemporaneous and lagged
degree of supply chain and credit linkage. In the final column, (3), the model
with contemporaneous and lagged degree of supply chain and credit linkage is
fit using only data from recession periods. All regressions include the full set of
controls for macroeconomic factors, firm-specific characteristics and systematic
and idiosyncratic volatility. Table 5.4 shows the corresponding results for the
correlation in residual returns of pairs of firms.
The results are similar when the response variable is the correlation in residual
returns (from the CAPM). That is, return correlation increases as the cash-flow
along the supply chain connecting two firms increases. In addition, an increase in
the use of trade credit along this supply chain is related to a further incremental
increase in return correlation. Regression models of the correlation in residual
returns against the supply chain distance, credit chain distance and control vari-
ables produced very similar results. The main result is that measures of economic
linkage are significantly positively related to correlation in both excess returns
and residual returns. This effect is amplified by the use of trade credit, as indi-
8 Fixed or random effect panel models could be used to estimate equation (5.6) but the in-
terpretation of a pairwise fixed effect is difficult to interpret. Unlike an individual fixed (or
random) effect, a pairwise fixed (or random) effect implies that some element of the business
relationship between two firms remains fundamentally unchanged over time. Such techni-
cal production relationships should be captured by the industry-pair dummies in the OLS
regression, so a pairwise individual effect was required.
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Table 5.3: Regressions of pairwise correlation in excess returns on economic linkage
(CS) and credit chain distance (CD), in the full period and in recessions
only.*,**,*** indicate significance with * for p < .05, ** for p < .01,
and *** for p < .001. The t-statistics are shown in brackets under the
coefficients.
Full period Recessions
(1) (2) (3)
b/t b/t b/t
b/t b/t b/t
MktRF -0.001 -0.002 -0.033
(-0.11) (-0.12) (-0.42)
RF -13.547*** -13.598*** 8.25
(-22.42) (-22.51) (-0.47)
CS 0.031*** -0.008 0.078
(-4.80) (-0.95) (-1.83)
L.CS 0.061*** -0.112**
(-6.90) (-2.72)
CD 0.231*** 0.323*** 0.456
(-5.25) (-7.07) (-1.69)
L.CD -0.223*** 0.737***
(-4.53) (-4.49)
L.MktRF -0.006 -0.006 0.073
(-0.45) (-0.46) (-0.68)
L.RF -15.095*** -15.003*** 16.997
(-28.18) (-28.01) (-1.27)
Var(s) -0.655*** -0.655*** -1.660***
(-23.90) (-23.90) (-8.93)
Var (c) 1.459*** 1.463*** 0.280
(-30.19) (-30.29) (-1.13)
Var(MktRF) 26.719*** 26.699*** 37.918***
(-47.47) (-47.44) (-4.61)
Bidask(s) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.073***
(-4.11) (-4.11) (-3.64)
Bidask(c) -0.003* -0.003* 0.011
(-2.32) (-2.30) (-0.31)
Size(s) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(-33.58) (-33.57) (-5.96)
BTM(s) 0.000 0.000 -0.008**
(-1.91) (-1.94) (-2.89)
Leverage(s) 0.000** 0.000** 0.000
(-2.99) (-3.14) (-0.37)
Trade credit(s) -0.004*** -0.003** -0.009
(-3.88) (-3.16) (-1.82)
Profit(s) -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.014***
(-26.19) (-26.43) (-3.75)
Size(c) -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(-26.81) (-26.91) (-10.29)
BTM(c) -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.006
(-7.58) (-7.59) (-1.77)
Leverage(c) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-1.11) (-1.08) (-1.78)
Trade credit(c) -0.003 -0.003 0.009
(-1.57) (-1.42) (-1.04)
Profit(c) -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.027***
Constant 0.211*** 0.209*** 0.199**
(-31.55) (-31.43) (-3.12)
Rsq 19.6% 19.6% 29.5%
Industry indicators Yes Yes Yes
Industry pair FE Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5.4: Regression results for pairwise correlation in residual returns in the full
period and in recessions only.*,**,*** indicate significance with * for p <
.05, ** for p < .01, and *** for p < .001. The t-statistics are shown in
brackets under the coefficients.
Full period Recessions
(1) (2) (3)
b/t b/t b/t
b/t b/t b/t
MktRF -0.018 -0.019 0.006
(-1.28) (-1.29) (-0.06)
RF -11.912*** -11.958*** 4.425
(-17.30) (-17.37) (-0.23)
CS 0.052*** 0.011 0.042
(-6.74) (-1.08) (-0.86)
L.CS 0.058*** -0.016
(-5.44) (-0.31)
CD 0.144* 0.225** 0.257
(-2.06) (-2.97) (-0.89)
L.CD -0.148* 1.012**
(-2.12) (-3.20)
L.MktRF -0.055*** -0.056*** 0.038
(-3.67) (-3.70) (-0.31)
L.RF -9.866*** -9.782*** 13.53
(-16.13) (-15.99) (-0.90)
Var(s) -0.349*** -0.350*** -1.068***
(-9.76) (-9.79) (-4.87)
Var (c) 2.732*** 2.741*** 2.656***
(-39.73) (-39.82) (-8.70)
Var(MktRF) 3.885*** 3.863*** 3.368
(-5.79) (-5.76) (-0.36)
Bidask(s) -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.075**
(-3.93) (-3.93) (-3.25)
Bidask(c) -0.002 -0.002 0.003
(-1.84) (-1.82) (-0.08)
Size(s) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(-31.47) (-31.46) (-3.60)
BTM(s) -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.004
(-12.74) (-12.75) (-1.26)
Leverage(s) 0.000 0.000 0.000***
(-0.19) (-0.24) (-3.87)
Trade credit(s) -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.007*
(-3.88) (-3.60) (-2.11)
Profit(s) -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.015***
(-22.74) (-22.92) (-3.49)
Size(c) -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(-40.09) (-40.12) (-13.17)
BTM(c) -0.018*** -0.018*** 0.005
(-6.47) (-6.49) (-1.25)
Leverage(c) 0.000 0.000 -0.000**
(-0.41) (-0.45) (-3.14)
Trade credit(c) -0.003 -0.002 0.015
(-1.17) (-1.06) (-1.35)
Profit(c) -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.027***
(-21.17) (-21.13) (-5.36)
Constant 0.179*** 0.178*** 0.106
(-23.58) (-23.44) (-1.50)
Rsq 18.0% 18.0% 33.7%
Industry indicators Yes Yes Yes
Industry pair FE Yes Yes Yes
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cated by the significant positive coefficients on the CD measures. For both the
excess return correlation and the residual return correlation t-tests of the null
that recession and full period coefficients were the same had p-values of 0.00,
indicating strong support for alternative that recession coefficients were higher
than full period coefficients.
The coefficient estimates for the controls were also consistent with previous re-
search and the theory discussed in the introduction. That is, in the full sample
lower risk-free rates are associated with higher return correlation. However, this
effect is not robust to the split sample regressions and does not hold in recessions.
Over 1990 to 2010 lower interest rates followed recession periods; i.e. therefore
it is possible that this negative relation is related to higher correlation during
recessions (Ireland, 2000).
There is a strong positive relationship between the variability of the market and
correlation. This is reasonable given volatile markets mean that supplier-customer
relationships are less substitutable, and at the same time there are more shocks
which may spread via these links (Egloff and Leippold, 2007).
There were mixed results for the influence of idiosyncratic volatility on pair-
wise return correlation. Higher levels of customer volatility (Var(c)) increased
return correlation, but higher levels of supplier volatility (Var(s)) decreased re-
turn correlation. The same relationship persists when Var(s) and Var(c) are split
into expected and unexpected components as in Campbell and Hentschel (1992)
(see the results in Appendix 5.A). This result is partially explained by the data
generating process. In the FAS 131 disclosures, firms are required to disclosure
key customers, but not key suppliers. Therefore, in the data the suppliers are
dependent on customers, but the customers are not necessarily dependent on the
suppliers. This implies that suppliers are less able to restructure business agree-
ments if their customer experiences distress, whereas customers are more able to
restructure business agreements if their supplier experiences distress. Hence sup-
plier volatility has less influence on return correlation, because customer firms are
more likely to restructure business agreements. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) and
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Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) found similar asymmetry in their results
(i.e. that significant customer distress is associated with negative and significant
stock price effects for suppliers, but that supplier distress had no impact on cus-
tomers) and also attributed it to the FAS 131 requirements which require that
firms disclose significant customers but not dependent suppliers. In addition, in
the current sample, customer firms are much larger than the supplier firms as in
Table 5.1. Gabaix (2011) argues that shocks to the largest firms in the economy
act as a form of systematic risk, as they have widespread effect, whereas shocks
to the smaller firms have a far less widespread effect. It is possible that the pos-
itive relationship between customer firm volatility and correlation arises because
shocks to the larger customer firms increase comovement in returns more than
shocks to smaller supplier firms, however customer and supplier size is controlled
for in the regressions, so this effect is secondary.
In terms of firm characteristics, profitable and value (high BTM) firms exhibit
lower correlation on average than unprofitable and growth (low BTM) firms.
These results are consistent with work showing that growth stocks are more af-
fected by common factors than value stocks whose returns are more driven by
firm-specific factors (Ohlson, 1995). A similar argument explains why more prof-
itable firms have lower correlation with trading partners on average, as a greater
portion of their returns are more driven their own earnings, rather than common
factors (Ohlson, 1995).
Economic significance Regressions of the correlation in excess returns showed
a positive relationship between both supply chain distance and credit chain dis-
tance. In general firms with a higher degree of connectivity have a higher degree
of correlation with their counterparties in periods during which they are econom-
ically linked. The point estimates indicate that if firm i adds one key customer,
j (so that lagged CS increases by ≈ 0.2, or more if the additional customer has
its own linkages) then the correlation between Ri and Rj will increase by ≈ 1%,
as the coefficient on L.CS was in the order of 0.05 in all of the runs above and
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0.01 = 0.05 ∗ 0.2)9.
5.4.3 Quantile regressions
In the context of economic linkages, there is reason to believe that shocks trans-
mitted via economic linkages are more influential in recessions (see e.g. Lang
and Stulz (1992)). Neglecting asymmetry could result in downward biased coeffi-
cient estimates (Raddatz, 2010). Using a conditional correlation approach, such
as quantile regression, is one way to allow for asymmetry. I estimated 5.6 over
different quantiles of the correlation distribution (via quantile regression) to test
whether the coefficients for the production and credit distance were higher in high
correlation regimes than in low correlation regimes. Quantile regression provides
a flexible modeling and estimation method to identify the dependence of two ran-
dom variables in cases where the dependence structure may vary across different
realizations of the response variable (Baur and Schulze, 2005). The quantiles can
be interpreted as a states or a regimes; i.e. lower quantiles (lower correlation) are
consistent with a good state and higher quantiles (higher correlation) are consis-
tent with a bad state or regime (Baur and Schulze, 2005; Longin and Solnik, 2001).
Table 5.5 shows the results of estimation of the following simple quantile re-
gression model corresponding to equation (5.6) i.e.:
Q(τ |X) ≈ c + βX + ε (5.8)
where Q(τ |X) denotes the τ -th conditional quantile of ρ, assumed to be linearly
dependent on a vector of exogenous variables X; and β(τ) is a parameter esti-
mating the effect of the factors within the τ -th conditional quantile of ρ.
The estimated parameters β(τ) reveals information about the behavior of re-
turn correlations during the crisis period. If, for example, the coefficients β(τ)
are significantly lower for small quantiles (e.g. τ ∈ (0.25, 0.5)) than high quan-
9 I have chosen numbers at the lower end of a reasonable range of possibility. For example, if
firm i adds one key customer, j, that has one key customer of its own, CS will increase by
0.24 = 0.2 + 0.2 ∗ 0.2, and so on.
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tiles (e.g. τ ∈ (0.75, 0.95)) this indicates the comovement related to linkages is
significantly higher during crisis periods in which correlation is higher.
Economic significance The results in Table 5.5 support the conclusion that
the return correlation induced by economic linkages is higher in a recession. For
example, the coefficient on one year lagged economic distance (L.CS) is 0.042 for
the bottom 25% of the return correlation distribution, but increases to 0.123 in
the top 5% of the return correlation distribution. The quantile regressions show
that in crisis periods, when return variance is higher, increases in correlation will
increase portfolio variance by up to three times more (dividing the high regime
and lower regime L.CS coefficients from Table 5.5 gives 2.93 = 0.123/0.042).
5.4.4 Model specification
I assess whether the OLS assumptions are met by analyzing the model residuals
and the covariance of the independent variables. The mean of the residuals was
zero. Residual plots from the standard regression models suggested the model
specification was reasonable, as most residuals were randomly scattered about
zero. There are a few outliers on the left hand side of the residual plot, and
there is a slight narrowing of variance in the right hand tail of the residual plot.
The estimator used (described in White (1982)) is robust to heteroscedasticity,
autocorrelation and firm-effects. To ensure the results are robust to potential out-
liers, I re-run the regressions after winsorizing extreme observations of the linkage
measures, to ensure the results are not attributable only to extreme observations.
That is, to avoid giving extreme observations heavy weight, the smallest and
largest 1% (5%) of observations for the IO distance and the Credit Distance are
set equal to the 1% and 99% quantiles (5% and 95%). The results are shown in
Table 5.7.
Other than the correlation between the linkage measures, the correlation be-
tween all other explanatory variables was below 20%. Higher correlations were
recorded for the linkages measures, however, with the correlation between the sup-
ply chain distance (CS2) and one year lagged supply chain distance (L12.CS2)
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Table 5.5: Quantile regression of return correlation on economic linkage and credit
linkages *,**,*** indicate significance with * for p < .05, ** for p < .01,
and *** for p < .001. The t-statistics are shown in brackets under the
coefficients.
Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.95)
b/t b/t b/t b/t
MktRF 0.026 -0.027 -0.031 -0.017
(-1.47) (-1.55) (-1.77) (-0.69)
RF -10.088*** -13.690*** -17.090*** -17.752***
(-11.78) (-16.97) (-21.27) (-16.29)
CS -0.016 0.002 0.007 0.005
(-1.32) (-0.15) (-0.55) (-0.33)
L.CS 0.042** 0.052*** 0.084*** 0.123***
(-3.23) (-4.22) (-6.92) (-7.86)
CD 0.229*** 0.392*** 0.405*** 0.189*
(-3.44) (-5.97) (-6.14) (-2.32)
L.CD -0.141* -0.216** -0.152* -0.045
(-2.03) (-3.26) (-2.39) (-0.57)
L.MktRF 0.012 0.004 -0.029 -0.022
(-0.63) (-0.25) (-1.61) (-0.95)
L.RF -15.384*** -15.860*** -14.480*** -13.046***
(-20.11) (-21.85) (-20.00) (-13.63)
Var(s) -0.795*** -0.684*** -0.589*** -0.312***
(-20.76) (-18.50) (-16.02) (-6.39)
Var (c) 1.225*** 1.249*** 1.740*** 1.877***
(-17.53) (-19.67) (-30.14) (-28.38)
Var(MktRF) 30.338*** 28.668*** 25.494*** 20.188***
(-37.21) (-36.94) (-33.19) (-20.09)
Bidask(s) -0.027*** -0.020*** -0.009*** -0.006
(-23.64) (-13.23) (-4.31) (-1.46)
Bidask(c) -0.024*** -0.011*** -0.002 -0.001
(-38.07) (-11.24) (-1.59) (-0.53)
Size(s) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(-21.22) (-34.75) (-67.24) (-98.71)
BTM(s) 0.000 0.000 -0.007*** -0.015***
(-0.78) (-0.47) (-88.41) (-329.03)
Leverage(s) -0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000
(-3.02) (-3.24) (-7.33) (-0.77)
Trade credit(s) -0.002 -0.003* -0.001 -0.003**
(-1.90) (-2.52) (-1.12) (-2.81)
Profit(s) -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.024***
(-18.18) (-22.93) (-20.48) (-12.23)
Size(c) -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(-20.55) (-23.31) (-21.92) (-18.31)
BTM(c) -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.022***
(-6.99) (-10.79) (-11.32) (-12.08)
Leverage(c) 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000***
(-4.19) (-0.55) (-0.87) (-5.52)
Trade credit(c) 0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.006
(-0.22) (-1.13) (-0.42) (-1.60)
Profit(c) -0.008*** -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.019***
(-7.10) (-11.42) (-15.70) (-11.37)
Constant 0.027*** 0.206*** 0.356*** 0.594***
(-4.33) (-34.38) (-59.74) (-72.20)
Rsq 7.19% 9.20% 11.58% 13.76%
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Table 5.6: Correlation between linkage measures and lagged linkage measures.
CS2 L12.CS2 CD2 L12.CD2
CS2 -
L12.CS2 0.7 -
CD2 0.5 0.3 -
L12.CD2 0.3 0.5 0.4 -
being 70%. To investigate whether this collinearity affects the main results I es-
timated a series of models, including the full set of macro and firm-level controls
and:
• Each of the covariates: CS2, L12.CS2, CD2, L12.CD2 separately
• Contemporaneous economic and credit linkages only (CS2, CD2)
• Lagged linkages only (L12.CS2, L12.CD2)
• First difference of covariates (D12.CS2, D12.CD2) and lagged linkages (L12.CS2, L12.CD2)
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The overall conclusion is that a positive relationship between economic linkage
and stock return correlation is robust to potential collinearity in the data. This is
most clearly indicated by the model results in Table 5.7 showing a clear positive
relationship between CS2 and CD2 and return correlation in all model specifica-
tions.
5.4.5 Robustness checks
The main result, that an increase in the cash-flow between customers and sup-
pliers increases their stock price correlation, was robust to the estimation across
different market regimes (as measured by quantiles of the correlation distribu-
tion). Furthermore, I also check the robustness of this result to estimation issues,
measurement issues and sample issues as follows. I control for the potential effects
of clustering across time and/or across firms by using standard error estimates
robust to these effects (in the benchmark model, the s.e. estimate is robust to
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.)
Another potential issue with the results is that I use a constructed measure of
supply chain connectedness that relies on an assumed value of α (the influence
or effectiveness of each linkage). The benchmark model, and all results above
assumed a value of α = 0.2 based on the sample average of disclosed percentage
of sales revenue attributed to each key customer. I also run the full model, using
values of α = 0.1 and α = 0.3.
Table 5.7 illustrates that the significant positive relationship between linkages
and return correlation is robust to all of these checks. The mean credit distance
is much lower than the IO distance because it is weighted by the trade credit
fraction, which is in the order of 15%, as well as the influence factor α = 0.2; in
any case the net effect of contemporaneous and lagged credit links is positive (i.e.
0.323− 0.223 = 0.100).
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Table 5.7: Robustness checks of the main results. *,**,*** indicate significance with
* for p < .05, ** for p < .01, and *** for p < .001. The t-statistics are
shown in brackets under the coefficients.
Supply
chain
dist(t)
Credit
dist(t)
Supply
chain
dist (t-1)
Credit
dist(t-1)
Specification: β/t-stat β/t-stat β/t-stat β/t-stat
A. Estimation
1) Pair fixed effects -0.008 0.334** 0.059* -0.228
(-0.3) (-2.7) (-2.1) (-1.5)
2) Time fixed effects -0.008 0.334* 0.059 -0.228
(-0.3) (-2.6) (-2.0) (-1.7)
B. Measurement
3) Using α = 0.1 -0.010 0.334*** 0.120*** -0.223***
(-0.6) (-7.1) (-6.7) (-4.4)
4) Using α = 0.3 -0.007 0.327*** 0.038*** -0.226***
(-1.24) (-7.28) (-6.54) (-4.67)
C. Sample issues
5) Winsorized 1 % 0.015 0.226** 0.056*** -0.219**
(-1.5) (-2.9) (-5.5) (-2.9)
6) Winsorized 5 % 0.008 0.348** 0.048*** -0.098
(-0.7) (-2.8) (-4.1) (-0.8)
D. Benchmark -0.008 0.323*** 0.061*** -0.223***
(-0.95) (-7.07) (-6.90) (-4.53)
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5.5 Discussion
Consistent with the hypothesis that shocks spread between firms via economic
linkages influence stock returns, I show that there is a direct relationship between
the strength of linkage between firms and the correlation of their stock returns. An
increase in the economic linkage10 between two firms is associated with increased
correlation in those firms’ stock returns. On average, if a supplier establishes
a new relationship with a customer providing 20% of their sales revenue, the
return correlation between the stocks of these two firms would increase by 1%.
The influence of economic linkages on return correlation is stronger when trade
credit is used along the supply chain connecting the firms and also in recessions.
This is consistent with economic theory and intuition that a supplier (customer)
is harder to replace when there are credit contracts involved in the relationship
and/or when the economy is in recession. These results are significant after con-
trolling for macro factors, industry effects and firm-level characteristics that have
been shown to influence contagion. The results are also robust to changes in the
data sample, the measure of return correlation used, and the estimation method
used.
Pairwise return correlation is a central component of portfolio return variance, so
this finding suggests linkages may have a significant influence on return volatility.
That is, when stocks are correlated, the portfolio return variance depends on the
correlation between individual stocks in a portfolio, as σ2P =
∑
i
∑
j wiwiCov(Ri, Rj).
In a portfolio of size N there are N variance terms in this equation, and N(N−1)
covariance terms, so small increases in the pairwise correlation between units in a
portfolio can increase the portfolio variance. For example, in an equally weighted
portfolio of 50 stocks, with i.i.d. returns each with variance of 10% p.a. the
portfolio variance is 0.2% (=50 x 1
502
x 10%); however if individual stocks are
not independent but all pairs have covariance of 1% the portfolio variance is 1%
(=0.2% + 50 x 49 x 1
502
x 1%).
10 To recap, the strength of economic linkage is defined as the proportion of total production
outputs sold by a supplier to a customer firm, as measured by the proportion of the supplier’s
sales revenue attributable to the customer.
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The results imply that economic linkages are a potential influence on asset prices,
as certain structures of linkage are associated with significant return correlation
across linked firms. It is widely acknowledged that returns do not follow a strict
factor structure and that there is often some degree of correlation between the
residual components of returns after allowing for systematic risk factors (resid-
ual returns) (Connor and Korajczyk, 1993). Stocks can still be priced ignoring
economic linkages, however, provided that the proportion of the correlations be-
tween residual returns that are significantly different from zero is close to zero
in large portfolios (Chamberlain and Rothschild, 1983). I show that economic
linkages induce non-zero correlations between stocks. In the universe of US listed
firms on the Compustat/CRSP database, on average 10% of these stocks were
linked to other listed firms during the period 1990 to 2010. The results in this
chapter therefore suggest that a large proportion of the correlations between the
residual returns of US stocks may be significantly different from zero. The evi-
dence presented in this thesis so far, therefore, suggests that economic linkages
may influence asset prices. The influence of economic linkages on asset prices is
directly addressed in the next chapter.
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5.A Results with expected and unexpected vari-
ance
Table 5.8: Regression results for pairwise correlation in excess returns in the full period and in reces-
sions.*,**,*** indicate significance at 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels. T-statistics are shown under
the coefficients.
Full period Recessions
(1) (2) (3)
MktRF 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.015
-4.51 -4.51 -0.1
RF -13.604*** -13.654*** 6.715
-22.43 -22.52 -0.34
CS2 0.029*** -0.008 0.086*
-4.6 -0.91 -2.02
CD2 0.240*** 0.334*** 0.44
-5.4 -7.22 -1.66
L12.CS2 0.059*** -0.123**
-6.65 -2.97
L12.CD2 -0.228*** 0.753***
-4.59 -4.51
L12.MktRF -0.018 -0.018 0.048
-1.43 -1.44 -0.4
L12.RF -16.529*** -16.437*** 7.273
-30.35 -30.17 -0.34
D.Var(s) -0.134 -0.137 1.216
-0.86 -0.88 -1.81
D.Var(c) 2.120*** 2.128*** 3.096**
-7.01 -7.04 -3.28
D.Var(MktRF) 65.989*** 66.015*** 4.587
-24.11 -24.12 -0.08
L.Var(s) -0.646*** -0.646*** -1.986***
-23.17 -23.17 -10.09
L.Var(c) 1.506*** 1.511*** -0.083
-30.53 -30.62 -0.29
L.Var(MktRF) 25.269*** 25.247*** 34.889*
-43.97 -43.93 -2.24
Bidask(c) -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.073***
-4.06 -4.06 -3.65
Bidask(s) -0.003* -0.003* 0.023
-2.49 -2.47 -0.66
Size (s) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
-33.56 -33.55 -5.99
BTM (s) 0.000 0.000 -0.008**
-1.93 -1.96 -2.85
Leverage (s) 0.000** 0.000** 0.000
-3.08 -3.23 -0.3
Trade credit (s) -0.004*** -0.003** -0.008
-3.84 -3.18 -1.71
Profit (s) -0.023 -0.024*** -0.014***
-26.27 -26.52 -3.53
Size (c) -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
-26.46 -26.56 -10.34
BTM (c) -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.007
-7.91 -7.92 -1.93
Leverage (c) 0.000 0.000 0.000
-1.27 -1.24 -1.46
Trade credit (c) -0.004 -0.003 0.01
-1.90 -1.74 -1.24
Profit (c) -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.027***
-19.00 -18.89 -6.2
cons 0.216*** 0.215*** 0.237*
-32.17 -32.05 -2.13
Industry indicators Yes Yes Yes
Industry pair FE Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-sq 19.8% 19.8% 29.9%
AIC -8,789 -8,833 -1,458
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Table 5.9: Regression results for pairwise correlation in residual returns in the full
period and in recessions only.*,**,*** indicate significance with * for p <
.05, ** for p < .01, and *** for p < .001. T-statistics are shown under the
coefficients.
Full period Recessions
(1) (2) (3)
b/t b/t b/t
MktRF 0.033* 0.033* 0.015
-2.18 -2.18 -0.10
RF -11.869*** -11.915*** 6.715
-17.26 -17.32 -0.34
CS2 0.050*** 0.010 0.086*
-6.56 -0.92 -2.02
CD2 0.152* 0.234** 0.440
-2.18 -3.11 -1.66
L12.CS2 0.058*** -0.123**
-5.47 -2.97
L12.CD2 -0.151* 0.753***
-2.17 -4.51
L12.MktRF -0.067*** -0.067*** 0.048
-4.42 -4.45 -0.40
L12.RF -11.029*** -10.946*** 7.273
-17.79 -17.65 -0.34
D.Var(s) -0.144 -0.153 1.216
-0.71 -0.76 -1.81
D.Var(c) 2.940*** 2.960*** 3.096**
-7.06 -7.10 -3.28
D.Var(MktRF) 38.702*** 38.732*** 4.587
-12.03 -12.04 -0.08
L.Var(s) -0.331*** -0.331*** -1.986***
-9.18 -9.20 -10.09
L.Var(c) 2.786*** 2.795*** -0.083
-40.19 -40.27 -0.29
L.Var(MktRF) 2.556*** 2.531*** 34.889*
-3.75 -3.72 -2.24
Bidask(s) -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.073***
-3.90 -3.90 -3.65
Bidask(c) -0.002* -0.002* 0.023
-2.02 -2.00 -0.66
Size (s) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
-31.53 -31.51 -5.99
BTM (s) -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.008**
-12.82 -12.83 -2.85
Leverage (s) 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.22 -0.27 -0.30
Trade Credit (s) -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.008
-3.97 -3.67 -1.71
Profit (s) -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.014***
-22.82 -23.00 -3.53
Size (c) -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
-39.42 -39.45 -10.34
BTM (c) -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.007
-6.63 -6.65 -1.93
Leverage (c) 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.26 -0.29 -1.46
Trade Credit (c) -0.003 -0.003 0.010
-1.37 -1.25 -1.24
Profit (c) -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.027***
-21.33 -21.29 -6.20
cons 0.184*** 0.183*** 0.237*
-24.21 -24.07 -2.13
Industry indicators Yes Yes Yes
Industry pair FE Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-sq 0.18 0.18 0.30
AIC -4,834 -4,861 -1,458
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Table 5.10: Quantile regression of return correlation on economic linkage and credit
linkages *,**,*** indicate significance with * for p < .05, ** for p < .01,
and *** for p < .001. The t-statistics are shown in brackets under the
coefficients.
Q(0.25) Q(0.5) Q(0.75) Q(0.95)
MktRF 0.092*** 0.044* 0.027 0.012
-4.85 -2.47 -1.50 -0.52
RF -10.070*** -14.145*** -17.044*** -17.957***
-11.77 -17.75 -21.12 -17.46
CS2 -0.018 0.003 0.01 0.004
-1.45 -0.26 -0.81 -0.28
L12 CS2 0.037** 0.051*** 0.081*** 0.123***
-2.84 -4.25 -6.58 -8.35
CD2 0.269*** 0.399*** 0.420*** 0.182*
-4.02 -6.13 -6.22 -2.36
L12 CD2 -0.139* -0.217*** -0.163* -0.062
-1.99 -3.32 -2.54 -0.83
L12MktRF -0.001 -0.009 -0.043* -0.035
-0.07 -0.52 -2.40 -1.60
L12RF -17.079*** -17.182*** -15.824*** -14.109***
-22.07 -23.72 -21.53 -15.52
D.Var(s) -0.156 -0.098 -0.037 0.345
-0.68 -0.47 -0.18 -1.35
D.Var(c) 1.720*** 1.773*** 2.061*** 2.648***
-3.8 -4.32 -5.23 -5.64
D.Var(MktRF) 79.956*** 72.380*** 57.218*** 36.332***
-20.7 -19.57 -14.96 -7.25
L.Var(s) -0.794*** -0.668*** -0.573*** -0.319***
-20.51 -18.09 -15.33 -6.85
L.Var(c) 1.262*** 1.335*** 1.811*** 1.922***
-17.81 -21.04 -30.87 -30.33
L.Var(MktRF) 28.521*** 26.668*** 23.998*** 19.381***
-34.55 -34.33 -30.66 -20.15
Bidask(s) -0.028*** -0.019*** -0.008*** -0.006
-23.87 -12.96 -3.83 -1.54
Bidask(c) -0.023*** -0.010*** -0.002 -0.001
-37.1 -11.08 -1.76 -0.54
Size(s) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
-21.79 -35.39 -67.62 -104.15
BTM(s) 0.000 0.000 -0.007*** -0.015***
-0.86 -0.57 -89.81 -348.86
Leverage(s) -0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000
-2.75 -3.17 -6.95 -0.43
Trade credit(s) -0.003* -0.003* -0.001 -0.003*
-2.57 -2.51 -0.97 -2.53
Profit(s) -0.021*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.024***
-18.19 -23.53 -20.63 -12.86
Size(c) -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
-20.4 -23.16 -21.39 -19.65
BTM(c) -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.023***
-7.50 -11.73 -12.31 -13.83
Leverage(c) 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000***
-4.10 -0.53 -0.91 -6.00
Trade credit(c) 0.000 0.003 -0.003 -0.007
-0.07 -0.99 -0.93 -1.89
Profit(c) -0.008*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.020***
-7.07 -11.97 -15.74 -12.39
cons 0.034*** 0.215*** 0.361*** 0.596***
-5.4 -36.14 -59.99 -76.78
Rsq 7.30% 9.32% 11.69% 13.86%
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Chapter 6
Economic linkages and expected
returns
6.1 Introduction
Modern financial theory generally concludes that returns should carry a premium
for non-diversifiable sources of risk, but that no return can be earned by hold-
ing diversifiable risk (Ross, 1976). In Chapter 3, I show that if firm i’s total
supply chain exposure1 is concentrated, such that a few firms supply (buy) a
large portion of a firm i’s inputs (outputs), then the shocks transmitted to firm
i from its suppliers (customers) may not be diversifiable. In Chapter 4, I show
that the linkages between US listed firms are highly concentrated. Together the
results in Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that shocks transmitted via the economic
linkages between US listed firms may be not diversifiable. If investors are unable
to diversify this risk, they will want to be compensated for it with a higher return.
The finding that shocks transmitted via inter-firm linkages may be non-diversifiable
naturally leads to the question: do shocks transmitted via economic linkages affect
expected stock returns? In this chapter I test the hypothesis that there is a posi-
tive relationship between shocks transmitted via economic linkages (transmitted
1 I.e. the sum of exposure over all direct (1-step away) and indirect (2-step away, 3-step away
etc.) suppliers and/or customers.
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volatility) and expected return. The primary test of a factor model is whether it
explains differences in average returns (Davis and Fama, 2000). Therefore I test
whether the degree and concentration of a firm’s economic linkages (i.e. exposure
to transmitted volatility from suppliers and/or customers) explain average stock
returns, cross-sectionally and over time.
Sections 2 and 3 discuss the method and the data used to test how transmit-
ted volatility affects returns. Section 4 contains the main results, supplementary
results and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes by discussing the implications
of this finding for asset pricing and modeling stock returns.
6.2 Research method
To empirically test whether shocks transmitted via inter-firm linkages (hereafter
transmitted volatility) influence stock returns, I augment a multi-factor model
of returns with a proxy for exposure to transmitted volatility. The methodology
consists of two main components: i) specifying a factor model of average returns
allowing for transmitted volatility, and ii) developing measures of the exposure to
transmitted volatility to be included in the factor model. These are now addressed
in turn.
6.2.1 Factor models of economic linkages and returns
Multi-factor models of returns can be broadly classified as either: macroeconomic,
fundamental or statistical factor models. In all factor models, returns are assumed
to be a linear function of exposure to pervasive risk factors (or systematic shocks)
plus an assets-specific return unrelated to the systematic shocks (Connor, 1995).
Linear sensitivities to the pervasive factors are called the ‘factor betas’ of the
security. Macroeconomic and statistical factor models estimate a firm’s factor
beta by time series regression. Macroeconomic factor models use observable eco-
nomic time series as measures of the pervasive factors influencing security returns.
Fundamental factor models do not require time series regression. A fundamen-
tal factor model uses observed company attributes as factor betas (Connor, 1995).
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A factor model implies that common risk factors should capture variation in
returns that is not explained by other factors. I.e. there should be a contem-
poraneous comovement between returns and factor betas, that is robust to the
inclusion of stock characteristics and other factor betas (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and
Zhang, 2006). Therefore, my approach is to test whether there are significant
loadings on factors that capture the structure of economic linkages, after control-
ling for a range of stock characteristics and other factors that have been shown
to influence stock returns, such as firm size, book-to-market ratio, leverage and
stock price volatility and liquidity (Fama and French, 1992; Ang, Hodrick, Xing,
and Zhang, 2006).
I extend a factor model of asset returns to allow for transmitted volatility. Fama
and French (1992) propose that stock returns are generated by the following factor
structure:
Ri,t = Et−1(Ri,t) +
K∑
k=1
βi,kFk,t + θi,t−1FD,t + εi,t (6.1)
where Ri,t is the excess return (over the risk-free rate) of stock i at time t
(i = 1, · · · , N and t = 1, · · · , T ); Et−1(Ri,t) is the expected return of asset i
at time t, based on information available at time t − 1; βi,k is firm i’s loading
on factor Fk, where Fk,t is the realization of factor
2 k at time t; θi,t−1 is firm i’s
loading on the distress factor of interest, FD,t; and the noise terms εit are assumed
to be mean zero, i.i.d. over time.
As shown in Section 3.4, transmitted volatility can be non-diversifiable when the
distribution of connectivity between assets in a portfolio is heavy-tailed. There-
fore to test whether transmitted volatility influences stock returns, (6.1) should
be extended as follows:
Ri,t = Et−1(Ri,t)+
K∑
k=1
βi,kFk,t+CONCi,t−1FCONC,t+DEGi,t−1FDEG,t+εi,t (6.2)
2 Common specifications of factors include: MKTt, the excess return on the market portfolio
(S&P 500) at time t, and the Fama-French SMBt and HMLt factors.
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where CONCi,t−1 is a measure of the concentration of firm i’s total connectivity
and DEGi,t−1 is a measure of the degree of firm i’s total connectivity; FCONC,t
and FDEG,t are pervasive factors associated with shocks transmitted via economic
linkages3.
Observable account data on economic linkages can be used to develop proxies
for CONCi,t−1 and DEGi,t−1. As in Fama and French (1992), variables based on
account information are lagged in order to ensure that the account information
is available before the returns that it is used to explain. It is also important to
note that CONCi,t−1 and DEGi,t−1 can vary over time as firms form and break
economic linkages4.
If the errors are mean zero and i.i.d., then it follows from (6.2) (under the Arbi-
trage Pricing Theory (APT) of Ross (1976)) that the risk premium of asset i is
a linear function of stock i’s betas, such that
Et−1(Ri,t) =
K∑
k=1
βi,kγk + CONCi,t−1γCONC +DEGi,t−1γDEG (6.3)
where γk is the risk premium associated with exposure to factor k (i.e. βi,k), and
γCONC and γDEG measure the risk premium associated with the concentration
and degree of firm i’s total connectivity respectively. In this model CONCi,t−1
and DEGi,t−1 should be interpreted as exposure to pervasive transmitted volatil-
ity, and γCONC and γDEG are the associated return premiums.
In the cross-sectional regressions represented by equation (6.3), the observed de-
3 Note that FCONC,t and FDEG,t are unobservable. This is not a problem in the cross-sectional
tests because the factor exposures (betas) CONCi,t−1 and DEGi,t−1 are observable from
account information and can be included directly. In the time series tests, however, it is not
possible to fit (6.2). Instead, in the time-series tests, CONCi,t−1 and DEGi,t−1 are included
alongside other pervasive factors (e.g. the three Fama French factors, or macroeconomic
factors) as firm characteristics that may influence returns, as in Daniel and Titman (1997).
This is explained in greater detail below.
4 Thus, purely statistical factor analysis is not a suitable method to use as it looks for asso-
ciations over time, and will average across years in which there are economic linkages and
years in which there are not.
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gree and the concentration of linkages are included alongside the factor betas for
the systematic risk factors (e.g. the three Fama French factors). The observed de-
gree and concentration of linkages are the factor betas for transmitted volatility.
The estimated coefficients on the degree and concentration of linkages represent
the premium for bearing transmitted volatility risk.
A characteristics-based pricing model As noted in Daniel and Titman
(1997), it is possible that return premia attach themselves to firm-level or asset-
level characteristics rather than to loadings upon pervasive risk factors. For
example, Daniel and Titman (1997) find that the return premia assigned to small
size and high book-to-market firms does not arise because of covariance of these
firms’ returns with the market index, but rather because their firm-level charac-
teristics (rather than the covariance structure of returns) explain cross-sectional
variation in stock returns. In other words, firm characteristics reliably predict
the future covariance structure of returns.
This alternative return generating process is represented as follows:
Ri,t = Et−1(Ri,t) +
K∑
k=1
βi,kFk,t + εi,t
Et−1(Ri,t) = a+ b1θi,t−1 (6.4)
where Ri,t is the excess return (over the risk-free rate) of stock i at time t
(i = 1, · · · , N and t = 1, · · · , T ); Et−1(Ri,t) is the expected return of asset i
at time t, based on information available at time (t−1); βi,k is firm i’s loading on
factor Fk, where Fk,t is the realization of factor k at time t; and θi,t−1 is the firm
characteristic of interest (in this case the degree and structure of a firm’s eco-
nomic linkages). As in Daniel and Titman (1997), in contrast to (6.1), expected
returns are a function of the firm characteristic, θi,t−1, and are not affected by
firm i’s loading on a distress factor (i.e. FD,t does not appear in this model)
5.
Consistent with (6.4), in the time-series tests CONCi,t−1 and DEGi,t−1 are in-
5 Another possible return generating process is a combination of (6.2) and (6.4) in which
expected returns are a function of both loadings on pervasive factors and firm-specific char-
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cluded alongside other pervasive factors (e.g. the three Fama French factors, or
macroeconomic factors) as firm characteristics that may influence returns6, as in
Ri,t = bCONCCONCi,t−1 + bDEGDEGi,t−1 +
K∑
k=1
βi,kFk,t + εi,t. (6.5)
6.2.2 Hypotheses tests
The models above suggests two testable hypotheses
• H1: There is a relationship between transmitted volatility and expected
return i.e. transmitted volatility carries a non-zero price of risk (HNull:
γCONC = γDEG = 0)
• H2: There is a relationship between the concentration of a firm’s economic
linkages and its average return over time (HNull: bCONC = bDEG = 0).
In order to estimate the hypothesis test statistics (γCONC , γDEG and bCONC ,
bDEG) I use Fama Macbeth (1973) (FM) cross-sectional regressions and Fama
and French (1993) (FF) time-series regressions respectively. The FF times-series
and FM cross-sectional regressions complement each other7 (Fama and French,
1993) and results from both methods suggest that transmitted volatility does
significantly affect the cross-sectional and time series variance of stock returns,
after allowing for systematic risk factors and firm-specific characteristics.
acteristics, i.e.
Ri,t = Et−1(Ri,t) +
K∑
k=1
βi,kFk,t + εi,t
Et−1(Ri,t) =
K∑
k=1
βi,kγk + b1θi,t−1.
6 It is not possible to distinguish between different return generating processes unless all of the
factors in (6.2) and (6.4) are observable. FCONC,t and FDEG,t are unobservable because it
is not possible to observe the shocks transmitted to a firm from its suppliers and customers
(outside of an event study setting). Therefore it is not possible to fit (6.2).
7 FM allow for time varying beta but FF do not; however FF regressions do not suffer from
error-in-variables issues that are an issues in FM regressions (Welsh, 2008).
161
6.2 Research method
6.2.3 Cross-sectional tests
FM regressions are fit in order to check whether transmitted volatility is priced
in the cross-section of returns. The first step in FM regressions is to estimate the
factor betas8. For each portfolio I regress portfolio returns on the market excess
return (MktRF) to get the CAPM beta, and on the FF three factors (MktRF,
SMB and HML) to estimate the factor exposures to the FF factors.
Second, I perform T cross-sectional regressions of the portfolio returns on the
estimated betas plus measures of exposure to transmitted volatility. That is, for
each portfolio I estimate (6.3). Then I collect the time-series of all these regression
slopes (γ1, · · · , γT) and average these over time to get the final gamma estimates:
γˆk =
∑T
t=1 γkt
T
.
Rejection of the null hypothesis that ˆγCONC = ˆγDEG = 0 implies that transmitted
volatility explains a significant part of the relative prices of stock returns9.
8 The betas used in the results that are presented below are estimated based on the full
(January 1990 to December 2010) sample of returns for each portfolio. I also performed the
tests using betas estimated on the past two years historical returns for each portfolio. The
sample period over which betas were calculated did not affect the results regarding whether
transmitted risk is influential over and above other common factors. So I used the full period
estimates for consistency with the time-series results, and because they had lower standard
errors. The use of rolling betas (based on historical information) is most useful in return
prediction studies.
9 Equilibrium models, such as the CAPM, impose tighter restrictions on equation (6.3) than
the APT. Under the CAPM, equation (6.3) must satisfy
Hα0 : α = 0
This hypothesis implies that the zero-beta expected return should equal the risk-free rate.
A rejection of Hα0 means that the factor cannot explain the average level of stock returns.
This is often the case for factors based on consumption-based asset pricing models because a
very high implied risk aversion is necessary to match the overall equity premium (Ang, Liu,
and Schwarz, 2008). However, even though a factor cannot price the overall market, it could
still explain the relative prices of assets if it carries a non-zero price of risk. A simultaneous
rejection of Hα0 and H
γ
0 implies that while the model cannot fully explain the overall level of
returns, exposure to Fk accounts for some of the expected returns of assets relative to each
other.
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6.2.4 Time-series tests
As in Fama French (1993) a second way to test whether the proxies for counter-
party risk exposure (FCONC and FDEG) explain common variation in returns is to
estimate (6.2) for each portfolio. It is then possible to test whether transmitted
volatility can explain average returns by testing the null hypothesis
HNull : bCONC = bDEG = 0
Where bCONC and bDEG are the slopes of time series regressions of excess returns
on common risk factors (including FCONC and FDEG).
In the time-series regressions in Section 6.4.4 and the macroeconomic factor model
in Section 6.4.5, therefore, the observed degree and concentration of company
linkages is included alongside the systematic factors (excess returns on the risk-
factor mimicking portfolios in the FF regression or macroeconomic variables in
the macroeconomic factor model) and I test whether this firm specific character-
istic explains returns over time, in addition to the systematic factors.
6.2.5 Portfolio formation
As explained in Daniel and Titman (2012) and Lo and MacKinlay (1999), by
grouping all of the assets with similar size and BTM together, any variation in
factor loadings that is independent of size or BTM is largely eliminated, so the
sorting procedure will result in a set of portfolios that exhibit a stronger rela-
tionship between loadings on size and BTM. Fama and French (1993) find that
the estimates of the CAPM intercepts deviate from zero for portfolios formed on
the basis of BTM as well as for portfolios formed on size. On finding that the
intercepts for these portfolios with a three-factor model are closer to zero, they
conclude that missing risk factors in the CAPM are the source of the deviations.
However, another explanation consistent is that on an ex post basis deviations
from the CAPM, considered in a group, will appear statistically significant but
may just be a result of grouping assets with common disturbance terms (Lo and
MacKinlay, 1999). Lo and MacKinlay (1999) conclude that using theoretically
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motivated out-of-sample factors to sort portfolios is a good way to reduce such
‘data-snooping bias’.
I form portfolios based on theoretically motivated ‘linkage’ factors so that induced
ordering and data-snooping bias are not likely to be serious in this study10. The
single sorted portfolios are formed yearly by ranking stocks according to one of
four annual measures of exposure to transmitted volatility:
• the degree of supplier linkage
• the degree of customer linkage
• the concentration of supplier linkage
• the concentration of customer linkage.
The distribution of linkages was uneven with most firms disclosing zero or one
significant customers (a single customer accounting for at least 10% of annual
sales revenue). Quartiles on the full dataset did not span a broad range of the
factor values. Therefore those firms with no linkages formed the first group (1),
firms with a single linkage formed the second group (2), and the remaining firms,
with one or more linkages, were split into two groups based on the 50th percentile
of firms with at least one linkage. In order the four ‘degree’ portfolios rank firms
from least to most connected.
Similarly, the distribution of concentration of linkages was uneven. Firms dis-
closing zero key customers11 (suppliers) had customer (supplier) concentration of
0%, while firms with one significant customer had customer (supplier) concen-
tration of 100%. All other firms had values in between 0% and 100%, however,
quartiles did not span a broad range of the factor values. Therefore those firms
with no linkages formed the lowest concentration group (1), firms with a single
linkage formed the highest concentration group (4), and the remaining firms, with
10 In addition, I use out-of-sample Fama Macbeth (FM) regressions (where current period
returns are regressed on factor exposures based on historical data) to avoid issues associated
with data-snooping bias.
11 As defined in FAS 131, a single customer accounting for at least 10% of annual sales revenue.
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Figure 6.1: Histogram of the degree of customer (backward) linkage for firms with at
least one significant customer exposure. The total degree is calculated as
the row sum of CS = (I−αcA)−1; where α = 0.2, and A is the adjacency
matrix with entries aij = 1 if i is a key customer of j and zero otherwise.
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one or more linkages, were split into two groups based on whether concentration
was greater than 0% and less than 50% (group 2) or greater than or equal to 50%
and less than 100% (group 3). In order, the four ‘concentration’ portfolios rank
firms from least to most concentrated supply chain structure.
Shanken and Weinstein (2006) suggest that results from tests of the APT are
sensitive to the method of portfolio formation. To check the results in this chap-
ter are robust to the method of portfolio formation, the tests were performed
using the four different portfolios outlined above, and also portfolios that are
double sorted on size and the exposure to transmitted volatility (the degree of
supplier linkage, the degree of customer linkage, the concentration of supplier
linkage, the concentration of customer linkage).
6.3 Data and measurement of variables
6.3.1 Data source and sample selection
I examine the relationship between transmitted volatility and returns using a
large unbalanced panel of observations on 10, 850 firms over 252 months, from
January 1990 to December 2010. The dataset contains monthly stock return in-
formation from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and associated
annual account information from Compustat. The sample period begins in Jan-
uary 1990 because this first year from which reliable disclosures of ‘key customers’
were available12.
The sample was selected from the set of all nonfinancial firms in the intersec-
tion of the CRSP return files and the Compustat annual files. These files contain
return and account information on all firms with listed securities on the NYSE,
12 On June 30, 1997, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued the Statement
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131, Disclosure about Segments of an Enterprise
and Related Information (FAS 131). Prior to 1997, similar information was collected under
FAS 14. When the accounting standards changed Compustat restated past ‘key customer’
disclosures under FAS 14 so that they were consistent with under FAS 131, but only back to
1990.
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AMEX and/or NASDAQ exchanges. The sample was selected from the full in-
tersection of CRSP and Compustat according to the following criteria, identical
to Fama and French (1992):
• The firm must have a record in both Compustat Fundamental Annual and
CRSP files between 1990 and 2010.
• There must be at least 2 years or 24 months of return data on CRSP. (As
at least 20 observations should be used to calculate beta and correlation
between firms return series. Furthermore, this controls for the potential
survival/selection bias inherent in the way COMPUSTAT adds firms to its
tapes (Banz and Breen, 1986).
• Financial firms were excluded based on SIC divisions 6000-6900 (because
disclosure requirements and accounting rules are significantly different for
these industries (Collins et al., 2003) and because the use and influence of
leverage is not comparable between financial and non-financial companies
(Fama and French, 1992)).
The final (unbalanced) panel, contained return information for 10,853 stock for
whom I had account information for the underlying firms, each with up to 252
monthly observations. Only 5% of firms were alive for the whole period. The
average number of months of observations per firm was 160 (75% of firms had at
least 50 months of observations).
6.3.2 Dependent variable: Excess returns
The standard response in asset pricing studies is the return on a stock in excess
of the risk-free rate (Fama and French, 1992). Given the time-series nature of the
data is it appropriate to use the log excess return defined as
rit = ln(Rit + 1)ln(Rft + 1).
where Rit is the return in percentage (i.e. Rit =
Ri,t
Ri,t−1
−1) and Rft is the risk-free
rate of return for the corresponding period. I also test the results are unchanged
if the untransformed excess return (i.e. Rit −Rft) is used as the response.
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Table 6.1: Summary statistics for monthly excess returns by year. Excess return is
each firm’s monthly with-dividend return (RET) less the one-month Trea-
sury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates). The sample period is 1989: 1 to
2010:12. The monthly data are scaled by 1200 to express returns in percent
per annum.
Year No. Obs Mean Sd Skewness Kurtosis
1990 (n=47,568) -0.02% 0.16% 0.68% 7.16%
1991 (n=49,124) 0.03% 0.18% 1.05% 7.63%
1992 (n=51,315) 0.01% 0.16% 1.01% 8.17%
1993 (n=54,592) 0.01% 0.15% 1.04% 8.43%
1994 (n=59,869) -0.01% 0.14% 0.67% 8.02%
1995 (n=62,462) 0.02% 0.15% 0.91% 8.06%
1996 (n=66,863) 0.01% 0.16% 0.82% 7.26%
1997 (n=70,400) 0.01% 0.17% 0.72% 6.81%
1998 (n=70,151) -0.01% 0.19% 0.60% 5.92%
1999 (n=66,173) 0.02% 0.20% 1.08% 6.25%
2000 (n=64,929) -0.02% 0.23% 0.55% 5.11%
2001 (n=60,836) 0.01% 0.22% 0.63% 5.31%
2002 (n=57,046) -0.02% 0.19% 0.52% 6.15%
2003 (n=53,293) 0.05% 0.17% 1.15% 7.59%
2004 (n=52,256) 0.02% 0.14% 0.83% 8.13%
2005 (n=52,248) 0.00% 0.13% 0.68% 8.08%
2006 (n=52,061) 0.01% 0.13% 0.81% 8.65%
2007 (n=51,552) 0.00% 0.13% 0.51% 8.80%
2008 (n=50,450) -0.05% 0.19% 0.09% 5.47%
2009 (n=47,030) 0.04% 0.20% 0.84% 6.11%
2010 (n=44,023) 0.02% 0.14% 0.72% 7.10%
Total (n=1,228,688) 0.00% 0.17% 0.72% 7.18%
Table 6.1 reports summary statistics of the excess returns of the sample by year.
The financial crises in the early and late 1990s, as well as the recent global fi-
nancial crisis are likely explanations for negative returns in the years 1990, 2000,
2002 and 2008. Over the entire period 1990 to 2010 the average excess return
was 0.00%. There is no obvious time trend in the mean, skewness or kurtosis of
excess returns in this sample.
6.3.3 Independent variables: Systematic covariates
The aim of this study is to test whether the shocks transmitted via economic
linkages affect the relative prices over and above systematic risk factors (SRFs).
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The FF three factor model is the benchmark for asset pricing studies (Ernstberger,
Haupt, and Vogler, 2011), so I use the three FF factors
• Excess return on the S&P 500 index (from Kenneth French’s website).
• SMB, the average return on the three small portfolios minus the average
return on the three big portfolios (from Kenneth French’s website).
• HML, is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average
return on the two growth portfolios (from Kenneth French’s website)
in the main model specification.
Previous studies show that the market return, average dividend yield and the
term spread (or long term government bond yield and short term bill rate) are
the key macroeconomic risk factors driving returns (Shanken and Weinstein, 2006;
Bekaert and Hodrick, 1992). Aretz, Bartram, and Pope (2010) show the three
Fama French factors above capture the cross-sectional variation in exposures to a
broad set of macroeconomic factors potentially important for pricing equities13.
Therefore in Section 6.4.5 I cross-check the results of the regressions by using the
following macroeconomic risk factors instead of the FF factors:
• Excess return on the S&P 500 index (from Kenneth French’s website)
• The average market dividend yield on the S&P 500 index (from Robert
Schiller’s website)
• The term spread defined as the difference between the 10-year, constant
maturity, Treasury bond rate (series GS10 from the Federal Reserve Board
website) and the 1-month Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates).
Time series properties: Unit root and structural break tests
In time-series and panel studies it is important to test whether the macroeconomic
series and systematic risk factors are stationary. Non-stationary series, that fol-
low a unit root process violate several regression assumptions and can lead to
13 The FF factors capture the cross-sectional variation in exposures to: innovations in economic
growth expectations, inflation, bankruptcy rates, the term structure of interest rates and the
exchange rate (Aretz, Bartram, and Pope, 2010).
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Table 6.2: Unit root tests. Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) Unit root
tests include a constant and a trend; the optimal lag length is chosen by
the Akaike information criterion and the Likelihood ratio test statistic.
Panel A: Unit root tests in levels
Jan 1990 - Jan 1995 - Jan 2000 - Jan 2005 -
Dec 1994 Dec 1999 Dec 2004 Dec 2009
DF PP DF PP DF PP DF PP
MktRF -4.566 -8.073 -5.332 -7.651 -4.414 -7.752 -2.211 -5.192
-3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490
SMB -3.996 -6.132 -3.660 -6.357 -5.566 -9.958 -4.806 -7.867
-3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490
HML -4.077 -4.784 -2.341 -6.357 -3.833 -8.786 -3.610 -8.786
-3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490
DivYield -2.337 -3.429 -0.192 -0.069 -0.499 0.544 -1.874 4.861
-3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490
Spread -1.31 -1.076 -2.034 -1.969 -2.268 -2.388 -2.33 -2.551
-3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490
Panel B: Unit root tests in first differences
Jan 1990 - Jan 1995 - Jan 2000 - Jan 2005 -
Dec 1994 Dec 1999 Dec 2004 Dec 2009
DF PP DF PP DF PP DF PP
D.DivYield -2.881 -2.847 -5.983 -4.271 -3.389 -3.084 -1.601 -1.736
-3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490
D.Spread -4.487 -5.096 -3.237 -5.927 -4.881 -6.445 -4.456 -7.05
-3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490 -3.490
spurious regression results. I.e. if two variables are trending over time, a regres-
sion of one on the other could have a high R2 even if the two series are unrelated.
To address this concern, I test whether each macroeconomic series contains a unit
root using the Dickey Fuller (DF) test and the Phillips Perron (PP) test. The
unit root tests include constant and trend; the optimal lag length was chosen by
optimizing the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Bayesian information crite-
rion (BIC), and the likelihood-ratio test statistics for the auto-regressive models
for each series.
Table 6.2 shows the tests of stationarity for the systematic risk factors. The
tests in levels, shown in Panel A, confirm that for the three FF factors, in all
cases there is a strong rejection of the null hypothesis that the variable contains
a unit root, in favor of the alternative that the variable was generated by a sta-
tionary process. For the Dividend Yield and the spread however, the test fail to
reject the null hypothesis that the variable contains a unit root. For these two
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series therefore, a second set of unit root test was performed on the variable in
levels. These tests are shown in Panel B of Table 6.2 show that for the Dividend
Yield and the Spread, the series are first difference stationary. In summary, in
the macroeconomic specification, I fit the variables MktRF, SMB and HML in
levels, but I fit the Dividend Yield and the spread as first differenced series to
avoid the problems involved with non-stationary explanatory variables.
6.3.4 Independent variables: Measures of transmitted volatil-
ity
In this section I develop measures of exposure to transmitted volatility. Transmit-
ted risk is frequently unobservable and/or hard to distinguish from direct shocks
to the firm (Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez-Hermosillo, and Martin, 2011). However,
while the portion of return volatility caused by transmitted risk is unobservable,
I have information on the economic linkages that hypothetically transmit shocks.
Therefore, in order to test whether risk transmitted via economic linkages af-
fects asset returns, I develop measures of the exposure to transmitted volatility
via economic linkages. Estimating exposure rather than the shocks themselves
circumvents the errors-in-variables bias that is created when estimates of shocks
themselves are used in subsequent regressions to derive factor loadings14 (Hahn
and Lee, 2009).
I use available information of inter-firm linkages to develop measures of the degree
(DEG) and the concentration (CONC) of transmitted risk exposure. To recap,
the in-degree of a firm in a supply network is the number of significant connec-
tions it has to customers (i.e. customer linkages or CL), while the out-degree
of a firm in a supply network is the number of significant connections it has to
suppliers15(i.e. supplier linkages or SL). High in-degree means that the firm is
influential in its role as a supplier (receiving cash ‘in’ from its customers); high
14 Because aggregate exposure to transmitted shocks involves summing across both systematic
and idiosyncratic shocks to all customers and suppliers directly and indirectly linked to firm
i, even small estimation errors in estimates of individual shocks could compound to create
significant estimation bias.
15 These measures indicate the direction of cash-flow involved in the relationship, i.e. cash is
paid out to suppliers, and in from customers.
171
6.3 Data and measurement of variables
out-degree means that the firm is influential in its role as a customer (paying cash
‘out’ to its suppliers).
Firms are exposed to shocks to their customers’ customers, and suppliers’ suppli-
ers and so on. So, as in Chapter 3, the total degree of a firm is a weighted sum
across all possible n-step linkages. The ‘total in-degree’ (‘total out-degree’) mea-
sures represent aggregate exposure to shocks from a firm’s customers (suppliers).
In model (6.6) I include the total degree of customer and supplier linkages (CL
DEG and SL DEG), which are based on the row and column sums of the matrix:
CSt = (I− αcAt)−1
where At is the adjacency matrix constructed as described in section 5.3.3 which
captures all direct links between suppliers and customers in year t. For these
calculations I use three different scaling weights αc: αc = 0.1, αc = 0.2 and
αc = 0.3 (based on the average percentage of a firm’s total revenue associated
with a single link, as explained in Section 5.3.3).
As in Table 3.3, measures of the total degree of linkage to customers and suppliers
can be derived from CSt as i
′CSt and i′CS′t respectively. I.e. the total degree of
linkage to customer i is the i’th row sum of CSt and the total degree of linkage
to supplier j is the j’th column sum of CSt.
In addition to measures of total degree, I also construct measures of the struc-
ture of total connectivity based on the theory in Chapter 4. Three measures of
network structure are proposed:
• 1. V ar(CSi) (i.e. CS row variance)
• 2. max(CSi)||CSi||2
• 3. ||CSi||2||CSi||1 .
These are all measures of the concentration (or ‘heavy-tailedness’) of a firm’s
links either upstream or downstream of the firm. As explained in Chapter 4, the
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variance of the i’th row of the CS matrix is a measure of the concentration of the
distribution of firm i’s linkages across its counterparties. To see this note that
the variance of entries along CSi is
V ar(CSi) = s
2
in = n
−1∑
j
(CSij − CSi)2 = n−1
∑
j
CS2ij − CSi2,
where CSi = n
−1∑
j CSij is the average row entry. So if the distribution of
firm i’s linkages is concentrated on firm j then (CSij − CSi) will be large for j,
which will increase V ar(CSi). The second measure is derived from Proposition
1 in Chapter 4. The ratio max(CSi)||CSi||2 is the fraction of the standard deviation of
i’s return explained by the most dominant (or influential) counterparty. The last
measure is a ‘Herfindahl index’. The Herfindahl index is a commonly used mea-
sure of concentration in economics (Gabaix, 2011). When firms are linked it is
their total influence, rather than their size, which determines the contribution of
their idiosyncratic risk to the aggregate. So in the context of network structure,
the Herfindahl index translates into the ratio of the 1-row-norm over the 2-row-
norm from the CS matrix. The row Herfindahl
√∑
j CS
2
ij∑
j CSij
represents concentration
of customer base, while the column Herfindahl
√∑
i CS
2
ij∑
i CSij
represents concentration
of supplier base.
These measures are highly collinear (for example, when all elements in a row
of CS are equal, measures 2 and 3 are identical) so they are used alternatively as
measures of exposure to transmitted volatility in equation (6.6).
Aggregate and idiosyncratic volatility
Market-level and firm-level volatility may affect returns (Bekaert and Wu, 2000).
Similarly, market-level and firm-level shocks can influence returns directly and
indirectly via linkages. To test whether transmitted volatility affects returns,
therefore, it is important to control for direct exposure to market-level and firm-
level volatility. I do this by including proxies for market volatility and firm-level
volatility in equation (6.6).
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As in French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987); Campbell and Hentschel (1992);
Bekaert and Wu (2000), the proxy for market volatility is the variance of the mar-
ket return (the monthly return on the S&P 500 index) over the past 24 months.
Consistent with Gabaix (2011) the proxy used for firm-level volatility is the vari-
ance of the firm’s return series over the past 24 months16
I include the one month lagged proxies (i.e. at time t I use V art−1(Ri) and
V art−1(RM)) to control for predicted volatility. This is reasonable given that
past 24-month volatility is based on information that is available to investors at
the start of each period, and is one way in which an investor might rationally
measure volatility. I include first difference in the volatility proxy to allow for un-
predicted volatility. If it is assumed that volatility follows an AR(1) process then
this is exactly the method recommended in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(1999) for separating (monetary policy) shocks into predictable and unpredictable
components. The predicted and unpredicted components are uncorrelated so in-
cluding them both in the regression should not bias estimates.
Firm-level characteristics
In addition to systematic risk factors and volatility, firm-level characteristics can
influence stock returns (Ang, Liu, and Schwarz, 2008; Daniel and Titman, 1997).
Therefore, to be sure that the estimated influence of linkages is not biased because
of omitted firm characteristics, I include the following firm characteristics as
control variables:
• Firm size (market capitalization at last fiscal year end)
• Book-to-market ratio (the ratio of book value of equity to market capital-
ization at last fiscal year end)
• Profitability (the ratio of sales to total assets at last fiscal year end)
• Book leverage (the ratio of total debt to the book value of equity)
16 I also calculated the residuals from the standard CAPM (i.e. Ri − βiRMt) over the past 24
months, however the variance of the residuals from the CAPM were highly correlated with
the variance of the market return, so Var(Ri) is a better choice for use in the regressions.
174
6.3 Data and measurement of variables
• Trade credit ratio (the ratio of accounts payable to total cost of goods sold).
The first two variables are standard controls taken from the Fama French three
factor model (Fama and French, 1992; Daniel and Titman, 1997). In addition
I control for profitability, leverage and trade credit. Fama and French (2008)
confirm a ‘profitability’ effect in pricing, showing that among profitable firms,
higher profitability tends to be associated with abnormally high returns. In the
context of production linkages, the profitability of a counterparty affects whether
or not it can fulfil its obligations to supply or purchase goods and/or services,
so the firm’s own profitability is included as a control to ensure that any ef-
fects of counterparty risk on returns are not a results of excluding an important
firm-specific factor that affect the counterparty relationship. Similarly, leverage
and trade credit so are controlled for because they have been proposed as fac-
tors related to the propagation of shocks between counterparties (Raddatz, 2010).
Finally, an industry dummy variable was created using the 12 industry classifica-
tion scheme from Fama and French (1997). This classification scheme was chosen
as it is the lowest level of disaggregation which cleanly separates all Finance,
Banking, Insurance, Real Estate, and Trading businesses (SIC codes 6000-6999)
from other industries. Industry level summary statistics and regression results
are not included due to the very low significance of the industry dummies and
because they did not alter the results.
6.3.5 Summary statistics
Table 6.3 presents descriptive statistics for the firm-level control variables for the
whole period of 1990 to 2010, and also broken into consecutive five year periods.
The descriptive statistics illustrate that the accounting ratios vary over the sam-
ple period. In particular, leverage is noticeably higher, and more variable, in the
years 2000 to 2005. The variance in profitability is lower, both across firms and
over time. The mean firm size (or market value of equity) increases noticeable
over the full sample period, however the measurements in the table are in nomi-
nal dollars so this trend is reasonable. The dispersion of firm size (large standard
deviation, positive skewness and kurtosis, and the fact that the maximum firm
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Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics for the firm-level covariates, for the Compus-
tat/CRSP population of US listed firms, 1990 to 2010.
Mean S.D. Skew Kurt Min Max
Size ($m) 2,626.86 13,336.31 14.37 307.66 0.07 508,329.47
BTM 0.64 3.56 -201.17 48,950.67 -906.64 60.75
Leverage 3.49 289.46 298.87 90,575.56 -2,941.78 87,750.70
Trade Credit 0.35 7.39 104.37 13,860.12 -8.07 1,272.35
Profit 1.10 1.10 51.54 7,639.67 -0.93 183.86
1st-order CL 0.46 1.19 6.00 73.91 0.00 34.00
1st-order SL 0.49 3.79 27.01 1,132.47 0.00 247.00
Total CL 1.10 0.26 6.32 78.48 1.00 8.44
Total SL 1.11 0.85 26.74 1,101.40 1.00 57.97
Conc. CL 0.19 0.35 1.52 3.58 0.00 1.00
Conc. SL 0.09 0.26 2.81 9.32 0.00 1.00
size is significantly higher than the average firm size) indicates that there are a
few very large firms in the sample, whereas the majority are much smaller. To
minimize some of the extreme values in the explanatory variables, I winsorize all
ratio variables at the first and 99th percentiles.
The dispersion of the linkage measures (1st-order CL, 1st-order SL, Total CL,
Total SL) also indicates that there are a few very connected firms in the sample,
whereas the majority are much less connected. The most striking feature of this
data is that the supplier linkages (out-degree) are several times more heavy-tailed
than the customer linkages (in-degree). These summary statistics are consistent
with the evidence presented in Chapter 3 that the out-degree distribution of
listed firms (or number of dependent suppliers that a customer firm has) is much
more heavy-tailed than the in-degree distribution of listed firms (or the number
of customers that account for over 10% of sales revenue).
Correlation between covariates
It is important to investigate whether any explanatory power attributed to the
degree and/or structure of linkages is directly related to firm-level linkages, or
whether it derives from the covariance of firm-level linkages with another factor
that is driving returns. For robustness, to ensure that linkages are not merely a
proxy for correlation with the market risk factor, I also calculated the correlation
between the linkage measures and CAPM beta, estimated by fitting the following
rolling regression over 24 month periods: Rit = βiRmt + εit.
176
6.4 Empirical results
Table 6.4: Correlation of firm-level model covariates: size, beta, degree of customer
linkage, degree of supplier linkage, concentration of customer linkage and
concentration of supplier linkage.
Size Beta 1st ord
CL
1st ord
SL
Total
CL
Total
SL
Conc.
CL
Size 1.000
Beta -0.021 1.000
1st ord CL -0.018 0.047 1.000
1st ord SL 0.454 -0.016 -0.009 1.000
Total CL -0.016 0.051 0.983 -0.010 1.000
Total SL 0.443 -0.016 -0.010 0.993 -0.010 1.000
Conc. CL -0.041 0.053 0.555 -0.022 0.524 -0.022 1.000
Conc. SL 0.162 0.005 0.005 0.154 0.007 0.143 -0.017
Table 6.4 shows the correlation of the covariates measuring the degree and struc-
ture of linkage, with the firm-level covariates: beta and size. Other than a cor-
relation between the measures of total supplier and customer linkage (Total CL
and Total SL) and 1st order supplier and customer linkage there appears is little
evidence of multi-collinearity among the firm-level predictors17. To address this
issue I never include both measures of Total CL (Total SL) and 1st order linkage
in the same regression.
6.4 Empirical results
6.4.1 Average returns for portfolios
Table 6.5 shows the mean excess return and standard deviation of the excess
return for each portfolio, and the characteristics of the firms in each portfolio.
There is an increasing trend in excess returns in all portfolios, as both the de-
gree and concentration of a firm’s supplier and customer linkages increase. The
increasing trend in average excess returns is clearer in the portfolios sorted on
forward (supplier) linkages than backward (customer) linkages. These trends sug-
gest that returns are positively related to transmitted volatility over the period
1990 to 2010.
17 The high correlation between the measures of total supplier and customer linkage and 1st
order supplier and customer linkage indicates that second-order and higher-order connections
are secondary effects.
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In relation to the other characteristics, firms with a high degree of supplier link-
age (more concentrated supplier-base) are larger than average and have higher
beta. For example, the average size of firms in the top quartile of firms with
one or more suppliers (SL DEG., Group 4) is $34,514m, which is much greater
than the sample mean of $2,627m. To check whether the uneven distribution
of size across the portfolios affects the results I run the regressions below using
portfolios formed on exposure to transmitted risk and on size. The double sorted
portfolios produced comparable results to single sorted portfolios, suggesting that
the results are robust to size.
6.4.2 CAPM and APT tests
The standard approach for testing multi-factor explanations of returns is to first
test whether the CAPM or Fama-French (1992) three factor model fully explains
returns by testing whether the model has a zero intercept. Empirical findings
that the model intercepts deviate from zero suggest that further factors should
be included to explain the risk return relationship.
The CAPM and Fama-French three factor model were fit to the portfolio grouped
data. The results are in Appendix 6.A. The key result is that α, the intercept, is
significantly different from zero in almost all of these models. The positive alpha
in the CAPM and APT regressions, for almost all of the portfolios, indicates that
the three Fama French factors are not sufficient to explain the average level of
asset prices in portfolios ranked on linkage measures. The R2 in the FF three
factor regressions ranges from 6% to 19%. In comparison, the R2 in comparable
regressions in Table 6 of Fama and French (1993) range from 83% to 97%. This
difference may be explained by the method of portfolio sorting. In Fama and
French (1993) portfolio sorting on size and BTM induces higher association be-
tween these variables and average returns (Lo and MacKinlay, 1999). When R2 is
higher the bias attributable to induced ordering interferes with the test that the
intercept is significantly different from zero. Lo and MacKinlay (1999) criticize
the Fama and French (1993) conclusions and method of portfolio sorting on the
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grounds that it induces significant ‘data-snooping bias’.
6.4.3 Cross-sectional tests
I use FM cross-sectional regressions to test whether there is a significant risk pre-
mium associated with transmitted volatility (i.e. the impact on average expected
returns). Specifically, I fit model (6.3)
Et−1(Ri,t) = α +
K∑
k=1
βi,kγk + CONCi,t−1γCONC +DEGi,t−1γDEG
where βk for k = 1, · · · , K are exposures to systematic risk factors estimated as
described in Section 6.2.318, and CONCi,t is a measure of the concentration of
firm i’s total connectivity and DEGi,t is a measure of the degree of firm i’s total
connectivity. I include four measures of exposure to transmitted volatility, as
developed in Section 6.3.4:
• degree of customer linkage
• degree of supplier linkage
• concentration of customer linkage
• concentration of supplier linkage.
When the intercept of this model (α) is not significantly different from zero, the
gamma coefficients (γˆ) can be interpreted as the compensation for exposure to
that factor, after controlling for all other factors in the regression19. Table 6.26
presents the results of cross-sectional Fama Macbeth regressions of the excess re-
turns on the FF factor betas (i.e. βMktRF ) estimated over the full sample period
and on the exposures to transmitted volatility estimated from the previous years
18 I.e. For each portfolio I regress portfolio returns on the market excess return (MktRF) to
get the CAPM beta, and on the FF three factors (MktRF, SMB and HML) to estimate the
factor exposures to the FF factors.
19 I.e. The gamma coefficients from Fama Macbeth regressions are the sum of compensation
for factor exposure and the historical rate of return on the factor itself (Welsh, 2008). If the
intercept is different from zero then the FM coefficients are complex functions of exposure
to all factors in the regression (Welsh 2008)
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financial accounts.
In order to estimate the gamma coefficients, as in Fama and French (1992), in
each calendar year I match account information from year t − 1 with return in-
formation from July of year t to June of year t + 1. This ensures there is a
minimum gap of 6 months between account measures (including the exposures
to transmitted volatility derived from key customer disclosures) and the returns
they are used to explain.
Table 6.6 and 6.7 present the coefficient estimates and t-statistics from the cross-
sectional regression of excess returns on Beta, Size, Book-to-market ratio (BTM),
Leverage, Profit, degree of customer linkage, degree of supplier linkage, concentra-
tion of customer linkage, concentration of supplier linkage. The FM regression
results show that there is a significant positive risk premium attached to the con-
centration of supplier linkages. Having a concentrated supplier base was related
to higher cross-sectional average returns, suggesting investors demand a positive
risk premium for this exposure. The coefficient for degree of customer linkage,
however, was insignificant in most cases, indicating that a higher number or con-
centration of customers does not attract a risk premium. Together the results in
Tables 6.5 to 6.7 show that there is a significant relationship between the average
return on stocks and the degree and concentration of their supply chain exposure.
The stock of firms with more concentrated supplier bases have higher expected
returns, suggesting that investors demand a significant positive risk premium for
bearing this risk.
The results in Table 6.6 and 6.7 show that the risk premium associated with con-
centration of supply-base is relatively constant across different portfolios formed
on degree of customer linkage, degree of supplier linkage, concentration of cus-
tomer linkage and concentration of supplier linkage. Connor and Korajczyk
(1993) argue that a testable implication of the APT equality of the price of
risk across different subsets of assets. Therefore these results provide support for
the inclusion of supply chain concentration as a priced risk factor.
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Robustness checks I tested whether the risk premia on the transmitted volatil-
ity measures was still significant after
• Using market beta estimated from past 24 months data only, rather than
full sample period (i.e. this is an out-of-sample test)
• Using untransformed excess returns (ER) as the response, rather than tak-
ing logs of ER
• Controlling for the 3 Fama French factors and aggregate volatility and id-
iosyncratic volatility.
The full results from the robustness checks are shown in Appendix 6.B and are
summarized below in Tables 6.8 and 6.9.
The results show that the significant positive risk premia associated with the
concentration of a firm’s supplier-base is robust to the method of estimating mar-
ket risk exposure (beta), transformation of the response and to the inclusion of
other systematic risk factors and controls for market volatility and idiosyncratic
volatility. This suggests that investors require higher expected returns on firms
that are more exposed to counterparty risk along the supply chain, which is sig-
nificant over and above premia for aggregate volatility and purely idiosyncratic
volatility.
6.4.4 Time-series tests
To complement the cross-sectional tests, I also test the significance of economic
linkage factors in explaining average stock returns over time. As explained in
Section 6.2.2, it is not possible to fit (6.2) because the shocks transmitted to a
firm from its suppliers and customers are not directly observable. It is possible,
however, to observe the structure of economic linkages and to include measures
of the structure of linkages alongside other pervasive factors (e.g. the three Fama
French factors, or macroeconomic factors) in a time series model. That is, I fit
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6.4 Empirical results
the following time-series regression for each portfolio:
Rp,t = αp+
K∑
k=1
βp,kFk,t+
M∑
m=1
βp,mX
m
p,t−1+bp,CONCCONCp,t−1+bp,DEGDEGp,t−1+εp,t
(6.6)
where Rpt is the excess return in portfolio p at time t; αp is the time-fixed non-
systematic premium for portfolio p; βp,k is portfolio p’s loading on systematic fac-
tor Fk ∈ F; βp,m is portfolio p’s loading on firm characteristic Xmp,t−1 e.g. bp,CONC
is portfolio p’s loading on the concentration of economic linkages CONCp,t−1 and
bp,DEG is portfolio p’s loading on the degree of economic linkages DEGp,t−1.
In each calendar year I match returns from July of year t to June of year t + 1
with account information from year t − 1 to ensure there is a minimum gap of
6 months between account measures and the returns they are used to explain.
The following covariates (Xmp,t−1) are constructed from account information: the
degree and concentration of a firm’s supplier and customer linkages, firm size,
BTM, leverage, trade credit and profit.
As financial time-series may exhibit heteroscedasticity, auto-correlation and firm
and/or time effects which may bias the estimates of the coefficient standard er-
rors, I use standard error estimates that are robust to these issues20.
The underlying return generating process corresponding to model (6.6) is shown
in full in equation (6.4); in this specification the degree and concentration of
linkages are firm characteristics that are assumed to directly influence expected
returns. The results from the estimation of equation (6.6) are shown in Table
6.10. As a cross-check, I also estimate equation (6.6) including both the first
and second lags of the degree and concentration of exposure to customers and
suppliers. Linkages may have contemporaneous effects on cash-flow (and hence
asset prices) if shock transmission is fast. However, if shocks take several months
to transmit along supply chains or stock prices take time to adjust (as found
20 White (1982) proposed estimates of s.e.s robust to heteroscedasticity. The version of the
White (1982) estimator implemented in STATA (the ‘Huber White sandwich estimator’) is
also robust to autocorrelation and firm-effects.
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in Cohen and Frazzini (2008)) then lagged linkage measure should be included
in the regression. As the linkage measures are constructed from annual account
figures, they are lagged 12 months in the regression. The results including both
the first and second lags of supply chain exposure are shown in Appendix 6.C.
The main finding is that increasing the concentration of exposure to upstream or
downstream counterparties reduces returns over the long term. That is, the sig-
nificant negative coefficients on the proxies for concentration of supplier and/or
customer linkages indicate that firms with highly concentrated supplier and/or
customer linkages have lower long term returns than firms with less concentrated
supplier and/or customer linkages. Secondly, unlike the CAPM and APT models
fit in Section 6.4.2, the intercept of the time-series model (6.6) equals zero for
most portfolios. This implies that the inclusion of linkages, volatility and/or firm
characteristics is necessary to meet the requirements of APT.
Discussion of results and comparison to other studies The finding that
increasing the concentration of exposure to upstream or downstream counterpar-
ties reduces returns over the long term is consistent with the positive contempora-
neous risk premium found above21 and also with the theory in Chapter 3 showing
that returns may be influence by shocks transmitted via economic linkages.
In addition, the estimated coefficients for all parameters are consistent with pub-
lished studies. The Fama French factor coefficients (βSMB and βHML) reveal a
negative loading on SMB (small minus big) and HML (high BTM ratio minus
low BTM ratio) for each year. This result implies that large growth companies
heavily influenced the returns of these portfolio during the study period, con-
sistent with evidence presented in Cai and Houge (2008). The results show a
small negative size effect, consistent with many studies (see Crain (2011) for a
review). As in Fama and French (1989), Schwert (1990) and Fraser (1995), the
results show excess returns are positively related to the term spread. Regarding
21 As increasing current period required return creates downward pressure on prices which
lowers the long term return of an investor who purchased the stock before the risk premium
(or supply chain concentration) increased.
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6.4 Empirical results
the relationship between market volatility and returns, and firm-level volatility
and returns: Campbell and Hentschel (1992); Bekaert and Wu (2000) also find a
negative relationship between market volatility and realized returns, while Duffee
(1995) also finds a negative relationship between firm-level volatility and realized
returns.
Returns data are very noisy and the predictive R2 values tend to be low (Timmer-
mann and Granger, 2004). The R2 of the models is in the order of 10% to 15%.
This is reasonable predictive power in comparison to other firm-level studies such
as Ang, Liu, and Schwarz (2008) and Pavlov, Bauer, and Schotman (2004)22.
Recession periods
Theory suggests that the relationship between linkages and returns is likely to
shift across economic regimes. Bekaert and Wu (2000) note that volatility feed-
back at the firm-level is stronger if covariances respond asymmetrically to shocks.
Many empirical studies of financial contagion have noted that covariance be-
tween asset returns tend to increase in crisis periods (see Dungey, Fry, Gonzlez-
Hermosillo, and Martin (2005) for a review). Although models of financial con-
tagion focus on unobservable linkages between assets and/or markets, the covari-
ance created by observable supply links should also to increase in crisis periods
because supply linkages to be more influential in a recessions(Lang and Stulz,
1992). That is, suppliers and customers are harder to replace when the economy
is in recession23.
To empirically test whether the relationship between customer and supplier link-
22 The R2 should be compared to firm-level studies because R2 is usually higher in portfolio
based studies of returns because aggregation usually averages out some variation which can-
not be explained by the model, resulting in higher R2 values than comparable firm-level stud-
ies. As portfolio studies generally have a higher level of R2 than firm-level studies(Reisinger,
1997), the R2 of model (6.6) should be compared to similar firm-level studies.
23 Similarly in studies of default contagion, it has been shown that shocks are more likely to
spread between suppliers and customers when the respective counterparty cannot be replaced,
for example, because the market as a whole is depressed (Lang and Stulz, 1992; Jorion and
Zhang, 2009). Both Lang and Stulz (1992); Jorion and Zhang (2009) find empirical evidence
that default contagion is stronger in recessions or when an entire industry is in distress.
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6.4 Empirical results
ages and returns is different in recession periods to expansion periods, I estimate
(6.6) over NBER recession periods. The results indicate that her the risk premia
attached to transmitted volatility is only present in certain stages of the business
cycle.
To test this hypothesis I run the same regressions above over pooled data from all
of the NBER recession periods between 1990 and 2010, and the test whether the
coefficients for the supply chain factors are significantly different in the recession
regimes versus the full period. The NBER contraction and expansion periods are
listed in Table 6.12 In the period 1990 to 2010 there were three recession periods
Table 6.12: NBER US Business Cycle, Expansion and Contraction dates. Contrac-
tions are peak to trough, expansions are trough to following peak. Avail-
able at: www.nber.org/cycles.html
Peak Trough Contraction (months) Expansion (months)
July 1981 November 1982 16 12
July 1990 March 1991 8 92
March 2001 November 2001 8 120
December 2007 June 2009 18 73
noted by NBER. The first two of these were only 8 months long, the third was
18 months long. The results from estimation of model (6.6) over these recession
periods are shown in Tables 6.13 and 6.14.
The results of the regressions in recession periods versus the full sample period
(mainly comprised of expansions) illustrate that economic linkages (i.e. Supp Deg
and Conc, Cust Deg and Conc) have a different affect on returns in contraction
versus expansion periods. The main results can be seen by comparing the magni-
tude of the coefficients for the Supplier and Customer degree and concentration
measures in Tables 6.13 and 6.14 to the corresponding results in Tables 6.10 and
6.11. On average, the coefficients on the degree and concentration of supplier
linkages are more negative in the recession periods (Tables 6.13 and 6.14) than in
the full period regressions (Tables 6.10 and 6.11); however the magnitude of this
192
6.4 Empirical results
T
a
b
le
6
.1
3
:
T
im
e
se
ri
es
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
ex
ce
ss
re
tu
rn
s
on
sy
st
em
at
ic
fa
ct
or
s,
fi
rm
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s,
li
n
ka
ge
m
ea
su
re
s
an
d
vo
la
ti
l-
it
y
fo
r
p
or
tf
ol
io
s
so
rt
ed
on
th
e
d
e
g
re
e
of
ex
p
os
u
re
to
cu
st
om
er
s
an
d
su
p
p
li
er
s
in
re
c
e
ss
io
n
p
e
ri
o
d
s.
*
,*
*
,*
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
p
<
.0
5,
p
<
.0
1,
p
<
.0
01
le
ve
ls
.
T
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
a
re
sh
o
w
n
u
n
d
er
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
.
C
U
S
T
D
E
G
S
U
P
P
D
E
G
P
1
P
2
P
3
P
4
P
1
P
2
P
3
P
4
M
k
tR
F
1.
08
6*
**
1.
18
7*
**
1.
2
0
5
*
*
*
1
.2
1
4
*
*
*
1
.1
0
4
*
*
*
1
.1
9
6
*
*
*
1
.1
6
3
*
*
*
1
.1
2
0
*
*
*
-6
9.
23
-2
5.
17
-2
4
.3
4
-2
1
.7
1
-7
3
.5
9
-2
2
.1
2
-1
7
.1
1
-2
0
.9
0
S
M
B
0.
00
5*
**
0.
00
6*
**
0.
0
0
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
7
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
-1
8.
42
-7
.3
1
-6
.5
1
-7
.6
9
-2
1
.0
3
-5
.6
0
-4
.2
9
-1
.8
2
H
M
L
0.
00
2*
**
0.
00
0
0.
0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-7
.5
9
-0
.4
9
-1
.4
3
-0
.8
4
-7
.7
0
-1
.5
1
-0
.4
7
-0
.1
9
S
iz
e
-0
.0
00
**
-0
.0
00
*
0.
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-2
.6
2
-2
.1
6
-1
.0
2
-1
.2
2
-4
.7
0
-1
.9
6
-0
.2
3
-1
.4
5
B
T
M
0.
00
2
0.
00
5
0.
0
0
9
0
.0
0
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
0
-0
.0
2
2
0
.0
2
2
-0
.9
1
-0
.3
5
-1
.7
1
-9
.6
7
-3
.7
3
-0
.8
7
-1
.2
1
-1
.4
8
B
id
A
sk
0.
00
1
-0
.0
01
0.
0
0
6
0
.0
2
1
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
1
6
*
0
.0
0
0
-1
.5
7
-0
.7
2
-0
.7
8
-2
.4
2
-0
.8
7
-0
.5
3
-2
.4
2
-0
.2
8
L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
-0
.0
0
0
*
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
*
0
.0
0
0
-0
.9
5
-0
.0
5
-3
.2
1
-1
.4
3
-0
.8
9
-1
.7
0
-2
.0
2
-0
.1
8
T
ra
d
e
C
re
d
0.
00
0
-0
.0
17
0.
0
1
6
-0
.0
0
0
*
*
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
2
0
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
3
1
-1
.5
8
-1
.5
3
-1
.1
4
-2
.8
3
-0
.5
3
-1
.5
4
-0
.0
4
-0
.4
8
P
ro
fi
t
0.
00
5*
0.
02
8*
0.
0
0
9
0
.0
2
8
0
.0
0
9
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
3
6
0
.0
0
3
-2
.0
8
-2
.5
2
-0
.5
5
-1
.9
0
-3
.1
7
-0
.5
5
-1
.1
6
-0
.2
2
C
u
st
D
e
g
-0
.0
25
0.
01
0
-0
.0
2
9
-0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
8
0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
1
5
*
*
-1
.8
9
-0
.4
8
-1
.1
7
-0
.6
8
-1
.4
3
-0
.3
9
-0
.1
0
-2
.7
8
S
u
p
p
D
e
g
-0
.0
01
-0
.0
15
-0
.0
1
5
0
.0
0
9
-0
.0
1
6
0
.0
2
2
-0
.0
5
0
*
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.3
3
-0
.9
7
-0
.6
8
-0
.8
4
-0
.3
8
-0
.6
4
-2
.0
4
-1
.2
0
C
u
st
C
o
n
c
0.
02
0*
*
-0
.0
07
-0
.0
3
2
0
.0
1
5
0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
3
2
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
8
-2
.7
5
-0
.6
3
-1
.7
7
-0
.7
1
-1
.6
1
-1
.8
1
-0
.1
4
-0
.4
9
S
u
p
p
C
o
n
c
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
30
*
0.
0
0
5
-0
.0
1
7
0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
1
8
0
.0
3
3
-0
.0
4
0
-0
.4
7
-2
.1
4
-0
.2
7
-0
.6
9
-0
.4
2
-1
.4
9
-1
.9
4
-1
.3
9
D
.V
a
r(
R
m
)
-5
9.
58
9*
**
-5
2.
23
9*
**
-4
3
.9
6
3
*
*
*
-5
1
.5
3
1
*
*
*
-6
1
.1
8
5
*
*
*
-6
1
.5
2
7
*
*
*
-2
4
.2
3
4
*
-1
5
.8
7
4
-1
6.
11
-5
.3
7
-4
.1
3
-3
.8
7
-1
7
.5
6
-4
.4
5
-1
.9
8
-1
.7
0
L
.V
a
r(
R
m
)
3.
12
4*
**
-4
.1
83
-2
.1
8
6
-6
.3
5
3
*
3
.7
2
2
*
*
*
-3
.3
7
0
-7
.9
2
5
*
-4
.9
5
7
*
-4
.2
9
-1
.8
4
-0
.8
1
-2
.1
8
-5
.3
6
-0
.8
0
-2
.3
1
-2
.1
7
D
.V
a
r(
R
i)
4.
21
1*
**
4.
80
8*
**
4.
1
1
9
*
*
5
.5
7
5
*
*
*
4
.5
8
0
*
*
*
3
.6
7
2
-1
.6
5
9
0
.7
4
2
-8
.1
0
-3
.9
4
-2
.7
4
-3
.9
4
-1
0
.1
3
-1
.7
1
-0
.4
4
-0
.2
1
L
.V
a
r(
R
i)
0.
29
1*
*
0.
78
6*
*
0.
4
9
1
0
.4
8
0
0
.2
4
6
*
*
*
0
.5
9
1
1
.3
7
5
1
.0
8
2
*
-3
.1
1
-3
.1
6
-1
.4
8
-1
.4
8
-3
.5
0
-0
.7
8
-1
.6
1
-2
.0
8
c
o
n
s
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
34
0.
0
3
4
-0
.0
4
8
-0
.0
1
0
-0
.0
0
4
0
.0
1
5
0
.0
3
4
-0
.3
5
-1
.0
7
-0
.7
3
-1
.5
6
-0
.2
3
-0
.0
9
-0
.2
4
-1
.0
8
R
sq
20
.7
%
22
.7
%
23
.0
%
2
3
.1
%
2
0
.7
%
2
6
.4
%
2
7
.0
%
3
0
.3
%
193
6.4 Empirical results
T
a
b
le
6
.1
4
:
T
im
e
se
ri
es
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
ex
ce
ss
re
tu
rn
s
on
sy
st
em
at
ic
fa
ct
or
s,
fi
rm
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s,
li
n
ka
ge
m
ea
su
re
s
an
d
vo
la
ti
l-
it
y
fo
r
p
or
tf
ol
io
s
so
rt
ed
on
th
e
d
e
g
re
e
of
ex
p
os
u
re
to
cu
st
om
er
s
an
d
su
p
p
li
er
s
in
re
c
e
ss
io
n
p
e
ri
o
d
s.
*
,*
*
,*
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
p
<
.0
5,
p
<
.0
1,
p
<
.0
01
le
ve
ls
.
T
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s
a
re
sh
o
w
n
u
n
d
er
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
.
C
U
S
T
C
O
N
C
S
U
P
P
C
O
N
C
P
1
P
2
P
3
P
4
P
1
P
2
P
3
P
4
M
k
tR
F
1.
08
6*
**
1.
24
7*
**
1.
2
2
9
*
*
*
1
.1
5
5
*
*
*
1
.1
0
4
*
*
*
1
.1
6
2
*
*
*
1
.1
0
7
*
*
*
1
.2
0
0
*
*
*
-6
9.
23
-2
1.
73
-2
3
.1
2
-2
5
.8
4
-7
3
.5
9
-2
2
.5
2
-1
5
.1
3
-2
2
.9
1
S
M
B
0.
00
5*
**
0.
00
7*
**
0.
0
0
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
4
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
*
-1
8.
42
-7
.3
9
-6
.7
3
-7
.4
1
-2
1
.0
3
-1
.6
2
-4
.0
7
-5
.9
5
H
M
L
0.
00
2*
**
0.
00
0
0.
0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
-7
.5
9
-0
.5
1
-1
.9
0
-1
.1
9
-7
.7
0
-0
.8
1
-1
.0
1
-1
.5
5
S
iz
e
-0
.0
00
**
-0
.0
00
**
0.
0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-2
.6
2
-2
.7
0
-0
.1
7
-2
.8
5
-4
.7
0
-1
.4
5
-0
.4
7
-1
.8
9
B
T
M
0.
00
2
0.
00
0*
**
0.
0
0
9
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
2
5
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.9
1
-1
0.
27
-1
.6
2
-0
.6
0
-3
.7
3
-0
.3
2
-1
.5
8
-0
.3
9
B
id
A
sk
0.
00
1
0.
01
9*
0.
0
0
6
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
1
7
*
0
.0
0
0
-1
.5
7
-2
.3
1
-0
.7
2
-0
.5
5
-0
.8
7
-0
.4
4
-2
.2
7
-0
.5
7
L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
0.
00
0
0.
00
1
-0
.0
0
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.9
5
-1
.4
6
-3
.4
9
-0
.0
8
-0
.8
9
-0
.3
3
-0
.5
4
-1
.4
5
T
ra
d
e
C
re
d
0.
00
0
-0
.0
00
*
0.
0
1
6
-0
.0
1
7
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
4
9
0
.0
6
6
-0
.0
2
1
-1
.5
8
-2
.3
7
-1
.0
9
-1
.4
9
-0
.5
3
-0
.8
7
-0
.9
0
-1
.5
7
P
ro
fi
t
0.
00
5*
0.
01
5
0.
0
2
6
0
.0
2
3
*
0
.0
0
9
*
*
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
4
6
-0
.0
0
1
-2
.0
8
-1
.0
4
-1
.3
0
-2
.2
0
-3
.1
7
-0
.6
5
-1
.0
6
-0
.3
1
C
u
st
D
e
g
-0
.0
25
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
1
8
0
.0
1
5
-0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
1
0
*
*
-0
.0
2
9
0
.0
0
4
-1
.8
9
-0
.3
1
-0
.8
5
-0
.8
0
-1
.4
3
-2
.8
7
-0
.7
9
-0
.1
7
S
u
p
p
D
e
g
-0
.0
01
0.
02
1
-0
.0
1
9
-0
.0
1
8
-0
.0
1
6
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
2
3
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.3
3
-1
.7
1
-1
.1
2
-1
.5
4
-0
.3
8
-0
.6
1
-1
.0
3
-0
.1
C
u
st
C
o
n
c
0.
02
0*
*
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
2
1
-0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
2
8
-0
.0
4
7
-2
.7
5
-0
.0
9
-1
.1
0
-0
.7
8
-1
.6
1
-0
.1
6
-1
.3
6
-1
.8
3
S
u
p
p
C
o
n
c
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
2
2
-0
.0
2
6
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
1
0
0
.0
2
2
-0
.0
1
1
-0
.4
7
-0
.2
3
-0
.7
0
-1
.8
7
-0
.4
2
-0
.3
4
-1
.1
9
-0
.9
7
D
.V
a
r(
R
m
)
-5
9.
58
9*
**
-5
7.
22
7*
**
-3
8
.2
7
8
*
*
*
-5
1
.0
2
8
*
*
*
-6
1
.1
8
5
*
*
*
-1
0
.8
8
7
-3
2
.2
0
3
*
-5
8
.5
8
2
*
*
*
-1
6.
11
-4
.4
2
-3
.3
2
-5
.4
7
-1
7
.5
6
-1
.2
6
-2
.2
9
-4
.4
5
L
.V
a
r(
R
m
)
3.
12
4*
**
-8
.0
34
**
-2
.3
5
8
-3
.5
0
6
3
.7
2
2
*
*
*
-6
.0
3
0
*
*
-6
.8
0
9
-4
.2
3
1
-4
.2
9
-2
.6
5
-0
.8
4
-1
.6
6
-5
.3
6
-2
.9
4
-1
.6
8
-1
.0
7
D
.V
a
r(
R
i)
4.
21
1*
**
6.
69
5*
**
3.
0
0
9
4
.6
1
5
*
*
*
4
.5
8
0
*
*
*
-0
.3
3
3
-0
.9
4
9
3
.3
9
6
-8
.1
0
-5
.0
2
-1
.8
6
-3
.7
8
-1
0
.1
3
-0
.0
9
-0
.2
4
-1
.5
7
L
.V
a
r(
R
i)
0.
29
1*
*
0.
51
2
0.
5
5
0
0
.7
6
3
*
*
0
.2
4
6
*
*
*
1
.4
9
4
*
*
*
0
.8
2
0
0
.5
6
7
-3
.1
1
-1
.4
5
-1
.7
3
-3
.1
0
-3
.5
0
-4
.1
5
-0
.7
6
-0
.8
0
c
o
n
s
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
41
0.
0
0
1
-0
.0
3
2
-0
.0
1
0
0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
1
4
0
.0
2
5
-0
.3
5
-1
.2
9
-0
.0
3
-1
.0
8
-0
.2
3
-0
.1
9
-0
.1
8
-0
.6
1
R
sq
20
.7
%
23
.4
%
23
.5
%
2
2
.2
%
2
0
.7
%
3
2
.3
%
2
5
.3
%
2
6
.2
%
194
6.4 Empirical results
difference is small and far less noticeable than the increased sensitivity of returns
to the volatility of the market (Var(Rm)) in recession periods.
Wald tests are used to check whether the coefficients for the degree and con-
centration of supplier and customer linkages (Supp deg, Supp conc, Cust deg and
Cust conc) are equal in recession periods and in the full period regressions. That
is, I test the following hypothesis:
H0 : β
− = β+
vs.
HA : β
− 6= β+.
The results are summarized in Table 6.15. In about one quarter of cases the
Table 6.15: The p-values from Wald tests comparing the coefficients from a regression
of excess returns on Supplier degree, Customer degree, Supplier concen-
tration and Customer concentration.
P1,1 P1,2 P1,3 P1,4
Supp deg 0.731 0.608 0.572 0.617
Cust deg 0.000 0.032 0.291 0.371
Cust conc 0.063 0.449 0.601 0.879
Supp conc 0.549 0.822 0.722 0.631
P2,1 P2,2 P2,3 P2,4
Supp deg 0.000 0.888 0.117 0.735
Cust deg 0.948 0.548 0.059 0.926
Cust conc 0.261 0.229 0.339 0.065
Supp conc 0.110 0.145 0.766 0.229
P3,1 P3,2 P3,3 P3,4
Supp deg 0.731 0.110 0.996 0.596
Cust deg 0.000 0.479 0.053 0.067
Cust conc 0.063 0.288 0.458 0.511
Supp conc 0.549 0.676 0.827 0.857
P4,1 P4,2 P4,3 P4,4
Supp deg 0.000 0.957 0.189 0.855
Cust deg 0.948 0.387 0.002 0.587
Cust conc 0.261 0.253 0.459 0.031
Supp conc 0.110 0.974 0.084 0.123
coefficients on the economic linkage factors in recession periods are significantly
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greater than the corresponding coefficients in the full period. This provides weak
support for the hypothesis that the transmission of idiosyncratic risk through
economic linkages is stronger in recessions.
6.4.5 Macroeconomic factor models
As a final set of cross-checks on the results, I fit a macroeconomic specification
of model (6.6) in which the systematic risk factors (MktRF, SMB and HML)
are replaced with macroeconomic risk factors. This model is fit to firm-level
data and the response is the excess return on individual securities rather than
portfolio excess returns. Consistent with findings in Bekaert and Hodrick (1992)
and Aretz, Bartram, and Pope (2010), the macroeconomic factors that have been
shown to explain returns are:
• Excess return on the S&P 500 index (from Kenneth French’s website)
• The average market dividend yield on the S&P 500 index (from Robert
Schiller’s website)
• The term spread, defined as the difference between the 10-year, constant
maturity, Treasury bond rate (series GS10 from the Federal Reserve Board
website) and the 1-month Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates).)
I replace the three Fama French factors with these macroeconomic factors and
estimate model (6.6) at the firm-level. I use estimators that are robust to firm
and time effects, as well as to endogeneity (described in detail in Appendix 6.D).
The Hausman test (p=0.000) showed that the firm effect was a fixed effect, rather
than a random effect. Industry effects were not significant in any specification,
so although they were controlled for, they have been left out of the table above,
and left out of future regressions.
In addition to the covariates included in the time series regressions in Table
6.11, I include lagged systematic factors and interactions between the market
return (MktRF) and the linkage measures. The interaction terms can be inter-
preted as the effects of transmitted systematic shocks separate from transmitted
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idiosyncratic shocks. That is, in specifications where the interaction of l and fk
is included, the co-efficient of l is the effect of l when fk = 0, the coefficient of
fk represents the effect of fk when l = 0 and the coefficient of l ∗ fk is the effect
of l for a one unit increase in fk. When fk is the market return, the co-efficient
of l ∗ fk can be interpreted as the extent to which linkages amplify (or dampen)
macroeconomic risk.
The results provide strong support for two findings. First, measures of the de-
gree and the concentration of economic linkages interact with market returns and
amplify market shocks. For example, the market beta, βMktRF , is 0.89, the coef-
ficient on Mkt ∗ CLdeg. is 0.14 so when the underlying firm adds an additional
key customer, exposure of its stock returns to market risk (βMktRF +βMkt∗CLdeg.)
increases 15% from 0.89 to 1.03. The interaction of forward and customer link-
ages (supplier and customer linkages) and market risk is highly significant in all
models, implying that linkages transmit market shocks. The positive coefficients
suggest that customer linkages are a procyclical force i.e. a firm with more ‘key
customers’ will be affected more strongly by market movements24 as linkages am-
plify the effects of market shocks on returns. Second, the observable (last account
figure) concentration of supplier linkage (L.SL conc) is negatively related to ex-
cess returns. This implies that as the concentration of a firm’s supplier linkages
(supplier-base) increases, its stock returns decrease. Over the long-run, the re-
turns for firms with concentrated supplier-bases are lower on average than stocks
issued by firms with less concentrated supplier bases.
The consistency of the time-series results across all three estimates is evidence
that the results are robust to clustering through time and across firms. Thomp-
son (2011) shows that in panels where N is larger than T, clustering by time is
sufficient and the increase in bias from failing to cluster also by firm is small. For
this reason, the second column above shows the results of the panel fixed effects
model with the robust standard error correction proposed by Driscoll and Kraay
24 This is potentially because suppliers are unable to pass on price rises (as in theories of cost-
push inflation (Seelig, 1974)) when their customers dominate the buyers market for their
goods and services.
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Table 6.16: Log excess returns, macroeconomic factors and supply linkages. *,**,***
indicate significance with * for p < .05, ** for p < .01, and *** for
p < .001. The t-statistics are shown in brackets under the coefficients.
Panel: Huber
White (1982)
Panel: Driscoll
and Kraay (1998)
Panel GMM:
Schaffer (2010)
Macro MktRF 0.886*** 0.886*** 0.886***
factors (27.57) (11.61) (44.97)
DivYield -2.135*** -2.135 -2.135***
(-10.45) (-1.04) (-10.73)
spread 2.778*** 2.778 2.778***
(13.33) (1.00) (13.75)
Linkage CL deg 0.00 0.00 0.00
factors (-0.98) (-0.99) (-1.11)
SL deg 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.10) (1.08) (1.34)
CL conc 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-1.10) (-1.05) (-1.20)
SL conc 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.22) (-0.23) (-0.24)
Interactions Mkt*CLdeg 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.137***
(4.67) (6.28) (7.53)
Mkt*SLdeg -0.013** -0.013* -0.013***
(-2.83) (-2.18) (-4.93)
Mkt*CLconc 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.102***
(4.71) (5.30) (7.05)
Mkt*SLconc 0.073** 0.073* 0.073***
(2.89) (2.57) (4.88)
Firm Size -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000***
controls (-4.32) (-2.23) (-7.51)
BTM 0.00 0.00 0.000*
(0.75) (1.39) (1.98)
Leverage 0.000*** 0.000* 0.00
(5.13) (2.33) (1.72)
Trade Credit 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.22) (-0.21) (-0.16)
Profit 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(7.03) (7.48) (10.47)
Lagged L.MktRF 0.00 0.00 0.00
macro (-0.74) (-0.07) (-0.73)
L.DivYield 1.779*** 1.779 1.779***
(8.91) (0.86) (8.81)
L.spread 1.559*** 1.559 1.559***
(8.77) (0.78) (8.83)
Lagged L.CL deg 0.00 0.00 0.00
linkage (-0.54) (-0.68) (-0.59)
L.SL deg -0.002 -0.002* -0.002*
(-1.75) (-1.98) (-2.40)
L.CL conc 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.31) (0.36) (0.33)
L.SL conc -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003**
(-2.84) (-3.35) (-3.17)
Volatility D.σ2M -35.175*** -35.175** -35.175***
(-36.37) (-2.89) (-36.32)
L.σ2M -1.823*** -1.823 -1.823***
(-7.84) (-0.79) (-8.04)
D.σ2i 6.087*** 6.087*** 6.087***
(50.27) (4.94) (48.45)
L.σ2i 0.092*** 0.092 0.092***
(5.36) (1.23) (5.69)
R2 11.1% 12.0% 12.0%
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(1998), which controls for heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and time effects in
the errors. The results from this estimator are very close to the Panel fixed effects
model with Huber White (1982) adjusted standard errors (which only control for
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation). This implies that the time effects in the
error term are not strong. Finally the results from the instrumental variable re-
gression estimated by GMM are also consistent with the other models, suggesting
that endogeneity is not a significant problem.
Volatility decomposition
A useful way of examining the estimation results from model (6.6) is to consider
the contribution that each factor makes to total volatility of returns. Under
the assumption that the factors in the model are independent, it is possible to
decompose the variance of excess returns as follows
V ar(yi) =
K∑
k=1
β2i,kV ar(Fk) + V ar(εi). (6.7)
This is one way to quantify the relative importance of macroeconomic factors,
firm-level characteristics, transmitted volatility (linkages) and other volatility.
The full time-series model (6.6) was fit over all firms, in order to approximate the
proportion of the total return volatility explained by each group of covariates.
The results of the volatility decomposition are shown below.
This table illustrates that linkage factors primarily influence returns via their
Table 6.17: Volatility decomposition of time-series model shown in Table 6.16.
Volatility decomposition
Macro factors 7.89%
Macro volatility 0.30%
Linkage factors: direct 0.02%
Linkage factors: interactions 0.25%
Firm characteristics 0.15%
Firm volatility 2.21%
Model SS (R2) 10.84%
Residual SS 89.16%
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interaction with market returns. In this respect, the proportion of variation in
returns explained by market risk passed through linkages (0.25%) is almost as
important as volatility in the macroeconomic factors (0.30%), and is explains
more variability in returns that the firm characteristics (0.15%).
6.4.6 Model specification and robustness checks
Tests for endogeneity
Given the evidence that the linkage betas may be non-normally distributed, it is
important to check the regression residuals. Furthermore, it is possible that the
linkage factors are simply acting as a proxy for a firm-specific covariate that is not
included, e.g. size, as it is reasonable to hypothesize that the largest firms have
the most suppliers. Omitted variables or simultaneity bias can create endogeneity
which can might cause the regression results to be inconsistent. While including
firm-specific covariates: size, profitability and leverage did not affect the findings,
it is possible that latent factors (e.g. management strategy) simultaneously affect
a firm’s stock return and the firm’s characteristics (size, profitability and lever-
age) included in (6.6) and (6.6). Therefore, as a precaution I perform two sets of
tests for endogeneity.
First I plot the residuals of (6.6) and (6.6) versus predicted values. The residual
plot for the ‘macroeconomic’ specification of (6.6) shown in Table 6.16 is shown
in Figure 6.2. The graph suggests that the model residuals are distributed ran-
domly about zero and are not correlated with the model covariates. The residual
plot in figure 6.2 shows no trend between the residuals and the fitted values. The
residuals are distributed randomly about zero. I also formally test whether the
residuals are normally distributed, mean zero using the Jacque Bera test. Both
the graph and the statistical tests suggest that the fixed effects model is correctly
specified in the sense that E(ε|f ,x) = 0.
As a second check that the results were robust to potential endogeneity I es-
timated model (6.6) with GMM estimation using one-year and two-year lagged
terms as instrumental variables for the firm characteristics that are potentially
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Figure 6.2: Residual plots from the time series regressions of excess returns on
macroeconomic factors, firm characteristics, degree and concentration of
exposure to customers and suppliers, and volatility.
endogenous (size, profitability and leverage). The use of lagged terms as instru-
mental variables is common practice in econometrics, and is correct so long as
the lagged terms are not correlated with the response (Baum, Schaffer, and Still-
man, 2003). The results of the GMM IV estimations (included in Appendix 6.D)
show that the results in the original model are robust to potential endogeneity
problems.
Dependent customer subsample
Regulation FAS No. 131 requires firms to report key customers (contributing at
least 10% of total sales) but not major suppliers. This provides a direct measure
of backward linkages, but not a direct measure of forward (supplier) linkages. In
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this work, I calculate the degree and concentration of forward (supplier) linkages
by inverting the FAS No. 131 disclosures (or equivalently by taking the columns
sums of the adjacency and Leontief matrices, A and CS, rather than the row
sums). This method however, generates an incomplete sample of suppliers. As
noted in Section 4.4, it is not necessarily the case that key customers are, con-
versely, reliant on the supplier. In addition, it is not necessarily the case that if a
customer is reliant on a particular supplier, that the customer is a ‘key customer’
of the supplier (contributing at least 10% of the supplier’s total sales).
I address this issue by using the ratio of supplier sales to a given customer to
the customer’s cost of goods sold, to identify ‘dependent customers’. Customer
firms in which the supplier sales received are a large proportion of total cost of
goods sold should, all other things being equal, have cash flows more affected by
shocks to these ‘major’ suppliers. I check the robustness of the return results
on the sub-sample of co-dependent suppliers and customers, to ensure that the
asymmetry in the supplier-customer dependence did not mean that the results
above could not be generalized to the wider population of supplier and customer
firms.
Table 6.18 contains the results of time-series regressions using a sub-sample
of firms where customers depend upon suppliers for at least 5% of their total
cost of goods sold (and suppliers depend on customers for at least 10% of their
sales revenue). These results are consistent with the results for similar regressions
using the full sample of firms. That is, the concentration of supplier linkages (SL
conc and L.SL conc) is significant and is negative, while the concentration of
customer linkages is not significant on its own. This implies that stock issued
by firms with a more concentrated supplier-base have lower long term returns
than stock issued by firms with less concentrated supplier bases. Furthermore,
the interaction of supplier and customer linkages and market risk is highly signif-
icant in all models, implying that linkages transmit market shocks. These results
confirm that the significance of forward linkage is not just an artifact of the data
generating process.
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Table 6.18: Regression results for the subsample of dependent customers. *,**,***
indicate significance with * for p < .05, ** for p < .01, and *** for
p < .001. The t-statistics are shown in brackets under the coefficients.
(1) (2) (3)
b/t b/t b/t
MktRF 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(27.42) (27.42) (27.43)
DividendYield -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005***
(-12.39) (-11.13) (-11.22)
spread 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(11.43) (6.42) (6.52)
CL deg -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(-1.74) (-1.93) (-1.46)
SL deg -0.001** -0.001 -0.001
(-3.08) (-1.85) (-0.99)
CL conc 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.01) (-1.16) (-0.61)
SL conc -0.002** -0.003** -0.001
(-2.59) (-2.72) (-1.28)
Mkt* CL deg 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001**
(3.46) (2.74) (2.73)
Mkt* SL deg -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(-4.72) (-4.64) (-4.64)
Mkt*CL conc 0.001* 0.001* 0.001*
(2.22) (2.51) (2.52)
Mkt*SL conc -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.88) (-1.91) (-1.91)
L.MktRF -0.000** -0.000**
(-3.27) (-3.27)
L.DividendYield 0.002*** 0.002***
(4.54) (4.50)
L.spread -0.000 -0.000
(-0.85) (-0.81)
Leverage -0.000 -0.000
(-0.93) (-0.93)
SaleTA 0.008*** 0.008***
(5.41) (5.42)
Size -0.000*** -0.000***
(-5.25) (-5.26)
L.CL deg 0.000
(0.16)
L.SL deg -0.000
(-0.25)
L.CL conc -0.001
(-0.86)
L.SL conc -0.003**
(-2.82)
cons 0.039*** 0.022*** 0.023***
(13.86) (6.45) (6.58)
R2 0.118 0.121 0.121
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Robust estimates and standard errors
If linkages are a source of non-diversifiable risk that are not included in (6.1),
then market beta will be time varying. As (6.6) includes observable linkages,
however, as the estimators used are robust to the effects of unobservable link-
ages, it is reasonable to assume constant betas in the FF time-series regressions.
However, the Fama Macbeth tests provide a cross-check on this assumptions as
coefficients may change over time in FM cross-sectional regressions. In addition
I use three different fixed effects panel estimators for the FF time-series regres-
sions to ensure that the results are robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation,
time and firm clustering and possible endogeneity between firm-level returns and
firm-level characteristics (see Appendix 6.D for a review of the robust time-series
estimators used).
Errors-in-variables bias
There are error-in-variables issues that are associated with the Fama Macbeth
method due to the inputs in the cross sectional steps being estimates from the
first step (Welsh, 2008). The original motivation for using portfolios was to reduce
the errors in variables problem, however (Ang, Liu, and Schwarz, 2008) show that
smaller standard errors of beta estimates from creating portfolios do not lead to
smaller standard errors of cross-sectional coefficient estimates. (Ang, Liu, and
Schwarz, 2008) advocate the use of firm-level tests wherever possible. Therefore,
the time-series results and firm-level macroeconomic models are cross-checks of
the FM results that transmitted volatility affects stock returns.
6.5 Discussion
I previous chapters I have shown that the network of supplier-customer linkages
among firms can affect their stock prices, because firm-specific shocks transmitted
via these inter-linkages (transmitted volatility) may be non-diversifiable. In this
chapter, I investigate the implications of the model of returns in Chapter 3 for
expected returns, cross-sectionally and over time.
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The results show that the concentration of linkages is more influential on returns
than the degree of linkage. Shocks spread via economic linkages significantly in-
fluence average stock returns, however the economic significance of transmitted
volatility on stock returns is small compared to the influence of systematic risk
factors. The influence of transmitted volatility does, however, increase in reces-
sions, and is much larger in the presence of feedback (for example, ‘volatility
feedback’ on asset prices as proposed by French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987)
and Campbell and Hentschel (1992)). Thus the empirical evidence suggests that
shocks spread along supply chains affect stock returns, with firms that have con-
centrated supplier or customer bases having lower returns on average over time
than firms with balanced supplier or customer bases. These results were robust to
the inclusion of a range of common systematic factors (including the three Fama
French factors and macroeconomic factors), firm-level controls and controls for
market volatility and idiosyncratic volatility in the models.
Specifically, the Fama Macbeth regressions showed that there is a significant,
positive risk premium attached to the concentration of supplier linkages. Con-
sistent with this result, the time series results showed that an increase in the
concentration of supplier linkages in period t lowered returns in period t + 1 (as
the regression coefficients on the lagged concentration of supplier linkages were
significant and negative). That is, if investors demand a positive risk premium
(higher expected return) in the current period for concentration of supplier link-
ages, this places downward pressure on the stock prices of firms with concentrated
supplier bases. If an investor buys a stock at the start of period t, and the firm
that issued the stock subsequently increases the concentration of its supplier base,
the resulting downward pressure on the firm’s stock price will decrease the real-
ized return in period t+ 1 (i.e. it will lower holding period returns).
These results imply that multi-factor models of stock returns should be extended
to include a factor allowing for shocks transmitted via economic linkages. This
factor should reflect the concentration of a firm’s supplier-base, including indi-
rect linkages to suppliers (e.g. firm’s suppliers’ suppliers and so on). Both the
theoretical and empirical results in this thesis suggest that the concentration of
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economic linkages influences whether or not shocks to linked ‘counterparty’ firms
are diversified away, more so than the degree of linkage. Shocks transmitted be-
tween counterparties have already been incorporated into credit risk models. For
example, Jarrow and Yu (2001) show that credit counterparty relationship among
firms influence default probabilities and the term structure of credit spreads; and
they develop a model for pricing credit securities allowing for counterparty rela-
tions. The results in this chapter support the conclusion that factor models of
stock returns should be extended in a similar manner because shocks transmitted
via economic linkages can influence stock prices. Future work could therefore look
at allowing for multiple types of linkages (e.g. credit linkages and/or unobservable
informational linkages) within a multi-factor model of stock returns.
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Table 6.19: The CAPM model fit to the four sets of portfolios (based on degree and
concentration of customer and supplier linkages). *,**,*** indicate sig-
nificance with * for p < .05, ** for p < .01, and *** for p < .001. The
t-statistics are shown in brackets under the coefficients.
Cust Deg P1 P2 P3 P4
MktRF 1.139*** 1.256*** 1.351*** 1.318***
-147.45 -68.35 -55.41 -51.66
cons -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.018***
(-385.09) (-161.97) (-169.88) (-126.57)
R2 0.087 0.098 0.122 0.103
Supp Deg P1 P2 P3 P4
MktRF 1.180*** 1.237*** 1.168*** 1.071***
-157.01 -49.26 -36.00 -30.72
cons -0.018*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.005***
(-432.80) (-72.88) (-33.62) (-25.26)
R2 0.087 0.132 0.150 0.173
Cust Conc P1 P2 P3 P4
MktRF 1.139*** 1.387*** 1.337*** 1.232***
-147.45 -50.63 -53.65 -68.98
cons -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.017***
(-385.09) (-138.04) (-145.17) (-161.75)
R2 0.087 0.117 0.112 0.097
Supp Conc P1 P2 P3 P4
MktRF 1.180*** 1.099*** 1.167*** 1.220***
-157.01 -32.77 -31.32 -49.95
cons -0.018*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.009***
(-432.80) (-27.50) (-30.03) (-71.62)
R2 0.087 0.180 0.150 0.130
Double sorted on linkages and size
CL deg. P1
/ S1
SL deg. P1
/ S1
CL conc.
P1 / S1
SL conc.
P1 / S1
MktRF 1.220*** 0.972*** 0.938*** 0.972***
-49.95 -79.65 -68.11 -79.65
cons -0.009*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.024***
(-71.62) (-358.92) (-329.38) (-358.92)
R2 0.130 0.044 0.040 0.044
CL deg. P4
/ S4
SL deg. P4
/ S4
CL conc.
P4 / S4
SL conc.
P4 / S4
MktRF 1.220*** 1.048*** 1.212*** 1.134***
-49.95 -29.73 -36.57 -41.12
cons -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.013*** -0.006***
(-71.62) (-20.58) (-71.73) (-43.70)
R2 0.130 0.186 0.136 0.160
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Table 6.20: The Fama French model fit to portfolios based on degree/concentration of
customer/supplier linkages and portfolios double-sorted on size. *,**,***
indicate significance with * for p < .05, ** for p < .01, and *** for
p < .001. The t-statistics are shown in brackets under the coefficients.
Cust Deg P1 P2 P3 P4
MktRF 1.066*** 1.138*** 1.200*** 1.182***
-153.51 -66.56 -52.05 -49.87
SMB 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009***
-85.08 -38.51 -28.1 -32.57
HML 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001 0
-17.26 -4.13 -1.53 -1.35
cons -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018***
-347.77 -132.33 -129.85 -90.43
R2 0.103 0.120 0.143 0.130
Supp Deg P1 P2 P3 P4
MktRF 1.088*** 1.174*** 1.146*** 1.077***
-163.42 -49.69 -37.15 -34.66
SMB 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.001*
-103.29 -19.63 -9.65 -2.51
HML 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*
-15.63 -4.85 -5.07 -2.48
cons -0.019*** -0.011*** -0.007*** -0.005***
-399.78 -56.21 -29.79 -21.89
R2 0.106 0.144 0.157 0.174
Cust Conc P1 P2 P3 P4
MktRF 1.066*** 1.230*** 1.189*** 1.120***
-153.51 -48.7 -50.51 -67.68
SMB 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008***
-85.08 -28.51 -31.35 -39.11
HML 0.002*** 0 0.001 0.001***
-17.26 -0.02 -1.66 -5.02
cons -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.017***
-347.77 -103.57 -107.79 -134.47
R2 0.103 0.140 0.136 0.118
Supp Conc P1 P2 P3 P4
MktRF 1.088*** 1.101*** 1.145*** 1.162***
-163.42 -37.52 -32.00 -50.79
SMB 0.007*** 0.001* 0.003*** 0.005***
-103.29 -2.47 -8.86 -19.70
HML 0.002*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.002***
-15.63 -1.93 -4.64 -5.56
cons -0.019*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.011***
-399.78 -24.73 -25.22 -57.74
R2 0.106 0.181 0.157 0.142
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Table 6.21: The Fama French model fit to portfolios based on degree/concentration of
customer/supplier linkages and portfolios double-sorted on size. *,**,***
indicate significance with * for p < .05, ** for p < .01, and *** for
p < .001. The t-statistics are shown under the coefficients.
Double sorted C.Deg1 / S1 S.Deg1 / S1 C.Conc1 / S1 S.Conc1 / S1
MktRF 1.162*** 0.869*** 0.836*** 0.869***
-50.79 -73.89 -62.73 -73.89
SMB 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
-19.7 -55.22 -47.94 -55.22
HML 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
-5.56 -10.96 -8.97 -10.96
cons -0.011*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.025***
-57.74 -269.29 -244.79 -269.29
R2 0.142 0.059 0.055 0.059
C.Deg4 / S4 S.Deg4 / S4 C.Conc4 / S4 S.Conc4 / S4
MktRF 1.162*** 1.056*** 1.125*** 1.103***
-50.79 -34.51 -38.48 -44.58
SMB 0.005*** 0 0.005*** 0.003***
-19.7 -0.97 -13.02 -9.41
HML 0.002*** 0.001 0 0.001**
-5.56 -1.49 -0.69 -2.63
cons -0.011*** -0.004*** -0.013*** -0.007***
-57.74 -18.51 -63.82 -39.34
R2 0.142 0.187 0.149 0.165
209
6.B Cross-sectional robustness checks
6.B Cross-sectional robustness checks
T
a
b
le
6
.2
2
:
A
ve
ra
g
e
sl
op
es
(t
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s)
fr
om
m
on
th
ly
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
lo
g
ex
ce
ss
re
tu
rn
s
on
R
o
ll
in
g
2
y
e
a
r
B
e
ta
,
S
iz
e,
B
o
ok
-
to
-m
a
rk
et
ra
ti
o
(B
T
M
),
L
ev
er
ag
e,
P
ro
fi
t,
d
eg
re
e
of
cu
st
om
er
li
n
ka
ge
,
d
eg
re
e
of
su
p
p
li
er
li
n
ka
ge
,
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
of
cu
st
o
m
er
li
n
ka
ge
,
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
of
su
p
p
li
er
li
n
ka
ge
.
F
o
u
r
po
rt
fo
li
o
s
a
re
fo
rm
ed
.
E
a
ch
se
t
is
fo
rm
ed
ye
a
rl
y
by
so
rt
in
g
o
n
a
m
ea
su
re
o
f
ex
po
su
re
to
tr
a
n
sm
it
te
d
vo
la
ti
li
ty
(o
n
e
o
f:
d
eg
re
e
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
cu
st
o
m
er
s,
d
eg
re
e
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
su
p
p
li
er
s,
co
n
ce
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
cu
st
o
m
er
s,
co
n
ce
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
su
p
p
li
er
s.
F
ir
m
s
w
it
h
n
o
cu
st
o
m
er
(s
u
p
p
li
er
)
li
n
ka
ge
s
a
re
in
G
ro
u
p
1
(P
1
),
a
n
d
th
e
re
m
a
in
in
g
fi
rm
s
a
re
d
iv
id
ed
in
to
th
re
e
gr
o
u
p
s
(P
1
,
P
2
,
P
3
)
co
n
ta
in
in
g
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
o
n
e
ex
po
su
re
a
n
d
th
en
th
o
se
a
bo
ve
a
n
d
be
lo
w
th
e
5
0
’t
h
pe
rc
en
ti
le
o
f
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
m
o
re
th
a
n
o
n
e
ex
po
su
re
.
T
h
e
a
ve
ra
ge
sl
o
pe
is
th
e
ti
m
e
se
ri
es
a
ve
ra
ge
o
f
th
e
m
o
n
th
ly
re
gr
es
si
o
n
sl
o
pe
s
fr
o
m
J
a
n
1
9
9
0
to
D
ec
2
0
1
0
.
C
U
S
T
D
E
G
R
E
E
S
U
P
P
D
E
G
R
E
E
P
1
P
2
P
3
P
4
P
1
P
2
P
3
P
4
B
e
ta
(2
y
r)
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
-0
.7
4
-0
.5
3
-0
.3
-0
.5
7
-0
.7
1
-0
.5
1
-0
.8
9
-0
.2
2
S
iz
e
0.
00
0*
**
0.
00
0*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-3
.4
9
-2
.0
6
-0
.9
6
-1
.6
2
-4
.2
4
-0
.4
1
-0
.1
4
-1
.3
3
B
T
M
0.
00
1
0.
00
2
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.8
4
-1
.5
5
-1
.8
7
-1
.1
6
-1
.0
1
-0
.6
8
-0
.1
6
-1
.0
8
L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
-0
.0
00
*
0.
00
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-2
.1
7
-0
.2
5
-1
.1
9
0
.0
0
-1
.7
9
-0
.1
9
-0
.2
8
-0
.6
7
P
ro
fi
t
0.
00
2*
**
0.
00
2*
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-3
.4
6
-2
.3
8
-0
.9
7
-0
.4
8
-3
.5
5
-1
.8
8
-0
.1
8
-0
.3
5
C
u
st
D
e
g
-0
.0
04
0.
00
1
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
0
-1
.2
0
-0
.2
9
-0
.6
0
-0
.2
5
-0
.6
2
-0
.8
7
-1
.2
3
-0
.0
2
S
u
p
p
D
e
g
0.
00
0
-0
.0
04
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
9
*
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
0
-0
.9
4
-1
.9
6
-0
.0
4
-0
.7
5
-0
.4
7
-2
.0
4
-0
.7
8
-0
.7
8
C
u
st
C
o
n
c
-0
.0
02
0.
00
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
-1
.0
7
-0
.1
2
-0
.1
-0
.2
8
-0
.5
9
-0
.2
4
-1
.2
6
-1
.2
3
S
u
p
p
C
o
n
c
0.
00
5*
**
0.
00
5*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
-4
.1
9
-2
.3
7
-0
.3
-0
.9
6
-0
.0
3
-1
.1
-0
.6
9
-0
.4
2
c
o
n
s
0.
00
0
-0
.0
03
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
4
-0
.6
4
-0
.2
7
-1
.2
5
-1
.0
1
-1
.0
9
-0
.4
1
-0
.2
9
R
2
7.
5%
9.
9%
1
4
.9
%
1
1
.4
%
7
.3
%
1
3
.9
%
1
8
.3
%
2
0
.2
%
210
6.B Cross-sectional robustness checks
T
a
b
le
6
.2
3
:
A
ve
ra
g
e
sl
op
es
(t
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s)
fr
om
m
on
th
ly
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
lo
g
ex
ce
ss
re
tu
rn
s
on
R
o
ll
in
g
2
y
e
a
r
B
e
ta
,
S
iz
e,
B
o
ok
-
to
-m
ar
ke
t
ra
ti
o
(B
T
M
),
L
ev
er
ag
e,
P
ro
fi
t,
d
eg
re
e
of
cu
st
om
er
li
n
ka
ge
,
d
eg
re
e
of
su
p
p
li
er
li
n
ka
ge
,
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
o
f
cu
st
o
m
er
li
n
ka
g
e,
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
of
su
p
p
li
er
li
n
ka
ge
.
F
o
u
r
po
rt
fo
li
o
s
a
re
fo
rm
ed
.
E
a
ch
se
t
is
fo
rm
ed
ye
a
rl
y
by
so
rt
in
g
o
n
a
m
ea
su
re
o
f
ex
po
su
re
to
tr
a
n
sm
it
te
d
vo
la
ti
li
ty
(o
n
e
o
f:
d
eg
re
e
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
cu
st
o
m
er
s,
d
eg
re
e
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
su
p
p
li
er
s,
co
n
ce
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
cu
st
o
m
er
s,
co
n
ce
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
su
p
p
li
er
s.
F
ir
m
s
w
it
h
n
o
cu
st
o
m
er
(s
u
p
p
li
er
)
li
n
ka
ge
s
a
re
in
G
ro
u
p
1
(P
1
),
a
n
d
th
e
re
m
a
in
in
g
fi
rm
s
a
re
d
iv
id
ed
in
to
th
re
e
gr
o
u
p
s
(P
1
,
P
2
,
P
3
)
co
n
ta
in
in
g
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
o
n
e
ex
po
su
re
a
n
d
th
en
th
o
se
a
bo
ve
a
n
d
be
lo
w
th
e
5
0
’t
h
pe
rc
en
ti
le
o
f
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
m
o
re
th
a
n
o
n
e
ex
po
su
re
.
T
h
e
a
ve
ra
ge
sl
o
pe
is
th
e
ti
m
e
se
ri
es
a
ve
ra
ge
o
f
th
e
m
o
n
th
ly
re
gr
es
si
o
n
sl
o
pe
s
fr
o
m
J
a
n
1
9
9
0
to
D
ec
2
0
1
0
.
C
U
S
T
C
O
N
C
S
U
P
P
C
O
N
C
P
1
P
2
P
3
P
4
P
1
P
2
P
3
P
4
B
e
ta
(2
y
r)
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
2
0
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.7
4
-0
.5
6
-0
.3
-0
.5
6
-0
.7
1
-0
.0
3
-0
.8
6
-0
.5
9
S
iz
e
0.
00
0*
**
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
*
0
.0
0
0
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-3
.4
9
-1
.3
9
-1
.2
9
-2
.1
6
-4
.2
4
-1
.3
5
-0
.1
7
-0
.3
1
B
T
M
0.
00
1
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
3
*
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
-0
.8
4
-1
.2
1
-2
.0
2
-1
.5
1
-1
.0
1
-1
.1
2
-0
.5
8
-0
.7
4
L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
-0
.0
00
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-2
.1
7
-0
.8
8
-0
.4
-0
.7
1
-1
.7
9
-0
.2
2
-0
.3
2
-0
.3
1
P
ro
fi
t
0.
00
2*
**
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
2
-3
.4
6
-0
.1
5
-0
.9
3
-2
.5
1
-3
.5
5
-0
.4
8
-0
.0
2
-1
.7
9
C
u
st
D
e
g
-0
.0
04
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
2
-1
.2
0
-0
.7
7
0
.0
0
-0
.5
4
-0
.6
2
-0
.3
2
-0
.9
9
-0
.7
6
S
u
p
p
D
e
g
0.
00
0
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
8
*
-0
.9
4
-0
.5
8
-0
.5
-1
.8
9
-0
.4
7
-0
.7
3
0
-2
.1
C
u
st
C
o
n
c
-0
.0
02
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
0
-1
.0
7
-0
.5
7
-0
.5
3
-0
.1
9
-0
.5
9
-0
.3
9
-1
.0
8
-0
.0
2
S
u
p
p
C
o
n
c
0.
00
5*
**
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
4
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
2
-4
.1
9
-0
.0
8
-1
.7
8
-2
.2
2
-0
.0
3
-0
.2
0
-1
.7
2
-1
.0
2
c
o
n
s
0.
00
0
-0
.0
0
7
-0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
8
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
4
-1
.4
0
-0
.8
8
-1
.0
0
-1
.0
1
-0
.6
2
-0
.3
5
-1
.0
8
R
2
7.
5%
1
1
.8
%
1
2
.0
%
9
.9
%
7
.3
%
1
9
.7
%
2
0
.6
%
1
3
.7
%
211
6.B Cross-sectional robustness checks
T
a
b
le
6
.2
5
:
A
ve
ra
g
e
sl
o
p
es
(t
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s)
fr
om
m
on
th
ly
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
e
x
c
e
ss
re
tu
rn
s
on
B
et
a,
S
iz
e,
B
o
ok
-t
o-
m
ar
ke
t
ra
ti
o
(B
T
M
),
L
ev
er
ag
e,
P
ro
fi
t,
d
eg
re
e
of
cu
st
om
er
li
n
ka
ge
,
d
eg
re
e
of
su
p
p
li
er
li
n
ka
ge
,
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
of
cu
st
om
er
li
n
ka
ge
,
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
o
f
su
p
p
li
er
li
n
ka
ge
.
F
o
r
se
t
o
f
po
rt
fo
li
o
s
a
re
fo
rm
ed
.
E
a
ch
se
t
is
fo
rm
ed
ye
a
rl
y
by
so
rt
in
g
o
n
a
m
ea
su
re
o
f
ex
po
su
re
to
tr
a
n
sm
it
te
d
vo
la
ti
li
ty
(o
n
e
o
f:
d
eg
re
e
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
cu
st
o
m
er
s,
d
eg
re
e
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
su
p
p
li
er
s,
co
n
ce
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
cu
st
o
m
er
s,
co
n
ce
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
su
p
p
li
er
s.
F
ir
m
s
w
it
h
n
o
cu
st
o
m
er
(s
u
p
p
li
er
)
li
n
ka
ge
s
a
re
in
G
ro
u
p
1
(P
1
),
a
n
d
th
e
re
m
a
in
in
g
fi
rm
s
a
re
d
iv
id
ed
in
to
th
re
e
gr
o
u
p
s
(P
1
,
P
2
,
P
3
)
co
n
ta
in
in
g
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
o
n
e
ex
po
su
re
a
n
d
th
en
th
o
se
a
bo
ve
a
n
d
be
lo
w
th
e
5
0
’t
h
pe
rc
en
ti
le
o
f
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
m
o
re
th
a
n
o
n
e
ex
po
su
re
.
T
h
e
a
ve
ra
ge
sl
o
pe
is
th
e
ti
m
e
se
ri
es
a
ve
ra
ge
o
f
th
e
m
o
n
th
ly
re
gr
es
si
o
n
sl
o
pe
s
fr
o
m
J
a
n
1
9
9
0
to
D
ec
2
0
1
0
.
C
U
S
T
C
O
N
C
S
U
P
P
C
O
N
C
P
1
P
2
P
3
P
4
P
1
P
2
P
3
P
4
B
e
ta
0.
00
2
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
-0
.6
6
-1
.1
-1
.2
2
-0
.9
8
-0
.7
7
-0
.4
1
-0
.3
9
-0
.4
8
S
iz
e
0.
00
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-0
.8
6
-0
.2
8
-0
.0
6
-0
.5
9
-0
.8
2
-0
.3
3
-1
.3
4
-1
.4
3
B
T
M
0.
00
1*
0.
0
0
4
*
0
.0
0
3
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
0
.0
0
1
*
0
0
0
.0
0
3
*
-2
.3
8
-2
.4
-2
.0
1
-2
.9
4
-2
.5
9
-0
.1
7
-0
.0
8
-2
.2
9
L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
-0
.0
00
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-2
.1
5
-0
.9
8
-0
.5
2
-1
.0
3
-0
.5
8
-0
.9
-0
.2
4
-0
.4
2
P
ro
fi
t
0.
00
2*
**
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
3
*
*
&
-3
.4
6
-0
.8
2
-1
.4
3
-1
.5
-3
.2
1
-0
.4
8
-1
.0
6
-2
.8
7
C
u
st
D
e
g
-0
.0
01
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
8
-0
.0
0
5
-0
.4
2
-0
.2
8
-0
.3
9
-0
.3
7
-0
.6
4
-0
.8
9
-1
.2
7
-1
.8
8
S
u
p
p
D
e
g
0.
00
0
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
1
3
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
5
-0
.3
9
-0
.4
4
-1
.6
7
-0
.0
2
-1
.6
1
-0
.4
8
-0
.4
1
-1
.2
4
C
u
st
C
o
n
c
0.
00
0
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
4
-0
.2
7
-0
.4
9
-0
.1
5
-0
.3
3
-1
.2
3
-0
.4
-1
.0
7
-1
.8
6
S
u
p
p
C
o
n
c
0.
00
3*
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
0
-2
.0
5
-0
.4
3
-1
.7
1
-1
.4
1
-1
.2
1
-0
.0
2
-1
.4
4
-0
.3
0
c
o
n
s
0.
00
3
-0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
1
3
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
2
-0
.7
2
-0
.9
2
-0
.7
6
-0
.2
5
-1
.4
9
-1
.6
8
-0
.0
1
-0
.3
8
R
2
3.
9%
7
.9
%
7
.6
%
6
.1
%
3
.8
%
1
6
.3
%
1
7
.2
%
9
.9
%
212
6.B Cross-sectional robustness checks
T
a
b
le
6
.2
4
:
A
ve
ra
g
e
sl
o
p
es
(t
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s)
fr
om
m
on
th
ly
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
e
x
c
e
ss
re
tu
rn
s
on
B
et
a,
S
iz
e,
B
o
ok
-t
o-
m
ar
ke
t
ra
ti
o
(B
T
M
),
L
ev
er
ag
e,
P
ro
fi
t,
d
eg
re
e
of
cu
st
om
er
li
n
ka
ge
,
d
eg
re
e
of
su
p
p
li
er
li
n
ka
ge
,
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
of
cu
st
om
er
li
n
ka
ge
,
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
o
f
su
p
p
li
er
li
n
ka
ge
.
F
o
r
se
t
o
f
po
rt
fo
li
o
s
a
re
fo
rm
ed
.
E
a
ch
se
t
is
fo
rm
ed
ye
a
rl
y
by
so
rt
in
g
o
n
a
m
ea
su
re
o
f
ex
po
su
re
to
tr
a
n
sm
it
te
d
vo
la
ti
li
ty
(o
n
e
o
f:
d
eg
re
e
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
cu
st
o
m
er
s,
d
eg
re
e
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
su
p
p
li
er
s,
co
n
ce
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
cu
st
o
m
er
s,
co
n
ce
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
su
p
p
li
er
s.
F
ir
m
s
w
it
h
n
o
cu
st
o
m
er
(s
u
p
p
li
er
)
li
n
ka
ge
s
a
re
in
G
ro
u
p
1
(P
1
),
a
n
d
th
e
re
m
a
in
in
g
fi
rm
s
a
re
d
iv
id
ed
in
to
th
re
e
gr
o
u
p
s
(P
1
,
P
2
,
P
3
)
co
n
ta
in
in
g
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
o
n
e
ex
po
su
re
a
n
d
th
en
th
o
se
a
bo
ve
a
n
d
be
lo
w
th
e
5
0
’t
h
pe
rc
en
ti
le
o
f
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
m
o
re
th
a
n
o
n
e
ex
po
su
re
.
T
h
e
a
ve
ra
ge
sl
o
pe
is
th
e
ti
m
e
se
ri
es
a
ve
ra
ge
o
f
th
e
m
o
n
th
ly
re
gr
es
si
o
n
sl
o
pe
s
fr
o
m
J
a
n
1
9
9
0
to
D
ec
2
0
1
0
.
C
U
S
T
D
E
G
R
E
E
S
U
P
P
D
E
G
R
E
E
P
1
P
2
P
3
P
4
P
1
P
2
P
3
P
4
B
e
ta
0.
00
2
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
-0
.6
6
-0
.9
8
-1
.4
9
-1
.0
1
-0
.7
7
-0
.5
-0
.3
8
-0
.5
S
iz
e
0.
00
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-0
.8
6
-0
.7
5
-0
.0
7
-0
.2
2
-0
.8
2
-1
.2
9
-1
.8
1
-0
.0
3
B
T
M
0.
00
1*
0.
0
0
3
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
*
0
.0
0
3
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
-2
.3
8
-2
.6
0
-2
.8
7
-1
.5
3
-2
.5
9
-2
.1
8
-0
.2
2
-0
.2
7
L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
-0
.0
00
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-2
.1
5
-0
.4
9
-0
.3
1
-0
.1
1
-0
.5
8
-0
.3
2
-0
.3
8
-1
.5
7
P
ro
fi
t
0.
00
2*
**
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
&
-3
.4
6
-1
.5
1
-1
.3
5
-1
.2
3
-3
.2
1
-2
.8
7
-0
.7
7
-0
.6
8
C
u
st
D
e
g
-0
.0
01
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
6
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.4
2
-0
.4
6
-0
.5
3
-0
.2
8
-0
.6
4
-1
.9
3
-1
.3
0
-0
.9
8
S
u
p
p
D
e
g
0.
00
0
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
6
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
1
3
0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
-0
.3
9
-0
.6
3
-0
.8
7
-0
.3
0
-1
.6
1
-0
.7
5
-0
.5
7
-0
.6
0
C
u
st
C
o
n
c
0.
00
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
0
-0
.2
7
-0
.1
9
-0
.4
9
-0
.8
-1
.2
3
-1
.9
3
-0
.9
1
0
S
u
p
p
C
o
n
c
0.
00
3*
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
-2
.0
5
-1
.6
9
-0
.7
-0
.4
-1
.2
1
-0
.1
3
-0
.1
9
-0
.3
1
c
o
n
s
0.
00
3
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
5
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
1
3
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
7
-0
.7
2
-0
.0
3
-0
.4
1
-0
.3
6
-1
.4
9
-0
.6
2
-0
.4
4
-1
.5
1
R
2
3.
9%
6
.1
%
1
0
.3
%
7
.6
%
3
.8
%
1
0
.2
%
1
5
.2
%
1
6
.6
%
213
6.B Cross-sectional robustness checks
T
a
b
le
6
.2
7
:
A
ve
ra
g
e
sl
o
p
es
(t
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s)
fr
om
m
on
th
ly
re
gr
es
si
on
s
of
lo
g
ex
ce
ss
re
tu
rn
s
on
F
a
m
a
F
re
n
ch
th
re
e
fa
c
to
r
b
e
ta
s,
S
iz
e,
B
o
o
k
-t
o
-m
a
rk
et
ra
ti
o
(B
T
M
),
L
ev
er
ag
e,
P
ro
fi
t,
d
eg
re
e
of
cu
st
om
er
li
n
ka
ge
,
d
eg
re
e
of
su
p
p
li
er
li
n
ka
ge
,
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
o
f
cu
st
om
er
li
n
ka
ge
,
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
of
su
p
p
li
er
li
n
ka
ge
an
d
id
io
sy
n
c
ra
ti
c
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
.
F
o
r
se
t
o
f
po
rt
fo
li
o
s
a
re
fo
rm
ed
.
E
a
ch
se
t
is
fo
rm
ed
ye
a
rl
y
by
so
rt
in
g
o
n
a
m
ea
su
re
o
f
ex
po
su
re
to
tr
a
n
sm
it
te
d
vo
la
ti
li
ty
(o
n
e
o
f:
d
eg
re
e
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
cu
st
o
m
er
s,
d
eg
re
e
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
su
p
p
li
er
s,
co
n
ce
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
cu
st
o
m
er
s,
co
n
ce
n
tr
a
ti
o
n
o
f
to
ta
l
li
n
ka
ge
to
su
p
p
li
er
s.
F
ir
m
s
w
it
h
n
o
cu
st
o
m
er
(s
u
p
p
li
er
)
li
n
ka
ge
s
a
re
in
G
ro
u
p
1
(P
1
),
a
n
d
th
e
re
m
a
in
in
g
fi
rm
s
a
re
d
iv
id
ed
in
to
th
re
e
gr
o
u
p
s
(P
1
,
P
2
,
P
3
)
co
n
ta
in
in
g
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
o
n
e
ex
po
su
re
a
n
d
th
en
th
o
se
a
bo
ve
a
n
d
be
lo
w
th
e
5
0
’t
h
pe
rc
en
ti
le
o
f
fi
rm
s
w
it
h
m
o
re
th
a
n
o
n
e
ex
po
su
re
.
T
h
e
a
ve
ra
ge
sl
o
pe
is
th
e
ti
m
e
se
ri
es
a
ve
ra
ge
o
f
th
e
m
o
n
th
ly
re
gr
es
si
o
n
sl
o
pe
s
fr
o
m
J
a
n
1
9
9
0
to
D
ec
2
0
1
0
.
C
U
S
T
C
O
N
C
S
U
P
P
C
O
N
C
P
1
P
2
P
3
P
4
P
1
P
2
P
3
P
4
B
e
ta
M
k
t
0.
00
1
0.
00
1
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
-0
.3
9
-0
.3
2
-0
.6
6
-0
.5
2
-0
.4
1
(-
0
.1
9
)
(-
0
.7
9
)
-0
.2
3
B
e
ta
S
M
B
-0
.0
90
-0
.1
5
1
-0
.1
9
6
-0
.1
6
2
-0
.0
7
4
-0
.4
5
6
-0
.3
1
3
-0
.5
1
4
(-
0.
39
)
(-
0.
54
)
(-
0
.7
3
)
(-
0
.6
7
)
(-
0
.3
2
)
(-
1
.4
1
)
(-
1
.0
5
)
(-
1
.9
0
)
B
e
ta
H
M
L
-0
.0
24
-0
.0
9
8
-0
.1
1
9
0
.1
9
4
0
.0
0
9
-0
.3
6
8
-0
.3
1
6
-0
.1
6
5
(-
0.
10
)
(-
0.
36
)
(-
0
.4
5
)
-0
.8
1
-0
.0
4
(-
1
.1
9
)
(-
1
.0
9
)
(-
0
.6
2
)
S
iz
e
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
*
-0
.2
4
(-
0.
56
)
(-
0
.4
3
)
(-
0
.3
9
)
-0
.7
9
(-
0
.8
2
)
(-
1
.7
4
)
(-
2
.4
9
)
B
T
M
0.
00
1*
0.
00
2
0
.0
0
4
*
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
*
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
4
*
-2
.2
5
-1
.0
6
-2
.2
5
-1
.3
6
-2
.0
8
-1
.1
8
-1
.4
5
-2
.1
4
L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
-0
.0
00
*
0.
00
1
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
(-
2.
29
)
-1
.8
2
-0
.0
6
(-
1
.0
8
)
(-
2
.0
5
)
-0
.3
5
(-
0
.0
8
)
-0
.5
5
P
ro
fi
t
0.
00
2*
**
0.
00
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
*
0
.0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
*
*
-3
.6
4
-0
.4
7
-0
.7
7
-2
.1
-3
.3
7
-1
.0
7
-0
.9
6
-2
.6
6
C
u
st
D
e
g
-0
.0
03
0.
00
1
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
8
0
.0
0
0
(-
0.
79
)
-0
.3
9
(-
0
.2
4
)
-0
.2
5
-0
.0
4
(-
0
.7
0
)
-1
.3
3
(-
0
.1
7
)
S
u
p
p
D
e
g
0.
00
0
0.
00
3
-0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
6
(-
0.
32
)
-1
.0
4
(-
0
.9
7
)
(-
0
.3
4
)
(-
0
.3
5
)
(-
0
.6
5
)
-0
.0
1
-1
.5
5
C
u
st
C
o
n
c
0.
00
0
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
0
(-
0.
03
)
(-
0.
28
)
(-
1
.0
4
)
(-
0
.6
1
)
-1
.5
0
(-
0
.5
9
)
(-
1
.0
8
)
-0
.2
0
S
u
p
p
C
o
n
c
0.
00
2*
-0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
0
1
-2
.3
8
(-
1.
78
)
-1
.2
2
-0
.6
9
(-
0
.0
3
)
-0
.6
1
(-
1
.2
3
)
(-
0
.6
4
)
V
a
r(
R
i)
-0
.4
57
**
*
-0
.3
52
**
*
-0
.3
1
8
*
*
*
-0
.2
7
3
*
*
*
-0
.4
2
3
*
*
*
-0
.1
1
0
-0
.0
9
1
-0
.3
2
8
*
*
*
(-
11
.9
9)
(-
6.
19
)
(-
5
.3
3
)
(-
5
.1
1
)
(-
1
1
.4
0
)
(-
0
.7
6
)
(-
0
.7
0
)
(-
4
.5
8
)
c
o
n
s
0.
00
6
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
2
-0
.0
0
1
-1
.5
8
(-
0.
34
)
-0
.8
5
(-
0
.0
0
)
-0
.6
1
-1
.0
4
-0
.2
6
(-
0
.2
2
)
R
2
7.
8%
13
.4
%
1
3
.0
%
1
0
.4
%
7
.3
%
2
4
.0
%
2
4
.8
%
1
5
.8
%
214
6.B Cross-sectional robustness checks
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6.C Times series model with lagged linkages
6.C Times series model with lagged linkages
Table 6.28: Time series model for portfolios sorted on the degree of exposure to trans-
mitted shocks from customers.*,**,*** indicate significance with * for
p < .05, ** for p < .01, and *** for p < .001. The t-statistics are shown
under the coefficients.
CUST DEG
P1 P2 P3 P4
MktRF 1.000*** 1.062*** 1.130*** 1.131***
-127.74 -53.99 -44.73 -43.29
SMB 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008***
-68.19 -30.05 -22.92 -27.05
HML 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002***
-30.84 -9.42 -5.64 -5.83
Size -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000** -0.000**
-5.58 -2.42 -2.80 -2.62
BTM 0.003 0.005 0.006** 0.000
-1.47 -1.84 -3.04 -0.26
BidAsk 0.003*** 0.003 0.008* 0.014***
-3.67 -1.02 -2.27 -4.43
Leverage 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
-8.81 -1.29 -0.79 -1.63
Trade Credit 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
-0.82 -0.98 -0.91 -0.46
Profit 0.007*** 0.007** 0.005 0.011***
-6.13 -2.81 -0.95 -3.33
Cust Deg 0.000 0.000 -0.032 0.001
0.00 0.00 -1.40 -0.43
Supp Deg 0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.007
-0.81 -0.08 -0.27 -1.31
Cust Conc 0.000 0.000 -0.050* -0.011
0.00 0.00 -2.30 -0.94
Supp Conc 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001
-1.14 -0.65 -0.36 -0.2
L.Cust Deg -0.005 0.003 -0.004 -0.003
-1.35 -0.67 -0.93 -1.32
L.Supp Deg -0.001 -0.008 -0.008 0.004
-1.23 -1.75 -1.11 -1.09
L.Cust Conc 0.006*** -0.008*** -0.005 0.006
-3.81 -4.4 -1.42 -1.56
L.Supp Conc -0.003** -0.007* 0.000 -0.008*
-2.61 -2.41 -0.03 -2.28
D.Var(MktRF) -32.266*** -34.569*** -32.206*** -30.191***
-29.77 -11.83 -9.37 -7.52
L.Var(MktRF) -0.669*** -1.289* -1.961** -2.418***
-3.48 -2.37 -2.91 -3.38
D.Var(Ri) 5.907*** 6.870*** 6.410*** 5.489***
-39.58 -21.55 -14.04 -13.09
L.Var(Ri) 0.041 0.136* 0.258*** 0.093
-1.78 -2.53 -3.32 -1.37
Cons -0.016*** -0.014 0.069 -0.018
-4.18 -1.71 -1.56 -1.6
R2 12.80% 14.50% 17.30% 14.60%
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6.C Times series model with lagged linkages
Table 6.29: Time series model for portfolios sorted on the degree of exposure to
transmitted shocks from suppliers.*,**,*** indicate significance with *
for p < .05, ** for p < .01, and *** for p < .001. The t-statistics are
shown under the coefficients.
SUPP DEG
P1 P2 P3 P4
MktRF 1.015*** 1.131*** 1.125*** 1.074***
-135.27 -44.40 -33.72 -31.72
SMB 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.001
-83.46 -15.57 -7.17 -1.50
HML 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*
-32.30 -6.41 -4.88 -1.99
Size -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000**
-7.43 -5.05 -3.87 -3.24
BTM 0.000 0.000 0.009* 0.015***
-0.84 -0.02 -2.03 -4.07
BidAsk 0.004*** 0.001 0.009** 0.001
-5.24 -1.48 -2.69 -0.76
Leverage 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
-5.09 -0.19 -1.44 -1.38
Trade Credit 0.000 0.004* -0.015 0.002
-0.25 -2.26 -1.24 -0.42
Profit 0.008*** 0.002 0.005 0.007*
-7.36 -0.57 -1.12 -2.01
Cust Deg -0.001 -0.009 -0.001 -0.007*
-0.85 -1.60 -0.10 -2.58
Supp Deg 0.000 0.000 -0.016 0.002*
0.00 0.00 -1.15 -2.29
Cust Conc 0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004
-0.86 -1.36 -0.53 -0.88
Supp Conc 0.000 0.000 -0.016 0.015
0 0 -1.08 -1.14
L.Cust Deg -0.002 0.004 0.006 0.005
-1.36 -0.75 -0.98 -1.23
L.Supp Deg 0 0.005 -0.002 -0.003**
-0.06 -1.01 -0.42 -2.68
L.Cust Conc 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0
-0.94 -0.32 -0.26 -0.03
L.Supp Conc -0.003 -0.007*** -0.004 -0.006
-1.54 -3.45 -1.19 -0.72
D.Var(MktRF) -34.265*** -25.303*** -16.372*** -5.65
-32.87 -6.82 -4.42 -1.5
L.Var(MktRF) -0.476** -0.323 -2.304*** -2.326***
-2.97 -0.53 -3.59 -4.83
D.Var(Ri) 6.125*** 4.268*** 3.624*** 1.686
-49.11 -6.06 -3.7 -0.85
L.Var(Ri) 0.049** -0.025 0.252 0.276
-2.76 -0.22 -1.75 -1.85
Cons -0.018* 0 0.022 -0.016
-2.39 -0.05 -0.73 -1.88
R2 13.10% 16.40% 17.60% 19.00%
AIC -651,543 -65,986 -44,068 -52,620
BIC -651,325 -65,818 -43,894 -52,446
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Table 6.30: Time series model for portfolios sorted on the concentration of exposure
to transmitted shocks from customers.*,**,*** indicate significance with
* for p < .05, ** for p < .01, and *** for p < .001. The t-statistics are
shown under the coefficients.
CUST CONC
P1 P2 P3 P4
MktRF 1.000*** 1.185*** 1.125*** 1.040***
-127.74 -43.06 -43.43 -55.1
SMB 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007***
-68.19 -23.27 -25.65 -30.61
HML 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003***
-30.84 -4.39 -5.72 -10.32
Size -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000**
-5.58 -2.87 -2.74 -2.78
BTM 0.003 0.000 0.009*** 0.004*
-1.47 -0.48 -4.27 -2.51
BidAsk 0.003*** 0.016** 0.008* 0.003
-3.67 -3.26 -2.51 -1.03
Leverage 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
-8.81 -1.37 -0.79 -1.41
Trade Credit 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
-0.82 -0.03 -0.96 -0.99
Profit 0.007*** 0.010** 0.005 0.007**
-6.13 -2.9 -1.01 -2.9
Cust Deg 0.000 -0.002 0.003 0.001
0.00 -0.69 -0.69 -0.21
Supp Deg 0.001 -0.005 0.000 0.000
-0.81 -0.91 -0.01 -0.13
Cust Conc 0.000 -0.025 -0.008 0.000
0.00 -1.32 -0.39 0.00
Supp Conc 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
-1.14 -0.54 -0.03 -0.57
L.Cust Deg -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 0.003
-1.35 -0.69 -1.54 -0.66
L.Supp Deg -0.001 0.008* -0.008 -0.008
-1.23 -2.15 -1.29 -1.95
L.Cust Conc 0.006*** 0.007 -0.003 -0.008***
-3.81 -1.35 -0.74 -4.33
L.Supp Conc -0.003** -0.011** 0.004 -0.007*
-2.61 -2.88 -0.81 -2.46
D.Var(MktRF) -32.266*** -28.112*** -34.430*** -34.094***
-29.77 -6.85 -9.61 -12.24
L.Var(MktRF) -0.669*** -2.556*** -1.664* -1.297**
-3.48 -3.64 -2.55 -2.69
D.Var(Ri) 5.907*** 5.706*** 6.044*** 6.867***
-39.58 -12.81 -13.77 -21.96
L.Var(Ri) 0.041 0.092 0.178* 0.138**
-1.78 -1.29 -2.41 -2.67
Cons -0.016*** -0.01 -0.008 -0.015
-4.18 -0.65 -0.46 -1.92
R2 12.80% 15.90% 16.30% 14.40%
AIC -622,813 -42,612 -50,657 -91,026
BIC -622,597 -42,428 -50,471 -90,837
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Table 6.31: Time series model for portfolios sorted on the concentration of exposure
to transmitted shocks from supplies.*,**,*** indicate significance with *
for p < .05, ** for p < .01, and *** for p < .001. The t-statistics are
shown under the coefficients.
SUPP CONC
P1 P2 P3 P4
MktRF 1.015*** 1.099*** 1.116*** 1.122***
-135.27 -33.74 -29.36 -45.28
SMB 0.007*** 0 0.002*** 0.005***
-83.46 -1.13 -6.36 -15.91
HML 0.003*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.003***
-32.3 -1.46 -4.39 -7.21
Size -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
-7.43 -3.36 -4.12 -5.22
BTM 0.000 0.013*** 0.007 0.000
-0.84 -3.34 -1.58 -0.08
BidAsk 0.004*** 0.001 0.010** 0.001
-5.24 -0.81 -3.25 -1.45
Leverage 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000* 0.000
-5.09 -1.06 -2.06 -0.14
Trade Credit 0.000 0.001 -0.018 0.004*
-0.25 -0.3 -1.28 -2.19
Profit 0.008*** 0.007* 0.004 0.002
-7.36 -2.09 -0.81 -0.59
Cust Deg -0.001 -0.007** 0.005 -0.010
-0.85 -2.99 -0.70 -1.84
Supp Deg 0.000 0.002* -0.001 -0.005
0 -2.4 -0.14 -0.57
Cust Conc 0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005
-0.86 -0.78 -0.86 -1.18
Supp Conc 0.000 0.014 -0.004 0.000
0 -1.15 -0.21 0
L.Cust Deg -0.002 0.006 0.003 0.007
-1.36 -1.52 -0.52 -1.18
L.Supp Deg 0 -0.003** 0.002 0.004
-0.06 -2.74 -0.64 -0.83
L.Cust Conc 0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.002
-0.94 -0.43 -0.61 -0.54
L.Supp Conc -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.006**
-1.54 -0.48 -1.05 -3.26
D.Var(MktRF) -34.265*** -4.894 -14.382*** -25.262***
-32.87 -1.27 -3.53 -7.21
L.Var(MktRF) -0.476** -2.198*** -3.036*** -0.329
-2.97 -4.37 -4.06 -0.58
D.Var(Ri) 6.125*** 0.272 4.058*** 4.337***
-49.11 -0.13 -4.06 -6.28
L.Var(Ri) 0.049** 0.264 0.277 -0.039
-2.76 -1.85 -1.71 -0.35
Cons -0.018* -0.016* -0.012 0.006
-2.39 -2.21 -0.5 -0.5
R2 13.10% 19.80% 17.10% 16.40%
AIC -651,543 -56,392 -36,935 -69,794
BIC -651,325 -56,217 -36,764 -69,616
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6.D Robust estimation
In addition, financial time-series may exhibit heteroscedasticity, auto-correlation
and firm and/or time effects which may bias the estimates of the coefficient stan-
dard errors(Petersen, 2009). This can lead to incorrect inference. Therefore, I
estimate the time-series models, for single and double sorted portfolios using es-
timators that are robust to heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation. In order to
estimate the parameters of (6.6) I use panel least squares and GMM estimation.
Panel regression models allowing for both the cross-sectional and the time-series
structure of the data. They produce more efficient estimates of the parameters
in (6.6) than cross-sectional techniques because the variance of the parameter
estimates decreases as the length of the data sample increases (Ang, Liu, and
Schwarz, 2008). Furthermore, cross-sectional techniques (such as the three-step
approach devised by Fama and MacBeth (1973)) can produce biased coefficient
estimates in the presence of firm fixed effects (Thompson, 2011; Petersen, 2009).
In contrast, the coefficient estimates from panel OLS will be consistent (but not
always efficient) so long as the error terms are uncorrelated with the explanatory
variables. Correlation within the error terms can lead to bias in the estimates of
the standard error of coefficients, but several robust estimates of standard errors
within panels control for both firm fixed effects and time effects in the residuals
(i.e. correlation in the residuals across time and across firms) (Thompson, 2011;
Petersen, 2009). Therefore, these models provide better estimates of coefficients
and standard errors than cross-sectional techniques.
As in Thompson (2011), correlation between the error terms can take three gen-
eral forms: firm effects (corr(εitεis) 6= 0), time effects (corr(εitεjt) 6= 0) and/or
persistent common shocks (corr(εisεjt) 6= 0). To understand these effects it helps
to consider the general data generating process for the errors:
εit = θ
′
igt + ηit + µit (6.8)
ηit = φηi,t−1 + it (6.9)
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where gt is a vector of random factors common to all firms, θi is a vector of factor
loadings specific to firm i, µit and it are random shocks, uncorrelated across firms
and across time, and ηit generates firm effects.
Common factors, if unmodelled, produce clustering of the error term across linked
firms. That is, linkages between firms cause their outcomes to be correlated due
to mutual exposure to each others (macro and idiosyncratic) shocks. Many stud-
ies do not allow for this source of correlation at all. If linkages are ignored in the
set of common factors f , it is likely that errors are cross-sectionally correlated
(across linked firms) in a given time period. Furthermore if there is a lag in the
transmission of shocks through linkages, the errors may be correlated across firms
and across time periods. Failing to account for these effects will lead to incor-
rect estimates of standard errors and may lead to incorrect statistical inference
about the statistical significance of factors explaining returns (Thompson, 2011).
Therefore, as discussed below I ensure the tests are robust to all three sources of
bias in standard errors25.
Petersen (2009) shows that if residuals are independent across time but corre-
lated across firms and if the factors are correlated across time or across firms,
then the OLS standard errors of estimates of factor loadings will understate the
true standard error, and the covariates and errors may exhibit both serial cor-
relation (a firm effect) and cross-sectional dependence (a time effect). In (6.6)
inter-firm linkages would create cross-sectional dependence in the residual returns.
In addition, residual returns may also exhibit serial correlation. The estimated
standard errors of parameters may be significantly biased when both the covari-
ates and errors are dependent across firms and/or time. To address this problem
I compare the robustness of different estimators of the standard errors in 6.5.
None of the estimators reviewed is robust to persistent time effects26, the bias as-
sociated with persistent time effects disappears as T increases (Thompson, 2011).
25 Using time dummies will not address this bias as time dummies are likely to be correlated
with macro covariates (which will cause s.e. to increase), and is unlikely to correctly model
factor structure of cross-sectional dependence.
26 Although Thompson (2011) contains an extension of the 2-way robust estimator that is
robust to persistent time effects
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Table 6.32: Summary of the properties of different panel estimators of the standard
errors. From left to right, the estimators included were standard LS panel
model, with robust estimates of s.e.s from White (1982), LS panel estima-
tors with s.e.s adjusted for spatial and time dependence as in Driscoll and
Kraay (1998) and OLS 2-way robust estimators proposed in Thompson
(2011).
Robust to: Panel: Hu-
ber White
(1982)
Panel:
Driscoll
Kraay
(1998)
OLS 2-way
robust:
Thompson
(2011)
Autocorrelation X X X
Heteroscedasticity X X X
Firm effect: time fixed X X X
Firm effect: time varying X x X
Time effect: contemporaneous x X X
Time effect: persistent x x x
Given I have 240 monthly observations, this bias is assumed to be small so it was
not a necessary criteria for the estimator. All fixed effect panel models are robust
to time fixed firm effects. In addition several panel least-squares estimators are
also robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation (HAC) and time varying firm
effects and/or time effects. White (1982) proposed estimates of s.e.s robust to
heteroscedasticity. The version of the White (1982) estimator implemented in
STATA (the ‘Huber White sandwich estimator’) is also robust to autocorrelation
and firm-effects. LS panel estimators with s.e.s adjusted for spatial and time
dependence are outlined in Driscoll and Kraay (1998). Finally, the OLS 2-way
robust estimators proposed in Thompson (2011) are only estimators available
that control for both firm and time effects in addition to HAC.27
27 In addition GMM estimators of the fixed-effects panel data models produce s.e.s that are
robust to heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and firm effects (Wooldridge 2002), these esti-
mators are used in the additional regressions run to test for endogeneity. GMM results are
included in Appendix 6.A. The Fama Macbeth estimator is not included above because, as
noted in Petersen (2009), the standard errors of Fama Macbeth procedure are unbiased in
the presence of a time effect but significantly downward bias in the presence of a firm effect.
Petersen (2009) notes that while many authors have proposed simple adjustments to the
Fama Macbeth procedure to allow for autocorrelation in the betas, the adjusted Fama Mac-
beth standard errors are still biased downward when there is an auto-regressive component in
the residuals. Given firm effects are often present in financial time-series Pavlov, Bauer, and
Schotman (2004); Ang, Liu, and Schwarz (2008) panel estimators that can control for both
firm and time effects are more efficient and less biased than the Fama Macbeth procedure.
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6.E First differenced macro variables and GMM
IV regressions
Instrumental variables regressions control for possibly endogenous regressors by
using ‘instrument’ variables that are correlated with the suspect endogenous re-
gressors, but not correlated with the regression errors. Lagged terms are often
used as instruments if it is reasonable to assume that the lagged covariates are not
correlated with current period errors. In financial processes, a frequent assump-
tion is that returns follow a stochastic process with little persistent correlation
in returns over time (McNeil, Frey, and Embrechts, 2005), therefore the use of
lagged terms as IVs is reasonable.
The GMM estimator was selected because while both the conventional IV estima-
tor and the GMM estimator are consistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity,
only the GMM estimator is efficient28. Therefore, the usual approach when facing
heteroscedasticity of unknown form is to use the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM), introduced by L. Hansen (1982).
I test the robustness of the main results to a) the inclusion of the macro terms
as first differenced variables rather than as levels and b) possible endogeneity of
the firm characteristics size, leverage and profitability (measured by the ratio of
Sales to Total Assets). That is, to check the results are robust to endogeneity, I
estimated the full model three different ways: using a GMM estimate without IV,
and using two separate IV estimations with one-year and then two-year lagged
covariates as IVs. These three regressions are compared to the first-differenced
Panel fixed effects model (FE model) in Table 6.33.
28 GMM makes use of the orthogonality conditions to allow for efficient estimation in the
presence of heteroscedasticity of unknown form(Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman, 2003).
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Table 6.33: First-difference models, estimated with Instrumental Variables via GMM.
*,**,*** indicate significance with * for p < .05, ** for p < .01, and ***
for p < .001. The t-statistics are shown in brackets under the coefficients.
GMM - no IV GMM - 1yr lags IV GMM - 2yr lags IV GMM - 2yr lags and
FD1
b/t b/t b/t b/t
MktRF 0.886*** 0.896*** 0.887*** -0.177***
(44.97) (28.46) (27.29) (-24.44)
DivYield -2.135*** -2.177*** -2.555*** -6.157***
(-10.73) (-10.59) (-12.10) (-3.48)
spread 2.778*** 2.738*** 2.720*** 12.915***
(13.75) (13.17) (12.88) (-29.03
CL deg. 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.008***
(-1.11) (-1.05) (-0.82) (-4.73)
SL deg. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.34) (1.09) (1.07) (-0.11)
CL conc. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-1.20) (-1.22) (-1.24) (1.25)
SL conc. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.24) (-0.17) (0.07) (0.04)
Mkt*CLdeg 0.137*** 0.126*** 0.133*** 1.019***
(7.53) (4.36) (4.48) (33.10)
Mkt*SLdeg -0.013*** -0.013** -0.013** 0.04
(-4.93) (-2.95) (-2.86) (1.65)
Mkt*CLconc 0.102*** 0.105*** 0.108*** -0.173***
(7.05) (4.86) (4.77) (-6.87)
Mkt*SLconc 0.073*** 0.073** 0.070** 0.094**
(4.88) (2.87) (2.69) (3.03)
Size -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(-7.51) (-4.46) (-4.43) (-4.39)
Leverage 0.00 -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000*
(1.72) (-8.77) (-2.25) (-2.10)
Profit 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005* 0.005*
(10.47) (4.76) (2.40) (2.45)
L.MktRF 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
(-0.73) (-0.14) (-0.40) (-1.22)
L.DivYield 1.779*** 1.866*** 2.231*** -0.354***
(8.81) (9.30) (10.80) (-5.22)
L.spread 1.559*** 1.681*** 1.633*** 3.036***
(8.83) (9.39) (8.73) (17.36)
L.CL deg 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-0.59) (-0.54) (-0.22) (0.67)
L.SL deg -0.002* 0.00 0.00 0.00
(-2.40) (-1.57) (-1.48) (-0.97)
L.CL conc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.33) (-0.00) (-0.01) (-0.38)
L.SL conc -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003**
(-3.17) (-2.82) (-2.84) (-2.67)
D.σ2M -35.175*** -35.307*** -32.822*** -32.579***
(-36.32) (-36.60) (-33.23) (-28.83)
L.σ2M -1.823*** -1.893*** -2.461*** -0.07
(-8.04) (-8.04) (-10.00) (-0.39)
D.σ2i 6.087*** 5.985*** 5.814*** 5.834***
(48.45) (49.37) (45.77) (45.95)
L.σ2i 0.092*** 0.096*** 0.107*** 0.112***
R2 (5.69) (5.58) (5.98) (6.24)
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Motivated by financial crises where the downfall of a small number of firms had
an economy-wide impact, this thesis focusses on how shocks spread via linkages
between suppliers and customers (economic linkages) affect stock returns. This
is a significant problem because if shocks spread via economic linkages are a sig-
nificant source of risk, then models ignoring counterparty linkages between firms
may incorrectly price stocks, or underestimate their risk. The main objective of
this thesis, therefore, is to increase knowledge of how economic linkages between
firms influence stock returns.
Literature review and research questions There is a large body of research
on financial contagion that shows how shocks spread between financial markets
and asset classes influence stock prices. However, this research is almost exclu-
sively conducted at the level of an entire market or asset class and mainly focuses
on shock transmission via financial linkages (including credit linkages and investor
behavior). The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 shows that there is limited un-
derstanding of how shocks spread via economic linkages influence firm-level stock
returns. Studies find that significant movements in a firm’s stock returns forecast
subsequent movements in the stock price of its major suppliers. Several ques-
tions remain open, however, regarding how shocks spread via economic linkages
influence stock returns. For instance how do shocks spread via economic linkages
influence return volatility and correlation? What characteristics of economic link-
ages (e.g. the degree or the concentration of linkage) are most important in the
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process of contagion? And does the spread of shocks via economic linkages in-
crease during recessions?
My approach is to examine how a firm’s economic linkages influence three dimen-
sions of its stock returns: volatility, pairwise correlation between linked firms’
returns and the cross-sectional distribution of average returns. Specifically, I
address the following research questions:
1. How does the structure of economic linkages influence the volatility of stock
returns?
2. How do shocks transmitted via economic linkages increase correlation be-
tween linked firms’ returns?
3. How do shocks transmitted via economic linkages affect average returns,
cross-sectionally and/or over time?
For each dimension of stock returns (volatility, pairwise correlation and average
returns) I examine what characteristics of economic linkages are most influential,
and whether the influence of economic linkages increases in recessions.
Theoretical framework To address the research questions I develop a theo-
retical model explaining how the spread of cash-flow shocks via economic linkages
between firms influences the volatility, pairwise correlation and mean of stock re-
turns. The model augments a factor model of returns based on the Arbitrage
Pricing Theory of Ross (1976) with an additional factor to allow for shocks trans-
mitted via economic linkages. I prove that when the distribution a firm’s economic
linkages is heavy-tailed (such that it has an extremely high degree of economic
linkage to a few firms and a far lower degree of economic linkage to all others),
shocks to the firm’s suppliers and/or customers can significantly influence its re-
turn volatility because they are non-diversifiable. Intuitively, shocks to the most
connected suppliers and/or customers are not offset by shocks to less connected
suppliers and/or customers, so they can significantly influence a firm’s cash-flow
and therefore stock returns.
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The theoretical model is used to answer research question 1, as I show that the
aggregate affect of shocks transmitted to a firm via its economic linkages does not
only depend on the number of linkages the firm has, but also on the distribution
of its linkages to other firms. If a firm’s linkages are balanced, shocks to suppliers
and customers are likely to average out and are less likely to influence the firm’s
cash-flow or stock price. However, if a firm’s linkages are highly concentrated, so
that it is highly exposed to a single firm, shocks to its suppliers and customers
are unlikely to average out and may significantly affect its stock price. In con-
trast to Allen and Gale (2000) who argue that financial contagion depends on the
degree of exposure to other firms, I show that contagion via economic linkages
also depends on the distribution a firm’s linkages to its suppliers and customers.
The finding that firm-level shocks spread via economic linkages can have a sig-
nificant influence on aggregate volatility even in large portfolios has important
implications for asset pricing theory. This is because the assumption that diversi-
fication occurs at rate 1√
N
underpins the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) of Ross
(1976). APT states that if asset returns follow a strict factor structure then the
expected return of a financial asset is a linear function of various systematic (or
macroeconomic) factors (Ross, 1976). However, this result only holds if there is
negligible correlation between residual returns after allowing for systematic fac-
tors. In Section 3.3, however, I prove that in heavy-tailed network structures the
portion of the variance of returns explained by transmitted shocks (which are not
systematic factors) is non-zero even in large portfolios. That is, in heavy-tailed
network structures there may be significant correlation between residual returns
even after allowing for systematic risk factors. These results imply that factor
models of stock returns should be extended to include an additional factor to
allow for non-diversifiable risk created by economic linkages (especially, in heavy
tailed network structures).
Research methodology, data and results The testable hypotheses arising
from the theory (i.e. Equation (3.4), and Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 in
Chapter 3) are that the structure of linkages significantly affect return volatility,
return correlation and the average level of returns. In particular, equation (3.4)
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suggests that the concentration of total connectivity (or heavy-tailedness of the
degree distribution) affects return volatility, the linkage ‘distance’ affects return
correlation and the degree of linkages affects mean returns. In addition, equations
(4.6) and (4.7) suggest that the concentration of linkages also affects mean returns.
To empirically test whether shocks transmitted via inter-firm linkages (transmit-
ted volatility) influence stock returns, therefore, I augment a multi-factor model
of returns with a proxy for exposure to transmitted volatility. The methodology
consists of two main components: i) specifying a factor model of average returns
allowing for shocks transmitted via economic linkages, and ii) developing mea-
sures of the exposure to transmitted volatility to be included in the factor model.
The methodology is described in detail in Chapter 4, and the main methods are
summarised below.
To address research questions 2 and 3 (how shocks transmitted via economic
linkages affect correlation between linked firms’ returns and the level of aver-
age returns), I extracted data on the significant supplier-customer links between
listed US firms is extracted from the annual Compustat/CRSP files from 1990
to 2010. This data shows that the structure of supplier-customer links between
US listed firms is highly heterogeneous. A few firms have a large number of
supplier-customer links while most firms have only a few links. In addition I
show that there was an increasing trend in the degree of economic linkage between
firms on the Compustat/CRSP database from 1990 to 2010, implying that listed
firms have become more connected to their suppliers and customers over the past
twenty years. These findings support the assumptions of the theoretical model,
and suggest that shocks spread via the economic linkages between US listed firms
may significantly influence their stock prices in many cases. Therefore, analyzing
the influence of inter-firm connectivity on asset prices is of increasing importance.
To investigate how shocks transmitted via economic linkages influence correla-
tion between linked firms’ returns, I test the hypothesis that an increase in the
degree of linkage between two firms increases the pairwise correlation between
their stock returns. First, I adapt standard correlation-based tests of contagion
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(reviewed in Dungey, Fry, Gonzlez-Hermosillo, and Martin (2005)) to test whether
the correlation between US listed firms’ returns is higher in years in which they
are linked than in years in which they are not linked. Second, I develop measures
of the strength of linkage between firms (using principles from network theory
and economic input-output modeling). I then estimate regressions of the corre-
lation of linked firms’ returns against the strength of their linkage and a number
of controls (such as industry-pair fixed-effects and credit usage along the supply
chain). The results in Chapter 5 show that an increase in the economic linkage
between two firms is associated with increased correlation between their stock
returns. This relationship is stronger when credit is involved in the supplier-
customer relationship and in recessions, implying that it is harder to replace a
supplier or customer in these situations. These results imply that economic link-
ages may be a source of volatility in stock portfolio returns, as small increases in
pairwise return correlation between stocks in a portfolio can significantly increase
the volatility of the portfolio’s return.
In Chapter 6 I test whether shocks spread via economic linkages influence av-
erage stock returns over and above systematic risk factors that have been shown
to explain stock returns. The reduced form of the theoretical model corresponds
to a simple extension of factor models of stock returns based on Arbitrage Pric-
ing Theory, where an additional factor is added to allow for non-diversifiable risk
created by economic linkages. Accordingly, I develop factors that capture the de-
gree and concentration of a firm’s supplier and customer linkages. These factors
(or statistical measures of economic linkage) are based on the theory developed
in Chapter 3. I include these linkage factors in a factor model of stock returns
alongside a number of other factors that have been shown to explain stock returns.
Cross-sectional regressions show that, in a given time-period, firms with more
concentrated supplier bases have higher average returns than firms with less con-
centrated supplier bases. Second, time-series regressions showed that an increase
in the concentration of a firm’s supplier-base lowered realized returns in the fol-
lowing period. These results suggest that investors demand a positive risk pre-
mium (higher expected return) in the cross-section for holding the stock of firms
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whose supplier-base is concentrated. This places downward pressure on prices,
which results in lower returns following an increase in supplier-base concentration.
While concentration of a firm’s supplier and customer linkages has a significant
influence on stock returns, the magnitude of the impact of economic linkages on
stock returns is small compared to the influence of systematic risk factors. The
influence of economic linkages on stock returns, however, increases in recessions.
Limitations of the results The source of the data on economic linkages lim-
its the interpretability of the results in Chapter 6 relating to average returns.
The data on the significant supplier-customer links between listed US firms is ex-
tracted from the FAS 131 account disclosures recorded on the Compustat/CRSP
files. Under FAS 131 firms are required to disclose information on significant cus-
tomers to which sales represent more than 10% of total sales revenue or profits,
however there is no information on a firm’s significant supplier linkages. Supplier
linkages were estimated by inverting the key customer disclosures. Robust results
have been obtained for US listed firms using this data1. Comprehensive firm-level
data on economic linkages is not widely available, however, so cross-testing the
results in other markets will be limited by the availability of data on linkages
between suppliers and customers.
Recommendations and practical implications of the results The theo-
retical results in Chapter 3, showing that independent shocks to a firm’s suppliers
and/or customers may not average out, imply that an additional factor should be
added to factor models of stock returns to allow for non-diversifiable risk created
by economic linkages. That is, economic linkages create common exposures to
firm-level shocks which may create clustering or cross-sectional dependence in the
1 Since FAS 131 require firms to report major customers but not major suppliers inverting
the links generates an incomplete sample of ‘key suppliers’, as it is not necessarily the case
that key customers are, conversely, reliant on the supplier. I test whether the results are
robust to this issue by using the ratio of supplier sales to a given customer to the customer’s
cost of goods sold, to identify a sub-sample of ‘dependent customers’ and checking that the
main results are the same for this sample. As discussed in Chapter 6, the main results of
this thesis are the same regardless of whether the full dataset or a sub-sample of ‘dependent
customers’ are used; so the results are not an artefact of the data generating process.
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residual returns of asset pricing models, even after allowing for common factors2.
Most studies do not allow for this source of correlation. Failing to account for
these effects will lead to incorrect estimates of standard errors and may lead to in-
correct statistical inference about the statistical significance of factors explaining
returns (Thompson, 2011). Therefore the results present a strong case to allow
for linkages in asset pricing studies. If data is not available on linkages, standard
error estimates for the model coefficient should be robust to correlation across
time and across firm effects. Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011) provide a
comparison of robust standard error estimates.
With respect to the practice of risk management within firms and also with
regard to stock portfolio risk management, the findings should spur managers to
analyze their supplier portfolios with respect to direct and indirect customer and
supplier exposures. In-house risk managers at firms should avoid concentrated
(direct and indirect) exposures when making sourcing decisions. Investment risk
managers should avoid concentrated (direct and indirect) exposures when making
portfolio restructuring and buy/sell decisions.
Another implication of these findings is that concentrated risk exposures in real
economic activities have implications for financial stability. Both monopoly and
monopsony market forms are likely to increase volatility in the price of the stock
of (direct and indirect) customer and supplier firms respectively. Therefore fi-
nancial regulators should be aware of which firms act as ‘hub’ firms along supply
chains (e.g. General Motors), because shocks to these firms are more likely to
create financial instability than shocks to unconnected firms. In other words, hub
firms may be ‘too connected to fail’.
Further research Further empirical research is required to establish the in-
fluence of different types of inter-firm linkages (such as credit linkages or unob-
servable behavioral linkages) on stock returns, and how this influence changes
over different economic regimes. The theoretical framework in Chapter 3 and
2 Furthermore if there is a lag in the transmission of shocks through linkages, the errors may
be correlated across firms and across time periods.
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the empirical methodology (outline in Chapter 4 and developed in Chapters 5
and 6) can be applied to test for the significance shock transmission or for the
influence of different types of inter-firm linkages on asset prices in any situation
in which inter-firm linkages are observable or may be inferred (e.g. from expert
knowledge or accounting data). Empirical work to date has been limited as data
on inter-linkages is generally unavailable. However, recently developed methods
for extracting assessments of connections from accounting and market data (e.g.
Diebold and Yilmaz (2011)) could pave the way for future empirical work.
The return model allowing for economic linkages developed in this thesis can
also be extended in several ways to offer further insight into how transmitted
shocks affect financial asset prices. First, the model can be extended to include
other forms of linkage and also to include dynamic feedback effects. For example,
this framework can be extended to model the effect of unobservable linkages on
returns by including a latent factor in the model. Second, if (3.1) is used to
define firm value in a structural default model (originally developed by Merton
(1974)), the framework can be used to examine how inter-linkages affect default
correlation.
Given the trend for increased integration within and between firms’ economic
activities, international financial systems and stock markets, and the huge loss
of wealth that contagion in these markets can cause, extending economic and
financial models to allow for the transmission of shocks between linked firms
is extremely important. This thesis provides a useful theoretical and empirical
framework for modeling the consequences of inter-firm contagion in a range of
contexts.
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